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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a study of the twentieth-century debate between F.R. Leavis and F.W. Bateson.
In it I explore the critical positions held by Leavis and Bateson in relation to the function of
criticism and the role of the critic. The epistemological inquiry central to my analysis asks: is
literary criticism and the study of literature antithetical to the construct of a discipline, which
by definition presupposes objective standards and criteria. My research concludes that the
views contested throughout the Leavis-Bateson debate stem from pre-conceived and implicit
notions regarding what Leavis and Bateson deem literary art ought to be. As such, their
methodological principles and critical ideologies can be seen as practical extensions of
subjective values. In the later sections of the thesis I examine the key issues of the debate in
relation to wider critical discourse in which the principles of literary evaluation are subject to
applied autotelic and meta-critical analysis. I conclude my work with the assertion that due to
the inherency of subjectivism in processes of critical performance, the systematic application
of determinable validity to critical methods or judgments within fields and disciplines of
knowledge, occurs not through deference to verifiable domains of aesthetic or nomothetic
truth, but rather through functions of power, position, and bad faith.
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1. NOTES ON PRIMARY SOURCES
The focus of this thesis is the Leavis-Bateson debate which comprised two sets of exchanges. The first
set, in 1935, and the second, in 1953.
1935
The structure of the first phase (1935) comprised, in total, three correspondences all of which were
originally published in Scrutiny: A Quarterly Review. Original publication information is detailed in
brackets.
(1) Leavis, ‘A Review’, (Vol. IV. No. 1, June, 1935. pp.96-100)
(2) Bateson, ‘A Reply’, (Vol. IV. No. 2, September, 1935. pp.181-185)
(3) Leavis, ‘A Rejoinder, (Vol. IV. No. 2, September, 1935. pp. 185-187)
All three of the above correspondences have been reprinted since in various publications. Some of
which are used by secondary sources throughout the thesis. These subsequent publications include:
Eric Bentley (ed.), 1948. The Importance of Scrutiny: Selections from Scrutiny: A Quarterly Review,
1932-1948, (New York: G.W. Stewart)
F.R. Leavis (ed.), 1968. A Selection from Scrutiny compiled by F.R. Leavis in Two Volumes, Vol.1,
(Cambridge: CUP)
All textual references and quotations from the debate (exchanges of 1935) in this thesis are sourced
from:
F.R. Leavis (ed.), 2008. Scrutiny: A Quarterly Review: IV 1935-1936, (Cambridge: CUP)
1953
The structure of the second phase (1953) comprised, in total, three correspondences all of which were
originally published in Scrutiny: A Quarterly Review.  Original publication information is detailed in
brackets.
(1) Leavis, ‘The Responsible Critic or
The Function of Criticism at Anytime’, (Vol. XIX. No. 3, Spring, 1953. pp.162-184)
(2) Bateson, ‘The Responsible Critic’, (Vol. XIX. No. 4, October, 1953. pp.317-321)
(3) Leavis, ‘A Rejoinder, (Vol. XIX. No. 4, October, 1953. pp.321-328)
All three of the above correspondences have been reprinted since in various publications. Some of
which are used by secondary sources throughout the thesis. The subsequent publications include:
F.R. Leavis (ed.), 1968. A Selection from Scrutiny compiled by F.R. Leavis in Two Volumes, Vol.2,
(Cambridge: CUP)
All textual references and quotations from the debate (exchanges of 1953) in this thesis are sourced
from:
F.R. Leavis (ed.), 2008. Scrutiny: A Quarterly Review: XIX 1952-1953, (Cambridge: CUP)
2. NOTES ON ABBREVIATIONS
Throughout the thesis, and in each chapter, all texts, both primary and secondary are titled and
referenced in full: (Author/(Editor)/Title/(Journal)/Edition/Place of publication/Publisher). However,
in the case of the following primary texts, subsequent mentions and citations are abbreviated as
follows:
Leavis, ‘A Review’, June, 1935: A Review
Bateson, ‘A Reply’, September, 1935: A Reply
Leavis, ‘A Rejoinder, September, 1935: A Rejoinder
Leavis, ‘The Responsible Critic or
The Function of Criticism at Anytime’, Spring, 1953: Anytime
Bateson, ‘The Responsible Critic’, October, 1953: Anytime Reply
Leavis, ‘A Rejoinder, October, 1953: Anytime Rejoinder
Other texts which are abbreviated in all cases asides from first mention in each chapter are:
F.R. Leavis, 1932. New Bearings in English Poetry: A Study of the Contemporary Situation,
(Harmondsworth: Penguin in assoc. with Chatto & Windus): New Bearings
F.W. Bateson, 1934. English Poetry and the English Language: An Experiment in Literary History,
(Oxford: Clarendon): E.P.E.L.
F.W. Bateson, 1953, ‘The Responsible Critic at the Present Time’, Essays in Criticism, Vol. III, No.1,
January, pp. 1-27: Present Time
F.W. Bateson, 1972. Essays in Critical Dissent, (London: Longman) E.I.C.D.
2. NOTES ON FOOTNOTES
I have used footnotes (fn.) throughout the thesis to cite the source of quotations, memoria technical,
and necessary elaboration where information is unsuitable within main body of text. Any subsequent
sourcing of the same text and the same page as that referenced directly above is noted as ibid. If the
text remains the same, but the reference is from a different page, then it is ibid., (followed by the
relevant page number).
Footnotes for each chapter begin at fn.1.
In all circumstances where a secondary source quotes either Leavis or Bateson I will supply the
original location of the citation to which they are referring by stating: writer (X) quotes (and
information in full of original text, unabbreviated). In all cases where Leavis quotes Bateson, or
Bateson quotes Leavis, I will also provide the original location of the citation to which they are
referring, except in chapters 2 and 3. In chapters 2 and 3 all cases where Leavis quotes Bateson, or
Bateson quotes Leavis are directly cited from the corresponding exchanges in the same year unless
indicated otherwise.
In conjunction with University of Birmingham’s style-sheet all citations within the thesis (in the
footnotes and the works cited section) will be presented in the Harvard style. Author/s (or Editor/s),
Year of publication, Essay/Article/Title, (if not independent—journal name), (if not independent—
Journal information), (ed.) (if not the Author/s), Place of publication: Publisher). If in footnotes, p.
(page no./ page no.s if continuous indicated by (-)
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INTRODUCTION
Long before the epistemological inquiries of Kant and Schopenhauer, the Latin maxim de
gustibus non est disputandum laconically expressed the sentiment that there is no point of
disputing matters of taste. The basis of such an admonition, when applied to literature, can be
seen in various anti-positivist claims even today, that the justification of literary studies as a
discipline of knowledge is threatened due to the inherently subjective nature of the critical
act. Though this may be true—for the critical act is, by its etymological definition, an act of
judgement—the limitation of such a claim is that it assumes literary studies to mean criticism,
and criticism therefore, to be synonymous with what is meant, when someone speaks of
literary studies. While the term and function of ‘criticism’ has been ‘scrutinized to the point
of reflecting on its own origin’1 in the hermeneutic philosophy of Schleiermacher, the
aesthetic theory of Husserl, and more recently, in the post-structuralism of Paul de Man, it is
worth noting that criticism is, in effect, only one of several ways in which literature has been
approached as a field of study throughout history. Patricia Waugh presents an understanding
of criticism by stating that it is ‘one associated with ‘judgement’ and ‘taste’ rather than
knowledge and scholarship.’2 Waugh distinguishes criticism from ‘scholarship’ on the basis
that the latter harbours a more stable association with fact, knowledge, and truth, and
therefore, assumes a paradigm of normative function more conducive to authority. If
authority—a basis from which to assert measures of validity within practice—can be said, in
turn, to legitimise the study of literature as an academic or professional discipline, then it
would appear, given the empirical impasse of criticism, that scholarship holds a stronger and
more nomothetically beneficial claim as the approach and method of preference.
1 Paul de Man, 1983. Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, 2nd ed.
(London: Routledge) p.8.
2 Patricia Waugh (ed.), 2006. Literary Theory and Criticism: An Oxford Guide, (Oxford: OUP) p.29.
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Certainly, this was the belief of the Oxford scholar F.W. Bateson when in 1934 he
published a thesis entitled English Poetry and the English Language. Bateson’s thesis,
however, was to come under severe attack in the Cambridge quarterly Scrutiny, in a review
written by the journal’s founder and editor, the academic and literary critic, F.R. Leavis.
What followed was a series of exchanges, in two phases, in which the study of literature
itself, its principles, as well as the role and responsibility of the critic, became subject to a
conflict of competing literary-ideological values. Indeed, within the debate Leavis and
Bateson respectively argued that certain methods and approaches to analysing literary work
were not only preferable over others, but necessary to standards, if criticism was to remain a
serious and justifiable discipline of intellectual pursuit. The debate’s contention deepened,
however, not only with regards to how particular standards could be realised in practice, but
more fundamentally, with regards to what those standards and critical objectives in
themselves should be.
Whilst in an autotelic sense, the dispute between Leavis and Bateson centred on how
literary works and their writers should be evaluated, the conflict and antithesis of their
discourse reflected a wider, academic, cultural, and traditional rivalry between their
institutions, the University of Cambridge, and the University of Oxford. While neither Leavis
nor Bateson had harmonious relations with their respective universities, Leavis, who founded
the Scrutiny journal at Cambridge in 1932, had significant associations with the emerging
formalist methods of practical criticism, that under the guidance of I.A. Richards, and later,
E.M.W. Tillyard, had become the prominent mode of literary evaluation within the school’s
English Faculty. The Oxford and Harvard educated Bateson, who later founded Essays in
Criticism specifically to exhibit the balance and scholarship absent, as he deemed, it in
Leavis’s Scrutiny, thus represented not only scholarship in its ‘antithesis’ to criticism, but the
literary approach of the rival faculty, in the rival university. These factors of representative
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and polarising association and ideology would characterise the debate as a significant battle
on several grounds relating to the practice and cultural context of British literary studies in
the mid-twentieth century.3
The central purpose of this thesis is to examine what can be learnt from the debate in
terms of how the study of literature exists as an academic discipline, and more broadly, as a
field of knowledge. In analysing the conflict between Leavis and Bateson, my aim is to
identify the crux of their contention, and to assess the degree to which their differences can
be seen to stem from a discrepancy of pre-conceived and implicit beliefs regarding literary art
and the ways it is studied. In this sense, the emphasis of investigation centres on the nature of
literary ‘values’ in both criticism and scholarship, and the significance and implication of
those values in relation to principles and assumptions surrounding disciplinary standards,
methodology, criteria, and ultimately, the judgement of literary art. Exploring the conflicting
ideology presented within the debate, my analysis will also examine the degree to which the
contentions between Leavis and Bateson can be evidenced as symptomatic of wider disputes
within literary-critical discourse. Indeed while the Leavis-Bateson debate is important in
terms of what it uniquely reflects, that being, the values, associations, and idiosyncrasies
particular to its two participants, there is also significance to be observed in the similarities
the debate shares with various other critical debates in the twentieth century. This assertion I
base on the view that if the same critical issues dividing Leavis and Bateson can be perceived
within other debates, then the recurrence of underlying dichotomies (such as between value
and truth, subjectivity and objectivity, and opinion and knowledge) may in fact be inherent to
the nature of criticism and the study of literature.
3 For an insightful account of British literary studies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
(particularly in relation to Cambridge and Oxford) see Terry Eagleton’s chapter ‘The Rise of English’ in Terry
Eagleton, 1983. Literary Theory: An Introduction, (Oxford: Blackwell).
INTRODUCTION Introduction
4
When surveying what has already been said about the debate, there are several
commentaries that provide a useful overview, in which the main issues of contention emerge
as evident in both a critical and cultural context. In his essay ‘The Literary Theories of F.W.
Bateson’ (1979) René Wellek states that the debate gave Bateson an opportunity to assert a
distinction ‘between two types of propositions, one literary historical which says that ‘A
derives from B’ and one critical which can be reduced to ‘A is better than B’ or even just ‘A
is good’.4 According to Wellek, Bateson’s argument was that the literary critic, in viewing a
literary work as an autonomous ‘artifact’5 evaluates it as if it was merely ‘a structure existing
in space’.6 The effect of this was that the purely critical approach disconnected literature from
its historical and social context, and thus, from a true understanding of its meaning,
significance and value. By distinction, Bateson argued, the scholar sought to explore literary
history in a social and cultural context in order to identify literary trends, themes, styles,
linguistic patterns, and so forth, so as to be able to situate, understand, and accordingly value
literary work in the wider context of the English literary tradition. In a later untitled essay
Wellek states that the contention arises within the debate due to Leavis’s ‘rejection’7 of
Bateson’s ‘social explanation’8 for understanding literature. In ‘Scholar, Critic, and Scholar-
Critic’ (1979) Valentine Cunningham offers the view that Bateson’s principal agenda was to
demonstrate how a sense of ‘contextual fact was vital to a reading of literary texts’9 and ‘how
critical ‘judgment’ depended on ‘knowledge’.’10 The issue, as Cunningham sees it, was that
4 René Wellek, 1979.  ‘The Literary Theories of F.W. Bateson’. Essays in Criticism, XXIX, 2, 112-123. p.116.
5 ibid., p. 120. R. Wellek is quoting F.W. Bateson, 2008. ‘A Reply’, Scrutiny: A Quarterly Review: IV 1935-
1936, (Cambridge: CUP). p.181.
6 Wellek, ‘The Literary Theories of F.W. Bateson’, p.120.
7 René Wellek, 1981. [untitled]. Modern Language Review, 76, 1, 175-180. p.177. Although untitled, Wellek’s
contribution was listed as a three-part review of: F.R. Leavis: Judgment and the Discipline of Thought by
Robert Byars, 1978; The Literary Criticism of F.R. Leavis, by R.P. Bilan. 1979; and The Moment of ‘Scrutiny’
by Francis Mulhern, 1979.
8 ibid.
9 Valentine Cunningham, 1979. ‘F.W. Bateson: Scholar, Critic, and Scholar-Critic.’ Essays in Criticism, XXIX,
2, 139-155. p.141
10 ibid.
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Leavis did not agree that scholarship could provide the “sense of fact”11 that Bateson
supposed it could. The consequence of this being that void of the ‘objectivity’ Bateson
assumed it to engender, scholarship was, in essence, a performance of value-based critical
assumptions about history and social context. Bateson’s failing in this sense, Leavis argued,
was not only that his ‘factual’ literary history was equally as subjective as criticism, but that
it re-directed its critical focus away from what was important—the text—the literary art itself.
Four years prior to Cunningham’s essay, Quentin Skinner wrote an article entitled
‘Hermeneutics and the Role of History’ (1975). Within it, Skinner states that the ‘classic’12
debate between Bateson and Leavis centrally involved a disagreement ‘over what Bateson
called “the discipline of contextual reading.”’.13 In a similar sense to Cunningham, Skinner
notes that Leavis’s rejection of Bateson’s argument centred on the view that ‘to reconstruct a
postulated “social context’”14 ‘was gratuitous’15 and that in most cases ‘the text, duly
pondered, will yield its meaning and value to an adequate intelligence and sensibility.’16 An
important stress rests on the word ‘postulated’. Indeed, for the idea that Leavis’s rejection of
11 ibid.
12 Quentin Skinner, 1975. 'Hermeneutics and the Role of History.' New Literary History, 7, 1, 209-232. p.215.
13 ibid., Q. Skinner quoting F.W. Bateson, 1953, ‘The Function of Criticism at the Present Time’, Essays in
Criticism, III, 1, 1-27. p.19 It is important to note that by ‘contextual’ reading and criticism, Skinner refers to the
type whereby information from beyond the page (the ‘context’ ) is consulted or considered as part of the
evaluative process. Though it is difficult to measure precisely degrees to which such extrinsic factors influence
or factor into a particular reading, what can be said for certain, is that such a method is clearly distinct from
particular critical approaches whereby it is specifically maintained that such extrinsic factors are not to be
consulted. I raise this here in order to clarify, in these general terms, what I, Skinner, and my other sources,
mean by ‘contextual criticism’. The reason being that there has been some confusion with regards to use of this
term. In J.A. Cuddon’s Literary Terms and Literary Theory ‘contextual criticism’ is defined as precisely the
opposite, that being, the critical method that does not consider, factor, or explore information from beyond the
text. The definition reads as follows: ‘Contextual Criticism: A mode of critical analysis of a literary text
characteristic of the New Criticism (q.v.), especially as practised by Murray Krieger and Eliseo Vivas. Krieger
discusses the method in The New Apologists for Poetry (1956) and Theory of Criticism (1976). He describes
contextualism as the claim “that a poem is a tight, compelling, finally closed context” and suggests that it is
necessary to analyse and judge such a work as an ‘aesthetic object’ without reference to anything outside or
beyond it. There is an obvious connection here with Jacques Derrida’s dictum that ‘there is nothing outside the
text’. The emphasis on close reading in contextual theory has had considerable influence of critical methods.’
J.A. Cuddon (ed.), 1999. Literary Terms and Literary Theory, 4th edn. (London: Penguin) p.177.  Whilst from a
certain semantic perspective Cuddon’s definition may be equally as valid, it is a particularly rare inversion of
the more commonly associated opposite definition whereby contextual criticism means the criticism that
considers a text’s surrounding and extrinsic context.
14 ibid., Q. Skinner quoting F.R. Leavis, 1968, ‘The Responsible Critic or the Function of Criticism at any
Time’, rpt. in A Selection from Scrutiny, (ed.) F.R. Leavis. (Cambridge: CUP) p.11.
15 ibid., Q. Skinner quoting F.R. Leavis, ibid., p.281.
16 ibid., Q. Skinner quoting F. R.Leavis, ibid., p.292.
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Bateson’s programme meant that Leavis felt context itself to be gratuitous or of no value, is
one that Michael Bell, along with several other Leavisian scholars, consider misleading. Bell
writes that the debate showed ‘not that Leavis objected to seeing literature in context, but that
he saw great literature as the overwhelming, almost self-sufficient, evidence of the context’,17
adding that, ‘so far as context matters’, Leavis felt that it existed ‘in the work, and the
language, itself.’18 Viewing the debate, like Skinner, as a ‘classic’ discourse in ‘intellectual
history’,19 Donald R. Kelley provides that, in essence, it constituted as clash between ‘the
“Responsible Critic” from Cambridge’20 and the literary historian from Oxford, with the
latter ‘posing as the champion of scholarship’.21 Kelley highlights that, for Leavis, ‘the idea
of placing a poem back into “total context” was nonsense and “social context” was an illusion
arising involuntarily “out of one’s personal living” situated in the twentieth century’.22 For
Kelley, Leavis’s argument entailed that ‘in any case “social” was an invidious term which
should not contaminate the high art of Literature, and such pretensions to scholarship
suggested an inability to read poetry and to make the sort of intuitive aesthetic judgments that
were the office of the critic.’23
Gary Day in Re-reading Leavis (1996) offers several pages of analysis on the debate,
as does R.P. Bilan in The Literary Criticism of F.R. Leavis (1979). Day proposes that the
debate can be understood as a disagreement over whether poetry ‘can be understood
independently of the social-context in which it was produced’.24 Bilan provides a similar
assessment in stating that the debate offered a platform for Leavis to emphasise that he did
17 Michael Bell, 1997, ‘The Afterlife of F.R. Leavis: Dead but won’t Lie Down’, The Cambridge Quarterly,
XXVI, 2, 196-199.p. 199.
18 ibid.
19 Donald R. Kelley, 1995. ‘Intellectual History in a Global Age’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 66, 2, 155-
167. p.155.
20 ibid., p.161.
21 ibid.
22 ibid.
23 ibid. p. 162. D.R. Kelley quoting F.R. Leavis, 1967. Anna Karenina and other essays, (London: Chatto &
Windus) p. 195
24 Gary Day, 1996. Re-reading Leavis: Culture and Literary Criticism, (London: MacMillan) p.143.
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not think consideration of a work’s social context was in anyway distinct or separable from
the necessary task of the literary critic, and so from literary criticism. Tae Chul Kim, in an
essay entitled: ‘F.R. Leavis, or the Function of Criticism under Specialist Modernity’ (2004),
highlights Leavis’s belief that ‘the further and wider one goes to reconstruct the original
historical setting “from his reading in the period, the more it is his construction (insofar as he
produces anything more than a mass of heterogeneous information alleged to be relevant).”’25
For Kim, Leavis’s argument reflected the ‘present-centredness’26 of his criticism:
The reason for Leavis's challenge to Bateson's project is that it may possibly mislead
the living reader to pursue the dead contextual meaning and to ignore the living
significance which a given literary text assumes at the present time. It is not in its
historical context that Leavis, unlike Bateson, is intended to embody the Arnoldian
spirit ‘to see the object as in itself it really is’, but instead here and now at the
‘present’ moment. Leavis is convinced that ‘only out of the living present is there any
access to the past,’ because ‘the historical imagination makes the past
contemporary’.27
The antithesis between Leavis and Bateson becomes further apparent when Kim’s account of
Leavis’s position is examined in line with the reflection on Bateson’s stance offered by
Graham Martin:
All poems, Bateson insisted, were intended as rational communications between their
writers and their original readership. The job of ‘the responsible critic’ was to provide
the modern reader with the historical information about the intellectual, cultural, and
socio-political assumptions which made up the world of a poem’s writer and first
readers, lacking which no full interpretation of it meaning was possible. Bateson went
so far as to insist that for each poem a ‘right reading’ could be discovered, though
only with help of such exceptionally detailed historical knowledge. The critics he was
faulting had read the poems as if they were of our time, a procedure which – whether
from ignorance of indifference – amounted to a denial of their existence as historical
documents. Hence their failure in critical ‘responsibility’.28
25 Tae Chul Kim, 2004. ‘F.R. Leavis, or the Function of Criticism under Specialist Modernity’, Journal of
British and American Studies. 10, 1, 81-112. p.103. Kim incorrectly cites the Leavis quote as from Valuation in
Criticism; the quote is accurate, however, it is from F.R. Leavis, 1968, ‘The Responsible Critic or the Function
of Criticism at any Time’, rpt. in A Selection from Scrutiny, 2, (ed.) F.R. Leavis. (Cambridge: CUP) p. 293.
26 Kim, p.107.
27 Ibid., p.105. T.C. Kim is quoting F. R. Leavis, 1986. Valuation in Criticism and Other Essays (ed.) G. Singh.
(Cambridge: CUP) p.121.
28 Graham Martin, 1996. ‘F.R. Leavis and the Function of Criticism’, Essays in Criticism, XLVI, 1, 1-15. p.12.
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The contention therefore, in Martin’s view, developed as the wave of Bateson’s historicist
ideology crashed against what, in Leavis’s criticism, was a focus upon contemporary life and
values. For Martin, Leavis’s central position entailed that ‘past literature should be
selectively evaluated for its critical bearing upon twentieth-century civilisation’.29 Bateson’s
on the other hand was, as highlighted above, that of the contrary notion, that past literature
‘could be seriously read only for what it told us about the past’.30
Richard Storer’s study Leavis (2009) provides a lucid overview of the debate and the
central differences between Leavis’s and Bateson’s approaches to literary evaluation.  For
Storer, these differences become apparent within the debate in the assessments made by
Leavis and Bateson of the poetry of Andrew Marvell and Alexander Pope. Bateson viewed
Leavis’s reading of the poems as encumbered, and even irresponsible, in the sense that they
were not sufficiently knowledgeable about information surrounding the poems’ external
social and linguistic contexts. Storer highlights that Leavis was ‘scornful’31 of this, and that
he believed in the obverse; that being, ‘that we can only know context through text’—
because the text is something ‘determinate – something indubitably there’.32 Storer, though
he discusses the conflict relatively briefly, nevertheless pin-points the debate’s autotelic
significance in asserting that the nature of its dispute constituted an epistemological challenge
to traditional assumptions regarding literary analysis and criticism as a discipline of study.
Another analysis of the debate from the perspective of its theoretical implications on the type
of knowledge that can be said to exist in a literary discipline is Josephine Guy and Ian
Small’s Politics and Value (1993).  According to Guy and Small the central issue of the
debate can be seen in the fact that Bateson believed literary judgments could be made more
‘rigorous, by a greater attention to scholarship, by which he meant ‘factual’ knowledge about
29 ibid., p.13.
30 ibid., p.14.
31 Richard Storer, 2009. F.R. Leavis, (London: Routledge) p.93.
32 ibid., R.Storer is quoting F.R. Leavis, 1953, ‘Correspondence: The Responsible Critic’, Scrutiny, 19, 4, 321-
328.p.325.
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the ‘social-context’ of literary works’.33 Guy and Small present the view that Bateson ‘was
not trying to eliminate value-judgments from the discipline; rather he was simply trying to
make them more ‘objective’, and by implication, more authoritative. He wanted, that is, to
provide a criterion by which literary-judgments could be deemed right or wrong’.34
It is somewhere then, between Storer’s perception of the debate’s epistemological
implications, and Guy and Small’s focus on whether critical judgements can be validated as
‘right or wrong’, that the inquiry of this work will aim to offer a modest contribution. To this
effect I note that there are limitations in the size of the work I am permitted to present. One of
the consequences of this may be evident in the slightly lesser emphasis I give to the broader
issue of British academic ‘class-consciousness’ that may be said to have affected or
influenced aspects of animosity between Leavis and Bateson. While it will be seen from the
beginning that I make no attempt to separate Leavis and Bateson, as men, from their
ideology, or literary theory from relevant socio-cultural contexts, it is from within the debate
itself that I aim to identify such contexts, and (without, I hope, begging the question) present
them, accordingly, as they contribute to an understanding of it. It is however, the
epistemological status of literary studies that principally concerns this thesis, and as such, my
inquiry, in all its contexts, aims to mobilise the debate in order to assess whether the
competing beliefs held by Leavis and Bateson regarding literary analysis stem, not from
deference to determinable ‘truth’, but rather from a subjective domain of ideological and
aesthetic literary values.
In terms of the thesis’s structure, I have divided it into five chapters. I examine the
debate in a chronological manner in order to reflect the evolution and development that can
be seen to emerge within the topics and focuses of the dispute. The first chapter I have
entitled: ‘The Emergence of the Leavis-Bateson Debate: Pre-1935. In this chapter I note that
33 Josephine Guy, and Ian Small, 1993. Politics and Value in English Studies: A Discipline in Crisis?,
(Cambridge: CUP) p.73.
34 ibid.
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the theoretical consideration of the critical act that occurred between Leavis and Bateson can
be attributed to an impending sense of ‘impasse’35 and loss of ‘bearings’36 they respectively
felt in the ‘contemporary situation’37 of literary studies in the 1920s and early 1930s. I trace
their early positions as they can be seen to relate to other methods and approaches within the
period. I also present a consideration of the debate’s emergence in light of the personal and
ideological relationships Leavis and Bateson held with their respective universities, and I
assess the major work they published in the years just prior to the clash, particularly Leavis’s
New Bearings in English Poetry (1932) and Bateson’s English Poetry and the English
Language (1934). I also look at Leavis’s principal hand in the founding and editorial doctrine
of Scrutiny as well as the journal’s critical significance, not only as the quarterly that hosted
the debate, but as the quarterly conceived upon the very critical principles that were to be
contested by Leavis and Bateson within their first exchanges of 1935. In presenting these
issues of context in chapter 1 my aim is to establish an understanding of the background and
the literary-ideological values held by Leavis and Bateson in the run-up to the debate, and
furthermore to assess the argument that their critical and ideological attitudes at this time,
made it inevitable, that if such a discourse of exchange was to occur, that it would be severe
and ideologically hostile.
The exchanges then that did occur in 1935 constitute the focus of my second chapter.
The debate began, as mentioned, when Leavis published a review of Bateson’s thesis
E.P.E.L. in Scrutiny’s June issue. The review, Bateson would later state, ‘was the most
unfavourable the book received.’38 Bateson, both ‘disappointed’39 and ‘angry’40 that Leavis
35 F.W. Bateson, 1934. English Poetry and the English Language: An Experiment in Literary History, (Oxford:
Clarendon) p.vi. Bateson’s italics.
36 F.R. Leavis, 1932. New Bearings in English Poetry: A Study of the Contemporary Situation,
(Harmondsworth: Penguin in assoc. with Chatto & Windus) term of title.
37 ibid., term of subtitle.
38 F.W. Bateson, 1978. ‘F.R.L. and E in C: A Retrospect’, Essays in Criticism, XXVIII, 4, 353-361.p.355.
39 ibid.
40 F.W. Bateson, 1964. ‘Alternative to Scrutiny, Essays in Criticism, XIV, 1, 10-20. p.13.
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failed to respond positively to his ‘honest attempt . . . to apply the methods of scholarship to
the avant-garde literary values of English poetry’,41 in turn wrote a carefully written response
re-stating the position of his thesis in the hope that Leavis, with a better understanding of it,
would identify the validity of its argument. Leavis’s rejoinder, however, whilst ‘less
astringent’42 than his initial review, nevertheless, did not budge ‘one inch’43 in terms of its
objection. I examine the dialectic form of the exchanges as a contiguous series of proposition
and refutation which provided the peer-public readership44 of Scrutiny a comparative
understanding of how Leavis and Bateson perceived ‘the rôles of literary criticism and
literary history.’45 I finally examine Leavis’s argument in its relation to wider claims in
literary theory that value judgement must centre on the internal analysis of structure and
language.
The 1953 exchanges are the focus of the chapter 3. To view the debate as one debate
of two parts, as opposed to two separate debates, is to acknowledge the sense of continuity in
which the exchanges of 1953 can be seen to constitute a development of the issues central to
the exchanges eighteen years earlier. In this chapter I provide analysis of the text that was to
provoke Leavis on this occasion, Bateson’s long essay: ‘The Function of Criticism at the
Present Time’.  Leavis’s attack on Bateson in this year was arguably even less surprising that
that the attack in 1935. This is because in Bateson’s new essay Leavis was explicitly named
amongst a group of critics subject to a series of severe critical charges. These charges, most
of which stemmed, as Bateson saw it, from a failure to attend to extrinsic context in
evaluation, resulted in claims of evasion of ‘social-duty’,46 ‘abuse of social-function’,47 and a
41 ibid.
42 ibid., p.14.
43 ibid.
44 Despite the relatively low print Scrutiny was widely read amongst an influential readership in the schools and
in the universities. ‘With subscriptions coming in from T.S. Eliot, George Santayana, R.H. Tawney and Aldous
Huxley.’ MacKillop. 1995. F.R. Leavis: A Life in Criticism. p.45
45 ibid.
46 F.W. Bateson, 1953, ‘The Function of Criticism at the Present Time’, Essays in Criticism, III, 1, 1-27.p.3
47 ibid.
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‘critical irresponsibility’48 that was both ‘reckless’49 and ‘insidious’.50 Though these
accusations may well have been enough to incense Leavis, I also look at how the wider
motive of Bateson’s essay would have constituted an even further provocation in that it
represented a declaration of the critical values to be central to the rival journal Essays in
Criticism.  In the ensuing battle of 1953, Leavis and Bateson would confront each other
regarding excerpts from Marvell and Pope, in which a demonstration of their conflicting
evaluative styles can be seen in action. I seek to identify parallels between these styles and
various principles of approach established throughout the twentieth century in the positivist
schools of Russian Formalism, the Cambridge elevation of Practical Criticism, and in the
emergence of the Anglo-American New Criticism.
Leavis and Bateson of course also published works that, although not directly
intended as continuations of the debate’s dialogue, nevertheless can be seen to develop and
define their positions with regards to the issues of contest within it. Indeed, the boundaries
between their exchanges and their respective wider work cannot be separated in that the
debate became a regular point of reference, most notably in Bateson’s subsequent writing,
after the exchanges and up until 1978.51 In this period Bateson himself would state that as he
‘read and re-read’52 the exchanges it had become clear that not only was Leavis ‘right’,53 but
that the ‘force’54 of his argument had since played a ‘crucial’55 role in his own ‘literary
education’.56 Throughout chapter 4 I examine the nature of this concession, and furthermore,
the degree to which Leavis’s victory can be seen to depend, in part, on a semantically
nuanced expression of ontological values. With this is mind, I then explore the series of shifts
48 ibid., p.4.
49 ibid.
50 ibid.
51 Both Leavis and Bateson died in 1978, Leavis in April, and Bateson in October. Bateson, however, had
written about the debate in his last published essay, ‘F.R.L. And E in C: A Retrospect’. See fn38.
52 F.W. Bateson, 1964. ‘Alternative to Scrutiny. p.12.
53 ibid.
54 ibid., p.13.
55 ibid.
56 ibid.
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in Bateson’s position, and particularly the degree to which Leavis’s ‘force’ within the debate
can be said to have influenced an almost entire U-turn in Bateson’s critical pursuit of
objectivity by the end of his career.
My aim in chapter 5 is to demonstrate that both criticism and scholarship, as they are
presented by Leavis and Bateson, engender three subsidiary issues of methodological and
aesthetic debate: that of the use of extrinsic and contextual information in critical assessment,
the availability and value of authorial intention, and the evaluative distinction between a
present-centric analysis of literature versus an assessment with emphasis on the original,
social, and historical contexts of a work’s composition. I examine the similarity the debate
shares with several critical discourses in which these issues constitute a point of theoretical
impasse. In doing so, I will attempt to situate the debate in relation to the wider evolution of
theoretical and critical philosophy in Europe and the United States. In exploring the
methodological and ideological conflicts in all these debates as stemming from subjective
literary values, I then examine the extent to which it may be said that a definite or a
posteriori truth of literary approach akin the type of universal certitude present in scientific
methods, appears inherently void from the type of knowledge that can be associated with
responses or judgements upon the merit or value of literary art.57
57 By this I refer to the question of whether the nature of, say, a mathematic equation, for example that 2 + 2 = 4,
holds a different order of determinable ‘truth’ than literary-critical assumptions whereby, say, if  Matthew
Arnold’s critical ideology was to find formula, might read: ‘assessing what a writer is trying to do’ + ‘assessing
how well he succeeds in doing it’ + ‘assessing whether the work exhibits ‘high seriousness’’ = the criterion for
good criticism. See William S. Burroughs, 1985. The Adding Machine, (London: Calder) p.192. While it would
seem unlikely (or perhaps not possible) that someone would challenge the law of a mathematical equation, the
‘law’ however of assessing whether a work exhibits ‘high seriousness’ may be challenged by a critic who might
believe that in order for a literary work to be, say, good, it should not exhibit high seriousness. Irrespective of
the degree to which such a criterion may appear unusual or hypothetical, if it were held by a critic, on what basis
could its justification as a critical criterion be dismissed? As such it may be argued, that the mathematic
equation that 2+2=4 possesses a type of epistemological certitude that does not exist in equal measure in a
critical judgement that, for example, Shakespeare’s work is ‘better’ than a tabloid glamour model’s
autobiography.  If it is not possible to confirm in nomothetic or ‘definite’ terms that Arnold’s criterion of ‘high
seriousness’ constitutes an irrefutable universal aesthetic truth, then it would be no less valid for a critic to hold
belief that a good work of literature should demonstrate, for example, ‘a close consideration of underwear,
limousines, or plastic surgery’, in which case a glamour model’s autobiography may, with no less justification,
be regarded as ‘better’ than the plays of Shakespeare. As my later sections (and particularly my conclusion) will
demonstrate, once one begins to question the nature and justification of established, traditional, and isomorphic,
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This investigation leads my thesis into its conclusion: a formulation of a theoretical
model which I have titled ‘Condition, Implication, Propensity, and Bad Faith.’ The model
examines the conflict between Leavis and Bateson in relation to epistemological problematics
surrounding the application of literary studies to disciplinary fields of practice. The model
itself comprises four parts, each representing a stage of a cycle that illustrates how responses
to literature evolve in a phenomenological sense, and the ways in which such responses can
be understood to exist in the epistemological domains of validity, fact, truth, and knowledge.
The value of proposing the model is that I wish to present my analysis of the debate as
significant in a universal sense, that is to say, as applicable to the general understanding of
literary-critical discourse in which conflict can be evidenced as ultimately symptomatic of the
same issues inherent in the debate between Leavis and Bateson.
critical assumptions, the study of literature can become a very unstable territory especially when considered in
relation to measures of truth, certainty, and knowledge. While the example of admonition provided in this
footnote is useful in indicating to the reader what will become central to this particular study, such examples—
which appear to turn critical assumption on its head—are endless in their potential to destabilise aesthetic and
critical values. Finally, I should note, if this exposing of assumption seems ‘destructive’ in that its theoretical
implications destabilise pre-conceived and implicit ideas about literary criticism, then Leavis and Bateson
engage in dispute on the basis of a ‘constructive’ hope, as mentioned, of determining how criticism and
approaches to literary study can become (in an epistemological sense) justifiable and legitimate as a
methodological and intellectual function. The differences in tendency or motive, however, between construction
and destruction (similar to the dichotomous connotations of positivism and anti-positivism) does not in itself, as
I shall conclude, lead to a difference in outcome with regards to the nature of criticism and its relationship to
domains of certifiable knowledge.
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CHAPTER ONE:
THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEAVIS-BATESON DEBATE: PRE-1935
In order to provide an understanding of the Leavis-Bateson debate, I begin, in this first
chapter, by presenting answers to the questions: why did the debate occur? And what factors
and events led to it? The immediate point to be made on this note is that it arose from a
climate of wider debate and contestation that had emerged in British literary academics in the
1920s. At Oxford in 1922, J.A. Middleton Murry’s thesis The Problem of Style assumed an
investigative mode of critical doubt, by asking: what is criticism? Can it be objective? What
is the nature of critical judgement? And, is it in ‘vain’1 that criticism seeks, ‘like the symbols
of mathematics’,2 a certitude and self-reason for being? Both Leavis and Bateson were
familiar with Murry’s work and the fundamental questions that it raised.3 They were also
cognizant of what P.W. Musgrave termed as the ‘substantial changes in method’4 at
Cambridge, which, in work of T.S. Eliot and I.A. Richards had seen new critical approaches
1 J. Middleton Murry, 1922. The Problem of Style, (Oxford: OUP) p.1.
2 ibid.
3 See P.W. Musgrave, 1973. ‘Scrutiny and Education’, British Journal of Educational Studies, 21, 3, 253-276.
p.253. Also, for an account of familiarity, it can be seen that Bateson quotes Murry’s The Problem of Style
throughout English Poetry and the English  Language. p.12, 117.  With regards to Leavis’s relation to Murry,
Chris Joyce writes ‘Leavis admired [Murry’s] Aspects of Literature (1920) and The Problem of Style (1922),
where Murry compared Shakespeare and Milton to the latter's disadvantage. In Leavis's dealings with poetry -
and with literature and culture more generally - the Shakespearean use of language was always a touchstone.’
Chris Joyce. 2008. Centre for Leavis Studies. [Online] http://mypages.surrey.ac.uk/eds1cj/f-r-leavis-life-and-
work.htm. [Accessed 04 March10]. Despite Joyce’s statement in which suggests a degree of ideological affinity
between Leavis and Murry, there have also been claims to the contrary. Lu Jiande notes that in his debut essay
in Scrutiny ‘The Literary Mind’, Leavis exemplifies his ‘ongoing concern with ‘intelligence’. Jiande adds that
because of Leavis’s ‘awareness of the inseparability of ‘intelligence’ and ‘sensibility’, and also a looseness in
writing, Leavis at times used the two terms interchangeably and even indiscriminately. In the second half of the
essay, for instance, in wielding and brandishing his sabres of ‘intelligence’ and ‘sensibility’ against those whom
he couldn’t agree with, Leavis reduced them to cheap verbal counters and dodges. John Middleton Murry was
one of the victims, being ‘almost incredibly defective in sensibility’, and ‘the defect of sensibility shows as a
defect of intelligence’.’  Lu Jiande, 2003. ‘F.R. Leavis’ Journal of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 53,
May, 22-34. p.25. L. Jiande quotes F.R. Leavis, 1932. ‘The Literary Mind’, Scrutiny, I, I, 20-32. p.27.
4 John Fekete, 1977. The Critical Twilight: Explorations in the ideology of Anglo-American literary theory from
Eliot to McLuhan, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul) p.3, 217.
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emerging from what John Fekete terms as the critical consequence of ‘nineteenth-century
problematics’5 between certain dualities such as ‘culture’ and ‘civilisation’.’6
Exploring this back-drop of concern and change throughout the chapter, I begin by
stating that in the five year period prior to their first exchanges in 1935, both Leavis and
Bateson had independently established proposals they felt could help correct some of the
problems of methodological dispute in the study of literature, and more specifically, in their
respective activities of criticism and scholarship. While it may be said, that to this extent,
they shared an aim: to point out a direction for improving consistency and standards, the
differences between them, however, emerged from the differences in what they respectively
deemed the contemporary failings to be, and thus, by extension, the solutions they proposed
as a means forwards.
The failing of contemporary criticism, as understood by Leavis, would form the focus
of his first book: New Bearings in English Poetry (1932). In the work, Leavis, then a thirty-
six year old tutor at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, addressed what he termed in the subtitle
as the ‘Contemporary Situation’,7 one which he felt had emerged from a critical neglect of
poetry in its relation to the modern world. Leavis’s principal admonition was that ‘if the
poetry and the intelligence of the age lose touch with each other, poetry will cease to matter
much, and the age will be lacking in finer awareness’.8 By this, Leavis was speaking of
something which he felt had already occurred, and his assessment that ‘very little of
5 ibid., p.3.
6 Paul Dean, 1996. ‘The Last Critic? The Importance of F.R. Leavis’, The New Criterion, 14, 1, 28-35. p.31.
Dean also states that ‘the debate concerning the relation of high to low culture, and the larger debate concerning
the relation of culture to society was particularly vigorous in the early 1930s. While its roots can be traced back
to the late eighteenth-century, as they are in Raymond Williams’s classic study, Culture and Society, the early
1930s saw the publication of several significant texts: F. R. Leavis’s Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture
(1930), and, co-authored with Denys Thompson, his Culture and Environment (1933); Q. D. Leavis’s Fiction
and the Reading Public (1932); and the first issue of Scrutiny, which appeared in 1932.’ p.35.
7 F.R. Leavis, 1932. New Bearings in English Poetry: A Study of the Contemporary Situation, (Harmondsworth:
Penguin in assoc. with Chatto & Windus) term of subtitle.
8 ibid., p.17.
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contemporary intelligence concerns itself with poetry’9 would bring into focus a central
engagement throughout New Bearings with why he felt this to be case.  In his first chapter
‘Poetry and the Modern World’, Leavis would state that:
No one could be seriously interested in the great bulk of the verse that is culled and
offered to us as the fine flower of modern poetry. For the most part it is not so much
bad as dead – it was never alive. The words that lie there arranged on the page have
no roots: the writer himself can never have been more than superficially interested in
them. Even such genuine poetry as the anthologies of modern verse do contain is apt,
by its kind and quality, to suggest that the present age does not favour the growth of
poets. A study of the latter end of the Oxford Book of Victorian Verse leads to the
conclusion that something has been wrong for forty or fifty years at the least.10
For Leavis the decline in critical standards had led to the promotion of a ‘dead’11 and
‘superficial’12 modern poetry. The effect of this, he felt, served to formulate a notion within
the general reading public that poetry, particularly good poetry, belonged to the past. If
modern poetry (and poor examples of it) were being anthologised as representative of the
contemporary period, then it could only be the case that contemporary audiences would
identify a gulf in the quality and merit of the work, and see that gulf as evidence that the past
offered a finer poetic quality and merit than the present. The loss of interest in poetry then,
and the crux of what Leavis meant by the ‘contemporary situation’,  stemmed from his belief
that criticism, in its failure to identify important contemporary work, was, in turn,
disconnecting poetry from the relevance of the modern world.
As the poetry of the eighteenth century had changed from that of the seventeenth
century, and the poetry of the present age from that of the nineteenth century, so too, felt
Leavis, should such changes be reflected in the diligence and intelligence of the criticism.  It
was, therefore, to criticism (and its standards) that Leavis sought to turn in order restore the
connection of poetry to the relevance and interest of the contemporary age and public. This
critical agenda was also seen throughout Leavis’s other work in this period. Indeed, the
9 ibid., p.11.
10 ibid., p.11-12.
11 ibid., p.12.
12 ibid.
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necessity of modernising contemporary critical practice and standards, and furthermore, the
consequence of a failure to do so, was re-emphasized three months later in the editorial
manifesto of Scrutiny’s first issue in May 1932, as well in Leavis’s introduction to Towards
Standards of Criticism published the following year in 1933. The critical argument that
united all three of them was Leavis’s belief that criticism should be ‘seriously preoccupied
with the movement of modern civilisation’13 and that literature should be valued, accordingly,
in terms of the influence it produced upon the modern and ‘contemporary sensibility’.14
For Bateson, however, this shift from what he termed ‘the understanding to the
reproduction of the past’15 encouraged a ‘lack of a sense of proportion.’16 Bateson’s
argument was that ‘understanding’ was essential to evaluation, and essential to the attainment
of understanding was a contextual observation of a work’s ‘political, social, ecclesiastical and
economical’ history.17 His basis for this belief was the view that: ‘Every book must be
relatable to a particular literary tradition; its divergences from that tradition must be
explicable.’18 Bateson believed that this provided a determinable means of identifying the
sentiment of the poem’s age (historical context), an indication of the intention of the author,19
and thus, through enabling ‘a true pursuit of the poet and the meaning of the poem’,20 a
legitimate means of assessing a literary work’s value. A ‘reproduction’ of the past, however,
in order merely to verify its resonance within the contemporary age and interests of the
13 F.R. Leavis, (ed.), 2008. ‘A Manifesto’, Scrutiny: A Quarterly Review, 1, 1932-33, 1, 1, 2-7, (Cambridge:
CUP) p.3.
14 F. R. Leavis, 1986. Valuation in Criticism and Other Essays, (ed.) G. Singh, (Cambridge: CUP) p.200.
15 F.W. Bateson, 1934. English Poetry and the English Language: An Experiment in Literary History, (Oxford:
Clarendon) p. v. Bateson’s italics
16 ibid.
17 ibid., p.8.
18 ibid., p.7.
19 It is important to note that irrespective of the virtue of Bateson’s argument in 1934, he was writing at a time
prior to significant contributions to debates about authorial intention later expressed by W.K. Wimsatt, M.C.
Beardsley, Roland Barthes, E.D. Hirsch, and Sean Burke. The significance of these contributions in relation to
the Leavis-Bateson debate, and furthermore, in relation to the wider theoretical considerations of this thesis, I
discuss in the fifth chapter.  This, however, is not to imply that Bateson predated all as an advocate of ‘intention’
in evaluative literary analysis. Later in this chapter, for example, I examine his position on authorial intention in
relation to earlier methods in critical ideological history.
20 Bateson, E.P.E.L. p.78.
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modern world, was not; Bateson felt, a true or responsible method of approach. By
reproduction Bateson was alluding, as he would later express to Leavis, to critical methods
of evaluation whereby a literary work was assessed ‘as if it had been written yesterday’.21
This type of reading, with its lack of grounding in historical context, constituted an entirely
subjective, and therefore unverifiable, abstraction of literary engagement. However, just as
Leavis had identified problems in the contemporary methods of criticism; Bateson had
identified an ‘impasse’22 in the philological methods of scholarship. In English Poetry and
the English Language (published two years after Leavis’s New Bearings) Bateson brought
this impasse into focus, by stating that:
The danger into which modern English scholarship is running is of not knowing when
to stop. If to be relentlessly thorough and impeccably accurate is to be scholarly, what
is there to prevent the aspiring scholar from tabulating the rhymes, let us say, in the
Theophilia of Edward Benlowes (‘propitious still to blockheads’)? What could be
more thorough—or more futile? To the antiquary, however, one piece of antiquity is
as good as another, and a fact, any fact, is something ultimate. The application of the
criteria by which one group of facts comes to seem more important than another is the
provenance not of the antiquary but of the historian.23
Bateson presents his belief that that ‘impasse’ into which scholars were ‘drifting’24 must
instead be avoided by the way of a linguistic ‘historical technique’,25 a technique that should
centre on the understanding that ‘the real history of poetry is . . . the history of the changes in
the kind of language in which successive poems have been written.’26 While Bateson sought
the best possible understanding of the poetry and the poet, his proposed emphasis on the
exercise of propriety and specificity in scholarly engagement related to his belief that the
understanding of literary work could only be achieved through analysis of language, not
specifically the language of the poem itself, but the language of the age in which the poem
21 F. R. Leavis, 2008. ‘Correspondence’, Scrutiny: A Quarterly Review XIX, 4, 1952-53. (Cambridge: CUP) p.
323.
22 Bateson, E.P.E.L. p. vi. Bateson’s italics
23 ibid., p.v-vi.
24 ibid., p.v.
25 ibid.
26 ibid.
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was produced. As such his methodological proposition was that a diachronic study of
linguistic ‘pressures’,27 ‘idiosyncrasies’,28 ‘tendencies’,29 ‘word choice’,30 and ‘word usage’31
throughout specific periods in literary history, would enable a means of monitoring a work’s
language in relation to the socio-economic and political pressures and influences upon the
author. A particular consideration of Bateson’s proposal was that of identifying the words
available to a particular poet in a particular given time throughout literary history, and the
words the poet used. This relationship, Bateson felt, could lend a great deal of understanding
about the poet and the poem, which in turn, could guide a reader towards a greater
understanding of a work’s intrinsic significance and value.
By proposing an evaluative method centring on the linguistic conventions at the time
of poetic composition, not as an evaluative end in itself, but as a means of understanding both
the poem and poet, Bateson’s method was markedly distinct from emerging formalist
approaches of understanding poems via a methodology focused predominately upon the
intrinsic structures and encoding of the ‘black marks on the page.’32 The method proposed by
Bateson comprised a incremental logic whereby, while he ultimately intended an
understanding of the poem and poet (the poet’s intention and intended meaning of the poem),
this was to be achieved through an understanding of the language of the period, then of the
language of the poem, and then, ‘and only then’,33 an interpretation of the poet, within the
poem, in relation to his historical hypostasis. Furthermore, Bateson argued that such an
approach could provide a verifiable means of assessing the validity of one particular
27 ibid., p.vii.
28 ibid., p.3.
29 ibid., p.46.
30 ibid., p.12.
31 ibid.
32 Dean, ‘The Last Critic? The Importance of F.R. Leavis’, p.30. Also see accounts of the emergence of The
New Criticism and Practical Criticism in several publications. My research has made use Stephen Matterson’s
chapter ‘The New Criticism’, 2006. (ed.) P. Waugh, Literary Theory and Criticism. 166-177. John C. Ransom,
1973. The New Criticism, (new edn.) (Connecticut: Greenwood).  M.H. Abrams, (ed.) 1999. A Glossary of
Literary Terms, (Boston: Heinle), and Peter Rawlings, 2006. American Theorists of the Novel: Henry James,
Lionel Trilling and Wayne C. Booth, (London: Routledge).
33 Bateson, E.P.E.L. p.vii.
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interpretation over another, in that such validity could be determined by a particular
interpretation’s accuracy and attention to factual aspects of the work’s composition and
compositional history. A significant feature of Bateson’s method was that it did not claim, as
such, a direct means of accessing what, in Cartesian terms, would be called the ‘elusive and
private domain’34 of the poet, in that Bateson was claiming that that ‘the age’s imprint in a
poem is not to be traced to the poet but to the language’35—and from the language the poet
could be realized in accurate—contextually supported—terms. With this in mind it can be
seen that E.P.E.L. raises two main critical assertions: one entailing that extrinsic linguistic
knowledge from beyond the text itself was necessary to the understanding of the value of a
literary work, and second, that methods of critical approach in which extrinsic and factually
verifiable historical information were consulted, could thus, in turn, be understood as
possessing a degree of validity or invalidity.
Bateson’s ideology then, if we are to understand it principally at its point of departure
from Leavis’s, centred on the belief that the analysis of formal structures alone (that is to say,
the intrinsic and isolated composition of the text on the page) was insufficient as a means of
evaluating a literary artistic composition. Proposing this view, Bateson states a warning: ‘that
attention to the internal language of the poem ‘for its own sake’ evidences not the true poet
but the mere artist.’36 Indeed, literary art, Bateson felt, was a part of history, and thus evident
34 ‘After the publication of Gilbert Ryle's Concept of Mind (1949) and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations (1953), philosophers became increasingly sceptical of mind/body dualism, epitomized by René
Descartes, which postulated an elusive private domain of mental life. To describe a person’s thoughts, desires,
and intentions, on the preferred view, was not to guess at a mysterious inner world to which only that person had
direct access, but was to make complex judgment about the person’s social interactions and observable
responses. Intentions became part of the publically accessible realm, and literary works were deemed as good an
indicator of intention as any other manifest behaviour. Undoubtedly this concept of the mind weakens anti-
intentionalist claims about the unavailability of intention, but it does not in itself refute anti-intentionalism per
se, for further claims about kinds of evidence and about the autonomy of the text are unaffected.’ Peter
Larmarque, 2006. ‘The Intentional Fallacy’, Literary Theory and Criticism. (ed.) P.Waugh. (Oxford: OUP)
p.184.
35 Bateson, E.P.E.L. p.vi.
36 Bateson, E.P.E.L.p. 91. Bateson’s full quote reads: ‘It would seem’, Newman summed up, ‘that attention to
the language for its own sake evidences not the true poet but the mere artist.’. Bateson quotes from John
Newman, ‘Poetry with Reference to Aristotle’s Poetics’ (1892) as reprinted in E.D. Jones, (ed.) 1916. English
Critical Essays, Nineteenth Century, (London: OUP) p.252.
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within it were the pressures of the age upon the language which it used. For this reason
Bateson argued that an understanding of history was essential both in discovering differences
between particular works of literary art and identifying the idiosyncrasies which made each
work (and its author) unique, significant, or valuable. He would state:
Art, considered as the subject matter of criticism, does stand still. But art may also be
considered as history, and as history it cannot stand still. It develops every decade,
often every year, and it is only by virtue of these developments that it becomes the
concern of the historian. If there is something in common in the novels of Henry
James and Richardson, there is also quite obviously something distinguishable,
something that they have not in common. And the business of the literary historian,
while always employing the tools and accepting the hierarchies of the literary critic, is
to isolate, define, and explain that ‘something not in common’.37
This extract, particularly representative of Bateson’s argument as outlined in the early
sections of his E.P.E.L. thesis, highlights his stress upon the significance of literature as a
‘changing’ and ‘heterogeneous’ flux.38 While literary critics often displayed a tendency to
group together similarities between writers and works, it was equally important, in Bateson’s
view, to draw attention to essential ‘differences’ in periods of literary history in order to
define and classify the evolution of literary development and change. He emphasizes in
italics, the view that, ‘it is these changes of language only that are due to the pressure of
social and intellectual tendencies.’39 Bateson’s E.P.E.L. thesis (unlike some of his later
work)40 was not an explicit challenge of Leavis’s critical ideology per se; that said, it did, by
implication of its methodological proposal constitute an attack on the emerging critical school
at Cambridge as seen in the work of I.A Richards, William Empson, and T.S. Eliot. That said,
it is clear to see, that Bateson’s desire to approach literary history in this way, and Leavis’s
desire to promote a focus on poetry as it reads in relation to the contemporary, world can be
seen in various systematic representations. One particularly useful example of this comes by
37 Bateson, E.P.E.L. p.6-7.
38 ibid., p.7.
39 ibid., p.vi.
40 There is no mention of Leavis per se in Bateson’s E.P.E.L., however, explicit attacks upon Leavis and his
critical positions are later made by Bateson in ‘The Function of Criticism at the Present Time’ (1953).
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way of an introductory extract from the English Faculty at Cambridge University as it is
expressed today (2008- ):
The English Faculty was founded in 1919. It was the first Faculty in the country to
encourage the study of English Literature up to the present day and the first to
approach English literature from a ‘literary’ point of view, rather than as a
manifestation of the history of the language. Founders of the method of practical
criticism, including I.A. Richards and William Empson, were members of the Faculty
in its early years and made a lasting impression on how literature is studied today.41
Interestingly then, in expressing the critical approach they seek to elevate, the Faculty
underlines one most closely aligned to the critical practice of Leavis; the type focused upon
the ‘literary’ and ‘literariness’ of the text as central to critical evaluation. Moreover, it can be
seen that modern Cambridge, in their explicit detailing of the approach they wish to avoid,
have also pin-pointed the very direction that Bateson’s E.P.E.L. thesis had sought to steer
literary analysis. Indeed, Bateson stated, in what would now appear direct antithesis to the
Cambridge Faculty, that it was ‘to words…their history and science’ that the study of poetry
should turn; ‘that poetry develops pari passu with the words it uses, that its history is a part
of the general history of language, and that its changes of style and mood are merely the
reflection of changing tendencies in the uses to which language is being put.’42 Bateson
develops this idea, and thus his polarization from the Cambridge critical ideology, through
the belief that in order to define the poem’s ‘poetic style...what we must do is, first of all, is to
isolate the influence of the age on the theory and practice of the language, and secondly (but
only secondly), when the linguistic tendencies have been defined, to examine their effect on
the poetry.’43 While Bateson would face Leavis’s rejection of his approach, the basis for
Bateson’s move towards a factually determinable context in which to set literary evaluation
was that he sought ‘a more satisfactory’, ‘intelligent’, ‘comprehensive’ and ‘historical
41University of Cambridge. 2008. Faculty of English. [Online] http://www.english.cam.ac.uk. [Accessed 10
January 11].
42 Bateson, E.P.E.L. p.25.
43 ibid.,vii.
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technique’.44 In tracing what may be regarded as a general propensity for objectivity within
Bateson’s evaluative and scholarly practice, some critics (I think particularly of Valentine
Cunningham) have felt his positivist determinacy to be symptomatic of a desire ‘to always be
demonstrably right.’45 According to Cunningham, Bateson, ‘once an impish school boy,
mustn’t only be right, he must be dazzlingly, shockingly right.’46 This is an important point,
not merely as a detail of personality trait, but rather in the extended significance of why
Bateson sought so ardently a determinable means of measuring the validity of interpretative
and evaluative readings. Later, in 1975, in a memoir entitled ‘Confessions of an Eng. Lit.
Tutor’, Bateson would write:
As far as I know, I was one of the few Oxford tutors who took careful notes of each
undergraduate essay as it was read to him. And prominent among each set of notes
there was almost always a list of its factual errors, which I found it convenient to
point out and correct as soon as the essay had been read . . . Once the last erroneous
date, title or quotation had been corrected my tutee was often left limp and
bewildered, and I could sail in with my rival interpretation of the poem or poet . . .47
Bateson, by his own admission recalls having left his students ‘limp and bewildered’ by a
succession of factual notes of which they had not, as diligently as he, attended to. This
method of his tutorship thus enabled him to ‘sail in’ with his ‘rival interpretation’. As such it
would appear that Bateson, throughout his teaching, felt that a work’s factual context could
be used as a measure of a particular interpretation’s validity. To this effect the logic was:
where there was evidence of factual inaccuracy in scholarship and evaluation there was a
basis to dismiss the legitimacy of a reading, and thus by extension, the validity of one’s
judgment of the work’s merit or value. The inherent problem of such a method is that
44 ibid.,vi.
45 Valentine Cunningham, 1979. ‘F.W. Bateson: Scholar, Critic, and Scholar-Critic.’ Essays in Criticism, XXIX,
2, 139-155.p.141. ‘Undoubtedly Bateson’s own relish for facts, his desire to prove himself triumphantly right (‘I
was always so sure that I was right’), his anxiety always to demonstrate his rightness (‘the ultimate raison d’être
of criticism within modern mass society . . . is to be demonstrably right’), could occasionally lead him to an
irritating parade of name and number.’ V. Cunningham quotes Bateson, 1966, ‘The Function of Criticism at the
Present Time’, English Poetry: A Critical Introduction, 2nd edn.,(London: Longmans) p.183. and also, Bateson,
1975, ‘Confessions of an Eng. Lit. Tutor’, Pelican: The Magazine of Corpus Christi College, III, 2, 20-21.p.21.
46 Cunningham, ‘...Scholar-Critic’, p.145
47 Bateson, ‘Confessions of an Eng. Lit Tutor..., .p.21.
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Bateson here is guilty of constructing a model of: assumption-upon-assumption. The nuance
of Bateson’s phrase ‘sail in with my rival interpretation’, suggests of course, by implication,
that Bateson himself was aware that his interpretation was merely a rivalling interpretation.
Granted, he would nullify competing interpretations on the basis that his reading was
grounded more fully in the facts of the work’s history and so forth, but Bateson assumes that
such facts are legitimate grounds for arriving at a judgment of a work’s artistic or aesthetic
value. While extending one’s critical analysis beyond the literary object is seen as beneficial
in Bateson’s view, it is often felt (particularly in strands of formalism, such as in anti-
intentionalist theory) that such a critical tendency is representative of a method distrusting of
a literary work’s self-sufficiency in communicating ‘all that needs expressed’.48
Leavis’s and Bateson’s involvement within the larger perspective of what has been
termed the ‘crisis of methods’,49 can be observed as moving towards a type of critical value
discrepancy wherein which Bateson believes that a literary work should be explored and
evaluated in relation to its socio-economic and linguistic historical context. Naturally, by
extension, such an assumption entails a critical (or scholarly) tendency to make a judgment
48 See Wimsatt and Beardsley’s. ‘The Intentional Fallacy’ (1946) essay from The Verbal Icon: Studies in the
Meaning of Poetry, (Kentucky: UPK) ‘If the poet succeeded in doing it, then the poem itself shows what he was
trying to do. And if the poet did not succeed, then the poem is not adequate evidence, and the critic must go
outside the poem—for evidence of an intention that did not become effective in the poem.’ p.4. And also, in
Wimsatt and Beardsley’s essay ‘Poetry and Morals’, they state: ‘We inquire now not about origins, nor about
effects, but about work so far as it can be considered by itself as a body of meaning. Neither the qualities of the
author’s mind nor the effects of the poem upon a reader’s mind should be confused with the moral quality of the
meaning expressed by the poem itself.’ p. 87.  See also, David Newton de Molina (ed.) 1976. On Literary
Intention, (Edinburgh: EUP); Gary Iseminger (ed.) 1995. Intention and Interpretation, (Philadelphia: Temple)
49 The word ‘crisis’ and term ‘crisis of methods’ have found widespread usage in modern literary theory. The
term is found as the title of the introduction to Re-Reading English edited by P. Widdowson, a collection of
essays which discusses the role of Post-structuralist and Marxist approaches literature in secondary and tertiary
education, and the future of the discipline of ‘English’. Widdowson argues that new critical methodologies and
theories have revealed the bourgeois ideology inherent in conventional educational methods and procedures,
which he concedes, were (and still probably are) entrenched in most English Departments throughout Britain –
practices that can be summed up as the exercise of teaching students to interpret and enjoy a collection of
special and valued texts. Carol Atherton’s essay ‘The Organisation of Literary Knowledge: The Study of
English in the Late Nineteenth Century’ from The Organisation of Knowledge in Victorian Britain (ed.) Martin
Daunton (2005) states that: ‘The last two decades have witnessed a number of concerns about the existence of a
‘Crisis in English Studies’, a sense that traditional assumptions about the nature and purpose of the study of
English literature are being eroded by a version of the discipline that is much more fragmentary and uncertain.’
p.220. The work of Paul de Man, and Josephine Guy and Ian Small has also examined the ontology of ‘crisis’
theory and its implications upon literary studies as an academic subject.
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based on the text’s ability to reflect or represent linguistic, social, or intellectual history.
Leavis on the other hand, particularly by evidence of New Bearings, appears to elevate a
critical practice which argues that a work of literature should attempt to produce certain
effects on the reading audience by appeals to contemporary intelligence, traditional cultural
values, morality, and sensibility. Leavis’s criticism, therefore, in its difference to Bateson’s,
would thus be inclined to make assessment of a work’s value according to its success in
achieving those aims. In view of this, the critical approaches and methodologies promoted by
Leavis and Bateson (those that would form the basis of the contention between them) can be
seen, even from this pre-debate period, to stem from discrepancies in terms of what they
respectively believe literature should achieve. It was virtually inevitable then, if they were to
collide, that these differing literary values would put Leavis and Bateson at odds in regards to
achieving an evaluative method that could encompass their essentially antithetical critical
ideals.
Whilst it has been said of Leavis that his ‘greatest strength’50 was his ‘consistent
refusal to define a clear theoretical basis for his work’,51 it is nevertheless true that a
characteristic of his critical tendency is that it closely resembles, at least in a broad sense, that
outlined in the earlier quoted Cambridge tenet: ‘the approach to literature from a ‘‘literary
point” of view’.52 Tracing an understanding of Leavis at this time it is also useful to observe
his personal and ideological situation as an academic and critic. In October 1931 Leavis’s
period of tenure at Emmanuel College, Cambridge was over. Furthermore he had learned in
the January of that year that it was not to be renewed. Concerned, and at the end of his
probationary position of three years, he ‘decided to do some extended writing so as to
improve his academic standing by publication’.53 It was in this period that he produced New
50 B.K. Grant, 2006, ‘Criticism-Ideology’, Shirmer Encyclopedia of Film, (Ontario: Shirmer Reference)p.6
51 ibid.
52 From (fn.41): Cambridge Faculty’s Introduction to English Studies.
53 Ian MacKillop, 1995. F.R. Leavis: A Life in Criticism, (London: Penguin) p.119.
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Bearings. Scrutiny, the journal that hosted the debate, and which would evolve from
particular concerns raised in New Bearings, has a history that over-arches the Leavis-Bateson
conflict, coming into existence, as it did, twenty-five months before Leavis reviewed
Bateson’s E.P.E.L. Having written ‘copiously for the quarterly from the start’54 Leavis was
the most significant figure in the journal’s conception and editorial life. Indeed, both the
emergence of Scrutiny at Cambridge, and the principles of criticism it set forth to represent
can be related to institutional pressures and intellectual concerns in Leavis’s career in 1931
and early 1932.55 Scrutiny’s ‘Manifesto’, published as the first piece in the first issue of
Scrutiny in May 1932 was authored, as noted, by ‘the editors’, of whom, for the first two
issues Leavis was not one.56 His influence, nevertheless, on the magazine’s programme is
evident in the related concerns of his earlier work.  Specifically, as it has been argued by
P.W. Musgrave in his essay ‘Scrutiny and Education’ the principal focus of Scrutiny was, as
noted at the beginning, ‘literary criticism at a time when substantial changes in method were
initiated in Britain by such writers as T. S. Eliot and I. A. Richards.’57
If we are to consider what is meant by these ‘substantial changes’, it is, as Musgrave
suggests, to Richards and Eliot that the focus tends to shift. There were several major works
published in the 1920s by these two influential critics and these had had an effect upon
Leavis's criticism, and more widely, throughout British academic methods of the period.
Richards’s The Principles of Literary Criticism (1924), Science and Poetry (1926), and
Practical Criticism (1929) all advocated a type of criticism that focused predominantly upon
54 ibid., p.147.
55 As MacKillop’s biography of Leavis details there was, at the time, light talk of an interest from Harvard, but
Leavis eventually became lecturer at Downing College, Cambridge, and in December he was appointed as the
College’s Director of Studies in English. Prior to the confirmation of his new post at Downing, Leavis sold a
property which would, by chance, allow him to finance his plans for Scrutiny. p.134.
56 For the first two issues Leavis was not an editor, first appearing on the title page of Volume 1, Number 3. We
have already seen that he liked to work (in college patois) as ‘back-coach’. MacKillop later notes: ‘As to staying
out of the editorship of the first numbers of Scrutiny, it is possible Leavis held back because as an editor it
would have been awkward for Denys Harding to contribute a review of New Bearings in English Poetry to the
first issue.’ MacKillop, F.R. Leavis, p.147.
57 Musgrave, ‘Scrutiny and Education’, p.253.
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the text itself. This focus upon the linguistic object, that is to say, on the poem or text as it
stood on the page, in a sense laid the foundations for Practical Criticism, and by extension
(particularly through the work of William Empson) the New Criticism that would later
develop prominently in the educational reforms of a post-World-War-Two United States.58
For Richards the objective of such an approach was to encourage the reader's concentration
upon the words on the page, rather than preconceived or received beliefs about the text.
Famously, Richards carried out several experiments at Cambridge in which students were
purposefully denied extrinsic information regarding the text they were set to interpret and
evaluate. In the last of the above mentioned publications, Practical Criticism, Richards
reported on the results of the experiments, and his conclusion was that reading literature in
such a way focused the reader with the work as a sphere of activity of its own. Leavis, while
he was not in complete agreement with Richard’s methods, nevertheless felt that this close
analysis enabled the text to perform, and thus be evaluated in such a way, so that the morality
of the text as presented in its composition (structure, poetic devices and so forth) could be
interpreted as a beneficial critical activity; his belief being, that critics could therefore, via
such an approach, bring the whole of ‘their sensibility to bear on a literary text and test its
sincerity and moral seriousness.’59
Eliot’s ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ (1920), and The Sacred Wood: Essays on
Poetry and Criticism (1920) offered critical ideas that Leavis, by his own admission,
admired. The ‘substantial changes’ alluded to by Musgrave, certainly as far as Leavis was
concerned, centred around three notable concepts in Eliot’s criticism: ‘dissociation of
58 When considering the theoretical implications and values of text-based criticism, such as in Practical
Criticism and The New Criticism, where evaluative emphasis centered on the work itself, it is important to note
also the practicality of such an approach. Returning U.S. soldiers, for example, who had spent several years in
military service, were deemed less likely to have sufficient scholarly knowledge of literary history or for that
matter the historical or social contexts of much literature studied. Thus The New Criticism was particularly
beneficial to U.S. educational reforms in that it promoted analytical emphasis the literature's internal
composition as opposed to extrinsic factors of consideration. In this sense not only is it important to consider the
social and historical context of literary art itself, but also the social and historical context surrounding the
emergence of particular approaches to literary analysis. Also see Fekete, p.19-20, 23-28, and 174-183.
59 Chris Baldick, 1987. The Social Mission of English Criticism 1848-1932, (Oxford: OUP) p.28.
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sensibility’,60 ‘tradition’,61 and ‘altered expression’.62 These values deriving, on an
immediately historical level, from Eliot, also met with another aspect of Leavis’s critical
interest, that being his focus on the ‘cultural and educational conditions within which
literature was studied’.63 For Leavis the university was the ‘creative centre of civilization’,64
and should not become a privatised means of systematically and ‘mechanically’65 producing
students for a ‘monstrous industry’.66 Another feature of Leavis’s interest that gave rise to the
concept of the Scrutiny journal was his interest in the university and in literary education.
Indeed, Scrutiny was founded, suggest both MacKillop and Musgrave alike, through the
educational influence of several American journals such as the Symposium which had been
60 Eliot’s term ‘disassociation of sensibility’ is taken up by Storer in his account of Leavis and Eliot in the New
Bearings chapter. Storer writes: ‘Eliot used the phrase ‘dissociation of sensibility’ in an essay on ‘The
Metaphysical Poets’ to express his sense of how English poetry in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
differed from the poetry of the early seventeenth century.’ p. 58. It is notable that New Bearings, for Leavis,
whilst a tribute in many ways to Eliot, was precisely an exercise in developing a critical consciousness between
the past (the seventeenth century and its poetry to the present (such as the later era of the nineteenth century).
pp.57-61. Storer’s point thus re-integrates consideration of Leavis’s belief highlighted in the beginning of this
chapter regarding the need to keep alive and vital the modernity and relevance of criticism to the contemporary
age.
61 A critical leitmotif throughout Eliot's best known essay, ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’, was belief that
literature does not possess its own isolated and complete meaning; rather it finds significance through a
‘dynamic’ and complex relationship with ‘tradition’; that is, ‘all the poetry that has been written’. Leavis
subscribed to this, and some Leavisian critics, Storer a particular example, claim that Leavis took it further in
applying its principle to the evaluation of novels as well as poetry.
62 The phrase ‘altered expression’ offered for Leavis a sort of mid-ground with regards to the role of the author
in the artistic process. By this I mean, Leavis, in New Bearings did not want to disregard the author’s life in
quite the total sense advocated in Richards’s work. Leavis advocated a more moderate belief that ‘literary’
traditions, though they must be considered ‘literary’, were ‘kept alive and viable by the great individuals who
were able to change them.
63 Richard Storer, 2009. F.R. Leavis, (London: Routledge) p.2.
64 F.R. Leavis, 1975. The Living Principle: English as a Discipline of Thought (London: Chatto & Windus) p.
24.
65The word ‘mechanical’ was used by Leavis (and several Leavisian scholars) as a construct of antithesis to the
agrarian and traditional values of the ‘Organic Community’ that Leavis throughout his career expressed a
preference for. This was evident in Leavis’s PhD thesis of 1921 ‘The Relationship of Journalism to Literature:
Studies in the Rise and Earlier Development of the Press in England.’ Day argues that ‘both Leavis’s cultural
and literary criticism is based on the destruction of what he called the ‘Organic Community’, by the advent of
the machine and mass culture.’ p.131. Another good source is Storer’s Leavis study, specifically the chapter
‘Culture’. pp. 42-53. See also Two Cultures? The Significance of C. P. Snow, Being the Richmond Lecture,
(1962) with an essay on Sir Charles Snow’s Rede Lecture, by Michael Yudkin. (London: Chatto & Windus,
1962); Roger Kimball, 1994. ‘The Two Cultures’ Today: On the C.P. Snow-F.R. Leavis controversy’, The New
Criterion, 12, 2, 10-18.; Guy Ortolano, 2002.  ‘Two Cultures, One University: The Institutional Origins of the
“Two Cultures” Controversy’, A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, 34, 4, 606-624.
66 Patricia Waugh, 2010. A review of Guy Ortolano, ‘The Two Cultures Controversy: Science, Literature and
Cultural Politics in Postwar Britain.’ Reviews in History, 849, 1, 1-11, p.3.
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introduced to Leavis from Princeton.67 Leavis and his group of editors (Donald Culver and
L.C. Knights)68 were keen to apply a similar model in Britain, specifically, ‘to do the
criticism that is not done in the commercial press.’69 This centralisation of Leavis’s chief
critical concerns — poetry in the modern world, educational standards, and a concern with
the corporate industrialisation of the arts — thus led to the idea and founding of Scrutiny, and
within it, Leavis would engage with these issues bringing them into a peer-public and
academic arena.70 Such was the respect and reverence for the journal amongst the British
literary-academic class,71 that several critics, Richard Storer being a particular example,
deduce today (2009) that ‘Leavis’s influence was more concentrated, more carefully
sustained, and in the end more widely disseminated, than that of any of his contemporaries.’72
Another belief that appears to unite several Leavisian scholars is that Leavis, and his critical
ideology, has been widely subject to false abstraction and systematic distortion.73 As the
debate will show there is a case to be made that Leavis himself appears at times,
contradictory and ambiguous, and this may, in part, factor in the type of problem that these
critics, most notably Gary Day, observe in the many attempts in the last thirty years to cohere
his various critical concerns into a neat or concrete theoretical position.74 His debate with
67 MacKillop, p.145. and Musgrave, p.255.
68 See MacKillops’s chapter ‘The Year of Scrutiny’ pp.145-150.
69 MacKillop, p.145.
70 Terry Eagleton notes that ‘Scrutiny was not just a journal, but the focus of a moral and cultural crusade: its
adherents would go out to the schools and universities to do battle there, nurturing through the study of literature
the kind of rich, complex, mature, discriminating, morally serious responses (all key Scrutiny terms) which
would equip individuals to survive in a mechanized society of trashy romances, alienated labour, banal
advertisements and vulgarizing mass media.’ Terry Eagleton, 1983. Literary Theory: An Introduction, (Oxford:
Blackwell), p.33.
71 Scrutiny had some notable subscriptions from people such as ‘T.S. Eliot, George Santayana, R.H. Tawney
and Aldous Huxley.’ This information from MacKillops’s biography of Leavis also includes the detail that: ‘The
initial print [of Scrutiny] [in May 1931] was run for 500 copies . . . An additional 250 copies were ordered and
sold. The print for later issues went up to 1,000 (but never exceeded 1,400). p.146
72 Storer, Leavis, p.1.
73 This certainly seems to be the agreed point in the Leavisian scholarship of R.P. Bilan and Gary Day as I will
examine in chapter 3.
74 Gary Day in his Re-reading Leavis (1996) asked, ‘who is this Leavis that can have such affect?’: ‘Although
there are many critics that have argued against his particular judgments and although some have challenged one
or other of his general assumptions and procedures there is no one, according to Francis Mulhern, who has
“produced anything resembling an integrated account and assessment of his aesthetic and critical position”. This
is a more sober version of Garry Watson’s view that Leavis’s work has been systematically distorted and
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Bateson, however, if assessed responsibly, is good grounds for an analysis of Leavis’s
autotelic ideology, in that it comprises precisely Leavis’s arguments in action against
Bateson.
In 1934 what should be said of Bateson as an academic was that he acknowledged
that his criticism was less able than his scholarship. This was a concern for him in the early
1930s and he would later state that: ‘Dr. Leavis at his best is a much better literary critic than
I am, but when it comes to scholarship I am perhaps the better man of the two—though I
agree cheerfully that nothing I have contributed to literary history is equivalent in that sphere
to his unique contribution to criticism’.75 Valentine Cunningham notes of Bateson that: ‘As
he came over to the English School as an undergraduate out of the dictionaries, the footnotes,
the dry linguistic exactitudes of Classics, so he started his critical career as a ‘minor
professional scholar, working for four bob an hour as general editor of the Cambridge
Bibliography of English Literature’.76 Cunningham goes on to regard Bateson’s E.P.E.L. as
among the best of Bateson’s work. This, in Cunningham’s estimation, was due to the fact that
Bateson demonstrated ‘how a sense of the contextual fact was vital to a reading of literary
texts. In fact’, Cunningham continues, ‘he proved again and again how critical ‘judgment’
depended on ‘knowledge, and ever fresh knowledge’.77 Bateson was born in Cheshire and
educated at Charterhouse and at Trinity College, Oxford. He took a BA in English (second
class), and then the B.Litt., which he completed in 1927. From 1927-29 he held a
Commonwealth Fellowship at Harvard and from 1929 to 1940 he worked on the Cambridge
Bibliography of English Literature. The latter work, as well as several publications that
ridiculed with critics ignoring what he does say in favour of what they believe he says – or even want him to
say. Day states: ‘It is this absence of a comprehensive account of his criticism that has given rise to a myth of
Leavis which is the source of the strong reactions that his name can still provoke nearly 20 years after his death.’
Day, Re-reading Leavis, p.ix.
75 F.W. Bateson, 1964. ‘The Alternative to Scrutiny’, Essays in Criticism, XIV, 1, 10-21. p.12.
76 Cunningham, ‘Scholar-Critic...’, p.142
77 ibid.
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rendered him to many as a ‘polemical dissenter’,78 would, in later years, see him become the
General Editor of the Longmann Annotated English Poets series, as well as Special
University Lecturer at Oxford and a fellow and tutor of Corpus Christi College until he
retired in 1969. Bateson’s E.P.E.L. thesis certainly provoked Leavis and those central to the
Cambridge critical movement. But if the post-Harvard doctoral student had not had his debate
with Leavis it is very possible that a similar debate would have ensued from several other
quarters in Britain and on the continent. Next door in Ireland, for example, T.P. Dunning in
an untitled review in Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review perceived several significant
deficiencies within Bateson’s argument.79 Beyond, there was René Wellek who also held
strong views on Bateson’s thesis, though it should be said that not all were critical, as I shall
later explore. Wellek’s most important assessment of E.P.E.L. in terms of charting the nature
and history of Bateson’s approaches was that they were reflected and paralleled in the earlier
Russian Formalist movement.80 The connective Wellek raises between Bateson and Russian
Formalism must be approached with caution, for while Bateson’s methods were, in certain
respects, close to the Russian Formalist programme, in others, he fell away from it. In order
to begin an understanding of this connection, it should be said that central to both Bateson
and the Russian formalists was the belief that a way out of the crisis of methods lay in the
close collaboration between literary history and linguistics. Boris Eichenbaum's essay ‘The
78 F.W. Bateson, 1972. Essays in Critical Dissent, (London: Longman) Inner back cover sleeve note.
79 See T.P. Dunning, 1952. Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 41, 164, 390- 392, where Dunning argues that:
‘The critics Mr. Bateson chooses to attack in this first part of the book are not these ‘academic’ writers, but the
Romantic critics (amongst whom Mr. Lucas and Mr. C. S. Lewis are cast). Indeed, Mr. Bateson's book is
intended to give “a decent and final interment” to Romantic criticism in general. However, it must be said that
Mr. Bateson displays only a partial understanding of the ‘Romantic’ critics he opposes and if he inters anything
it is something which he has largely created himself...It is a pity that in his criticism of these writers, Mr.
Bateson is so sweeping and so prone to over-simplification: for the exuberance of Romantic criticism badly
needs to be corrected by logical analysis, and the balance upset by their tendency to regard the poet as Seer
rather than as Maker needs to be redressed. For that reason, some of what Mr. Bateson says here is just and, to a
degree, satisfying.’ p.391.
80 Rene Wellek, 1979. ‘The Literary Theories of F.W. Bateson’, Essays in Criticism, XXIX, 1, 112 -123. p.112.
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Theory of the “Formal Method” argues that ‘since literature is made of language, linguistics
will be a foundational element of the science of literature.’81 Similarly, Bateson writes that:
The critical difference between the words, taken as one element, and every other
conceivable constituent of a poem is this: The words make the poem; other qualities
can only add to it. A poem without words is not a poem at all; whereas a poem
without simplicity (such as Donne’s ‘Anatomy’), or without sensuousness (such as
Pope’s ‘Essay on Man’), or without passion (such as Keats’s ‘Fancy’), if possibly not
easy or exciting or profound, does not cease ipso facto to be poetry.82
Both Bateson and the Russian formalists, in this sense, sought ultimately to produce ‘a
science of literature that would be both independent and factual’;83 that since literature is
made of language, linguistics will be a foundational element of the science of literature. Boris
Eichenbaum, along with Roman Jakobson and several other key figures of the Russian
formalism movement had arrived at their critical position several years earlier than Bateson
(between 1905-1915). Wellek himself notes that Bateson may have, in the composition of his
own piece, been completely unaware of the Russian Formalist movement altogether. While
significant connections are certainly evident,84 it is not altogether responsible to identify
Bateson’s ideology as with Russian formalism. Indeed, while the parallel may be useful in
accounting for certain aspects of Bateson’s ideological differences to Leavis, Bateson would
depart from the formalist doctrine in several crucial instances, just as Leavis can be said to
depart in his own way from the Practical Criticism of Cambridge.85 For Bateson, this was
81 Boris. M. Eichenbaum, 1965. ‘The Theory of the ‘Formal Method’’, Russian Formalist Criticism: Four
Essays, (ed.) Lee T. Lemon, and Marion J. Reis, (Nebraska: Uni. Nebraska) p.88.
82 Bateson, E.P.E.L. p.15.
83 Victor Erlich, 1980. Russian Formalism, (The Hague: Moulton) p. 212.
84 I think particularly of the two general underlying principles related to the Russian Formalist study of
literature: first, literature itself, or rather, those of its features that distinguish it from other human activities,
must constitute the object of inquiry of literary theory; second, ‘literary facts’ have to be prioritized over the
metaphysical commitments of literary criticism, whether philosophical, aesthetic or psychological.’ For Bateson,
the main endeavour of the critical function should, he felt, to consist in ‘defining a set of properties specific to
poetic language, be it poetry or prose, recognizable by their ‘artfulness’ and consequently analyzing them as
such.’ By extension therefore, and by removing attention to the history of language, Bateson, whose approach to
critical analysis depended upon such factual information as the author’s environment and the date in history of
the work’s composition, would find great difficulty with such seeming limitations to the critic’s analytical
palette as proposed, he felt, in the mandates of Practical Criticism.
85 This is a point Storer makes when he stresses that ‘we will probably misunderstand both “Practical Criticism”
and Leavis’s approach to reading, then, if we start by treating them as identical.’
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most evident in the sense that the Russian formalists sought to break from the methodology
of traditionalist Russian criticism by proposing that literature was an independent,
autonomous activity and not an extension of social, political or historic reality.86 Bateson did
not agree that literature should be viewed as existing independently from external conditions
or that literary language was distinct from the ordinary uses of language, points he would
express directly to Leavis.  The value, in this thesis, of both situating and un-situating Leavis
and Bateson and their critical ideologies within wider theoretical trends is that it mobilises
their debate as a framework in which to observe how the ideological evolution of critical
schools and movements over the century developed. Also it is to say that these two men are
representative of a bricolage of varying critical sentiment abstracted from several strands of
Formalist, Practical, and New Critical twentieth-century formulas as well as adaptations of
the pre-existing critical ideologies of Arnold and Johnson. We can trace Leavis’s and
Bateson’s personalities and characters as the catalysts of the ensuing debate, and deduce from
the tone of their earlier writing that their eventual argument would be severely combative.
Indeed Bateson was willing to concede in notably few matters, and ideologically speaking,
was ardent in his belief that critical analysis depended upon knowledge of context and that
history was not to be replaced by the interests of the present. Bateson’s relationship with
Oxford (where he encountered professional and ideological opposition) is perhaps a
consequence of, as Cunningham suggests, his being intelligent, dynamic, as well as
disruptive.87 Leavis, as I have noted, was influential, and whilst this cannot be denied, the
point has been made that ‘influence’ may be an insufficient word to use in relation to Leavis,
86 Their proposal, therefore, as documented in the work of Victor Erlich, is that literary analysis should focus on
‘rhythm, word order, referential meaning and intonation that interact and construct the dynamic and value of a
literary work’; in this sense it moves closer to the type of criticism that Leavis, and by extension Cambridge, had
sought to promote.
87 Despite harbouring (particularly in his early career) a dislike of several colleagues, Bateson was important to
Oxford, with one reason being the prestige surrounding his editing of the Cambridge Bibliography of English
Literature (1940). (See additional notes on this in Chapter 2.)
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given that he was a ‘controversial figure who divided opinion as much as he shaped it, and he
was resented and disliked almost as much as he was respected and admired.’88
88 Storer, F.R. Leavis, p. 2.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE LEAVIS-BATESON DEBATE: THE 1935 EXCHANGES
In this chapter I look at the exchanges between Leavis and Bateson in Scrutiny in 1935. My
aim is to provide an analysis of the critical issues that arose from Leavis’s reading of
Bateson’s English Poetry and the English Language (1934). I will also observe the structure
and style of argumentation within Leavis’s review of the book, Bateson’s reply, and Leavis’s
rejoinder, as well as highlighting the distinctions made between literary history and literary
criticism. In evaluating the correspondences in this way I aim to assess how the arguments
made by Leavis and Bateson reflect both a determination and anxiety in relation to the pursuit
of methodological objectivity in approaches to the study of literature.
The debate began in Scrutiny’s ‘Comments and Reviews’ section1 with Leavis’s
review of E.P.E.L. Leavis opened his review with the following statement:
Mr. Bateson introduces his essay with some just criticism of the academic study of
literature. The essay itself constitutes a much more radical criticism. For the
unprofitable issue of an intention and initiative in themselves so admirable must be
charged to academic deficiencies. A critic as interested and energetic as Mr. Bateson
ought not to have been able to be so unprovided with the elementary tools for his job,
so unprepared by the elementary training, and so unaware of his plight.2
It can be seen from this that Leavis did not receive Bateson’s thesis in a positive way. Noting
that he used the term ‘critic’ to describe Bateson Leavis states that Bateson would
‘repudiate’3 the ‘description’4 because he wished to differentiate his method of approach from
1 The ‘Comments and Reviews’ section was a standard section in almost all of the issues of Scrutiny published.
It is notable that Leavis’s other review in this issue, a review of Marianne Moore’s poetry, was also one of
negative response. Within it, Leavis criticised the praise that T.S. Eliot bestowed upon her work. See F.R.
Leavis, 2008. Scrutiny, IV, 1935-1936, (Cambridge: CUP). p.87-90. Bateson would go on to state that Leavis’s
frustration (and negativity) at this time (May/June 1935) may have been partially heightened due to his severe
suffering from ‘hay-fever’. F.W. Bateson, 1964. ‘Alternative to Scrutiny, Essays in Criticism, XIV, 1, 10-20.
p.13.
2 F.R Leavis, 2008. ‘A Review’, Scrutiny, IV, 1935-1936, Cambridge: CUP) p.96.
3 ibid.
4 ibid.
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criticism—and call it ‘literary history’.5 That such a distinction was intended in E.P.E.L. can
be seen in Bateson’s comment that:
Literary history, whatever it is, is not a department of literary criticism. Ideally,
indeed, the two activities do not even overlap; the one is the complement of the other.
They bear, that is, the same relation to each other that the science of organic
chemistry bears to biology; the subject-matter and the method are the same, the
difference is in the initial assumptions involved.6
For Leavis, however, the construct of the separation was fallacious. This was because the
‘kind of history’7 that Bateson promoted was ‘something more than the usual compilation for
the use of examinees—names, titles, dates, ‘facts about,’ irrelevancies, superficial comments
and labour-saving descriptions’.8 In attempting ‘something more’ than the recovery of factual
details about a literary work, argued Leavis, Bateson’s history went beyond the order of
determinable and factual truth, and entered the judicial and subjective domain of critical
judgement and ‘discrimination’.9 The significance of this, according to Leavis, was that due
to its dependence on decisions of a critical nature ‘such a history’10 did not possess the
‘concrete’11 ‘truth’12 and ‘fact’13 that Bateson claimed it to possess.
In an attempt to highlight and expose how Bateson’s ‘radical’14 history intended to
work in light of such a distinction, Leavis reprints Bateson’s statement that:
[The] objection to regarding literature as a function of the social organism is the
literary critic’s objection—not that it cannot be done, but that it can only be done by
disregarding those elements in literature that distinguish good writing from bad. In the
last resort, therefore, the literary historian stands or falls only in so far as he satisfies,
or fails to satisfy, the literary critic. If the interpretation he proposes does not clarify
5 ibid.
6 F.W. Bateson, 1934. English Poetry and the English Language: An Experiment in Literary History, (Oxford:
Clarendon) p.3.
7 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.96.
8 ibid.
9 ibid.
10 ibid.
11 ibid., p.97.
12 ibid., p.96.
13 ibid.
14 ibid. As well as ‘radical’ Leavis refers on several occasions to Bateson’s argument as ‘not clear’ and ‘vague’.
If there is a difficult tension between these concepts—of being radical whilst vague—it is likely to be because
Leavis held a double criticism of Bateson, that being, that he had been vague and not clear in attempting to
express his radical concept of literary history. Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.96-97.
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the central and universal significance of the literature he is treating, it is worthless.
His history may be excellent social history or economic history, but there is one thing
it will not be: it will not be literary history.15
While Bateson’s point was that his literary history must be literary-centric, with its focus on
literature, Leavis disagreed that it was possible to evaluate the past (in its relation to
literature) with a methodology exempt from the performance of critical decisions. Leavis
notes, in a deprecating tone, that Bateson’s ‘history’ ‘looking round for something’ that it
could ‘safely interpret’16 (in order that such ‘decisions’17 may be seen as factual as opposed
to ‘critical’) rather insufficiently ‘settles’18 on the ‘history of words’19 and the history of
change in linguistic tendencies and poetic language. Leavis accounts for his rejection of
linguistic analysis as a basis for a distinction between criticism and literary history by stating:
‘Word’ for [Bateson] is a simple term; ‘denotation’ and ‘connotation’ suffice for his
perception of complexities (Dr Richards’s ‘paradigm on the fluctuations of the word
word’ would have come to him as an inhibiting revelation). But even with a more able
analytic equipment he could not, except as a literary critic making a distinctively
literary-critical approach, have written a more essentially literary history—a history,
that is, unobnoxious to the consideration on which he dismisses the “social” and
“economic”.20
Leavis was highlighting a paradoxical element of Bateson’s approach whereby research of
social, linguistic, and economic contexts were undertaken with the proviso that the aim of
such extrinsic investigation should be to guide the scholar toward a greater understanding of
literature and of literary values. Leavis argued, however, that such extrinsic research—with
its ‘centre of interest’21 and ‘focus in literary values’22— must already assume certain literary
values in order that a decision be made as to what aspects of history are important to the
15 ibid., F.R. Leavis quotes F.W. Bateson, E.P.E.L., p.10.
16 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.97.
17 ibid.
18 ibid.
19 ibid. See chapter 1 in which Bateson’s argument on linguistic evolution is discussed: ‘It is to words therefore,
their history and science, that I invite the historian of poetry to turn. I suggest that poetry develops pari passu
with the words it uses, that its history is a part of the general history of language, and that its changes of style
and mood are merely the reflection of changing tendencies in the uses to which language is being put.’ Bateson,
E.P.E.L., p.25.
20 ibid.
21 ibid.
22 ibid.
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evaluative process. The only way such decisions about history and its relationship to literary
work could be made, argued Leavis, was by critical ‘discrimination’23 and an ‘eye for
significance’.24 With this Leavis made the claim that the very function of Bateson’s literary
history (and the process of determining what is ‘valuable’25 or ‘worth studying’)26 could
therefore ‘be successfully attempted only by a critic and would then be essentially literary
criticism’.27 Furthermore, what is deemed important about the past, argued Leavis, would
stem from a critical decision made from the values and perspectives of the ‘contemporary’,28
‘living’29 and ‘present’30 point in which the evaluation takes place.31 The inversion of this
argument also supported Leavis’s position in that he claimed any such ‘history’ would be
undertaken ‘not because such works were published, had once perhaps a public, and are
habitually referred to in histories of literature’,32 but ‘because works of certain poets are
judged to be of lasting value—of value in the present’.33
This far into Leavis’s review the issues of contention become apparent:  Bateson
believed literary history and criticism were distinct, arguing that they ‘do not even overlap’,34
and that an objective approach to the study of literature could be achieved by an evaluative
23 ibid.
24 ibid.
25 F.R. Leavis, 2008. ‘A Rejoinder’, Scrutiny, IV, 1935-1936, (Cambridge: CUP) p.187.
26 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.98.
27 ibid., p.96.The rejection of Bateson’s separation on the basis it could be ‘successfully attempted only by a
critic and would then be essentially literary criticism’ would become the leitmotif of Leavis’s attack throughout
the exchanges of 1935 and would remain central to his position in 1953.
28 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.98.
29 ibid., p.97.
30 ibid., p.98.
31 Josephine Guy and Ian Small view the basis of Leavis’s argument, as one ‘familiar in hermeneutics’,
whereby, in similar terms, any understanding of the past, ‘because partial, is always a construction placed upon
it’. Josephine Guy and Ian Small, 1993. Politics and Value in English Studies: A Discipline in Crisis?,
(Cambridge: CUP) p.79.  The strength of this refutation, which in effect, demonstrated Bateson’s argument as
centrally comprising a hermeneutic impasse, was one of Leavis’s most effective attacks within the debate. I
attend to it in more detail in chapters 4 and 5. I say most effective ‘direct’ attack, however, because some of the
the other key ways in which Leavis refuted Bateson were by means generally more dependent upon
argumentative strategy and style of polemic, rather than outright the outright disproving of his logic, as seen in
this example. This also is discussed in chapters 4 and 5.
32 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.97.
33 Leavis comments that a history of English poetry would in fact take place because the works are judged to
have lasting value – value as identified in the present. This is a theme in Leavis’s writing that would emerge as
the pioneering line of his Revaluation text several months later in 1936.
34 F.W. Bateson, E.P.E.L., p.3.
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engagement with how a literary work was received in the time of its original composition and
reception in history. Leavis argued the opposite; that criticism and literary history were not
distinct, particularly not Bateson’s type of history, and furthermore, that it was not merely
preferable, but inevitable, that evaluation (even of past literature) was an activity inseparable
from the contemporary ‘living’ values and sensibility of the modern world.
Exposing the tenuous line which E.P.E.L.’s mandate, were it achievable at all, would
entirely depend, Leavis attends to the idea Bateson presents within that such a history could
‘take account of changes in taste and fashion’35 without confusing ‘its business with that of a
history of taste and fashion.’36 For Leavis this was evidence that an implementation of
Bateson’s programme in actual practice was not possible.37 If Bateson’s literary historian
made it his task to observe social and linguistic developments throughout history, argues
Leavis, then his task would be no different from a social and linguistic history of language
and trend: in which case it would be history, but not literary history. On the other hand, if
Bateson’s historian made the literary aspect of historical inquiry the guiding emphasis of his
pursuit, then it would be literary, but it would not be objectively historical in that having
perceived the past from the context of literary values and traditions it will have ‘confused its
business’38 of historical assessment with literary assessment, and would therefore be literary
criticism.
Leavis also makes the argument that if Bateson’s history was, as Bateson would like it
to be considered, void of the subjectivity that characterises judgements of criticism, then a
history of poetry would be open to consideration of all texts and poetry without an initial
35 ibid.
36 ibid.
37 In his reply Bateson he would state that his thesis ‘was entirely theoretical’. F.W. Bateson, 2008. ‘A Reply’,
Scrutiny, IV, 1935-1936, (ed.) F.R. Leavis, (Cambridge: CUP) p.181. Prior to Bateson’s caveat (its significance
not entirely clear) Leavis is insistent within his review that the practical limitations of Bateson’s method cannot
be divorced from an assessment of its overall validity, theoretically, or otherwise.
38 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.97.
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prejudice that would ‘determine and control’39 what texts were ‘worth’40 assessing in the first
place. An example of what Leavis meant by this came in his rejoinder to Bateson’s reply in
which Bateson had provided a short analysis of Dryden’s poetry. It was not Bateson’s
analysis itself that Leavis questioned but rather how (and why) Bateson had arrived at the
conclusion that the poetry of Dryden was worth evaluating.  The implication was that
Bateson had reached a judgement on the importance of Dryden’s poetry via a ‘critical
estimation’41 but that he had presented the nature of his decision on Dryden’s ‘worth’42 as if it
had been ‘determined’43 by ‘fact accepted on authority’.44 As no such authority existed in the
realm of ‘opinion’45argued Leavis, so Bateson’s literary history was, unless it were to
contradict itself by admitting to a fundamental dependence on criticism, devoid of a means of
establishing a starting point of inclusion or exclusion when deciding what work is worthy of
attention within analysis.46
This basis of this argument brought Leavis to his next charge against Bateson, which
requires in order to be understood a presentation of Bateson’s view that:
The English poets are not suspended in a vacuum. They have relations and
connexions both with each other and with the general life of their times, and it should
be possible to illustrate and define those inter-connexions without falling into the
verbose of inanities of “influences” and “tendencies.”47
In seeking to further demonstrate that Bateson’s history could not be separated from
criticism, Leavis states:
39 ibid.
40 Leavis. ‘A Rejoinder’, p.186.
41 Leavis. ‘A Rejoinder’, p.186.
42 ibid.
43 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.97.
44 Leavis. ‘A Rejoinder’, p.186.
45 ibid.
46 Decisions made as to what work one ‘proposes to deal with’ Leavis would add, would stem not from factually
established criterion, but rather from existing pre-conceived, isomorphic, or culturally established ‘judgments of
poetic value’. Leavis. ‘A Rejoinder’, p.186.
47 It is of course natural that with Leavis’s reprinting of certain sections and extracts a certain degree of
contextomy subverts the wider poscēre of the ideological position. ‘Influences’ and ‘tendencies’ for example,
though referred to here as verbose and inane, were important to Bateson, but their importance can be understood
properly only via an understanding of their role in relation of his wider argument. For specific commentary on
‘influences’ and ‘tendencies’ in the context of the meaning intended in Bateson’s methodology see E.P.E.L. p.
3-5, 17, 45-46, 77, 121-123.
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The ‘illustrating’ and ‘defining,’ one must add, will be part of a strictly critical
process—a process of evaluating, and of bringing out the significance of what is
judged to be valuable. The desiderated ‘history’ will be as much a work of criticism as
a critique of a single poet is. ... Such a history, then, could be accomplished only by a
writer interested in, and intelligent about, the present. It would, for one thing, be an
attempt to establish a perspective, to determine what of English poetry of the past is,
or ought to be, alive for us now.48
Leavis’s paragraph emphasises that the processes of ‘illustrating’ and ‘defining’ were
inherently critical processes, and as such Bateson’s claim that they were central to literary
history, meant that the methodological criterion of ‘such a history’49 would ‘fundamentally’50
rely and depend upon criticism. This was also evident, argued Leavis, in Bateson’s ‘grounds
for omitting to consider’51 the poetry of W.B. Yeats and T.S. Eliot on the basis that because
Yeats and Eliot were not English, neither was their language ‘exactly English’.52This type of
judgement was ‘a piece’,53 argued Leavis, with other ‘essentially critical judgements’54 made
by Bateson in the guise of determinable and historical fact. As was Bateson’s belief, added
Leavis, that Houseman ‘benefitted by language’s gains in precision’ in the twenty years
before A Shropshire Lad’.55 This latter statement invoked contention in that Bateson had
supported his claim on the basis that A Shropshire Lad had ‘exactly those qualities of
directness, concision, and inevitability that Hopkins’s style just misses’.56 While Leavis does
not state whether he agrees or disagrees with Bateson’s initial proposition—that Houseman
‘benefitted by the language’s gains’—he emphasises that the stylistic and aesthetic judgement
on which the proposition is supported could not have been reached via a deferment to
historical or linguistic fact, but rather by means of an opinion stemming from a comparative
decision that must have been critical in nature. Despite the absence of Leavis’s view on the
48 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.98.
49 ibid.
50 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.98.
51 ibid.
52 ibid. F.R. Leavis is quoting F.W. Bateson, E.P.E.L., p.70.
53 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.98.
54 ibid., p.97.
55 ibid., p.98.
56 ibid.
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poetry of Houseman in relation to the poetry of Hopkins, he does however take wider issue
with the fact that Bateson’s initial proposition stemmed from a preoccupation with ‘linguistic
flux’.57 For Leavis, Bateson’s acute engagement with what he called the ‘changing and
heterogeneous’58 nature of literature, had served to ‘confuse’59 and ‘misdirect’60 his analytic
attention away from more ‘essential’61 and ‘important themes’62 of consideration.
One such example can be seen in E.P.E.L. where Bateson makes the claim that the
poetry of Thomson, Young, Gray, and Collins was indicative of a baroque style that became a
feature of eighteenth century poetry. Bateson’s observation of this led to his adjoining
assertion that: ‘The baroque style is rapid and inexact: it is rapid because inexact’.63 Just as
before, Leavis does not reprint Bateson’s view on this matter in order to discuss the validity
of its broader claim, but rather that such an observation misses the point of a more significant
matter which should have been addressed instead. Leavis states:
Instead [Bateson] would notice that these poets represent a poetic tradition bearing a
much less satisfactory relation to contemporary life than that borne either by the
Metaphysical tradition or by the tradition that includes Pope and Johnson; and he
would inquire how it was that so unsatisfactory a tradition came to prevail, making
poets ‘literary’ and ‘poetical’ in pejorative senses of those terms.64
Leavis’s argument here is that Bateson would have gained more by considering relationships
of ‘tradition’65 within the eighteenth century as opposed to specific accounts of stylistic trend.
The nature of this advice is similar to Leavis’s following view that a more profitable
57 ibid., F.R. Leavis quotes F.W. Bateson, E.P.E.L. p.7.
58 F.W. Bateson, E.P.E.L. p.7.
59 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.96.
60 ibid.
61 ibid.
62 ibid., p.99.
63 ibid., F.R. Leavis quotes F.W. Bateson, E.P.E.L., p.77.
64 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.99. It is worth noting here that Leavis is able to apply such critical terms as
‘satisfactory’ and ‘unsatisfactory’ without contradicting himself. This is because, unlike Bateson’s E.P.E.L.,
Leavis has not explicitly suggested that the virtue of his approach is its neutral presentation of facts.  While
Leavis may feel and believe that what he is saying is correct, the epistemological paradox of Bateson’s ‘literary
history’ is that it does not, according to Leavis, possess the very objective characteristic upon which its own
autotelic virtue and reason for being, ultimately depends in order for it to be ‘distinct’ from criticism.
65 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.99.
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engagement could have (and should have) been achieved with regard to Bateson’s
commentary on nineteenth-century poetry. Leavis states:
In the nineteenth century [Bateson] would find himself considering similar problems:
how came the Romantic tradition (on which, it its first phase, one’s comment is that,
though alive with the vitality of the age, it made so disappointing a use of the talents
belonging to it) to result in a Victorian poetry so essentially turned away from the
contemporary world and cut off from the sources of vitality?66
Again what can be seen in Leavis’s review is a type of argument that engenders both
condemnation presented in the form of a series of admonitions (that Bateson should been
more aware of) and corrections presented in the form of advice (that Bateson’s ‘elementary
training’,67 had seemingly failed to provide). The effect in terms of what this achieves for
Leavis is also two-fold in that Leavis can be seen to simultaneously promote literature’s
capacity to harbour, reflect, and furthermore, shape, the vitality of the age,68 while equally
asserting that the importance of doing so is of greater extended value than the mere
identification of differences that constitute Bateson’s thesis.
66 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.99-100.
67 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.96.
68 It can be seen that the differences between Leavis and Bateson are evident in their opposing methodological
directives. Hence, it can also be seen in both E.P.E.L. and Leavis’s review that a significant connotative
emphasis (and tension) surrounds the descriptors ‘literary criticism’ and ‘literary history’ and their associated
(through contested) functions.   However, when Leavis’s issues with Bateson’s thesis are collated and their
arguments are examined, much appears to depend on an antithetical position they hold in relation to three types
of sub-issue:  (A) a best means of literary assessment, (B) a best means of understanding literature in relation to
history, and (C) a best means of understanding history in so far as history (can be understood as) revealing and
aiding a better understanding of literature. Though a circular problematic becomes evident in such a broad
model, Bateson’s position in relation to it can be seen in E.P.E.L. where he argues that in order to define a
poetic style:  ‘What we must do is, first of all, to isolate the influence of the age on the theory and practice of the
language, and secondly (but only secondly), when the linguistic tendencies have been defined, to examine their
effect on the poetry.’ Bateson, E.P.E.L., p.vii. For Leavis if practice was to be profitable then Bateson’s directive
must be applied in reverse. Where Bateson argues that the ‘influence of the age upon linguistic tendencies’ was
essential to the examination and understanding of words and by extension the poetry of the age, Leavis argued
differently (as can be seen throughout his association with ‘close reading’). Indeed, Leavis’s argument was that,
the age is to be understood via analysis of the words, then , the poetry, and from the poetry and the traditions of
literature, the ‘spirit of the age’ can be observed. Later in the thesis it will be seen that due to Leavis’s belief that
literature held a capacity to imbue moral and cultural tradition, one of the values he placed on literature in the
context of contemporary culture, was that it could help re-establish a morality in a vastly changing post-
industrial age of modernisation and commercially profiteering capitalist and industry forces. For Leavis such
forces, often associated with he called progressive-scientific and Neo-Benthamite cultural ‘drive’, were
destroying domestic (sometimes noted as Christian) traditional moral values.
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‘Angry’69 at what he would later call the ‘pedantic’70 ‘irritable’71 attack and overall
‘misunderstanding’72 of his essay, the Oxford scholar (as we will see in his reply) defends
himself in strong terms. A contributing factor to the cause of Bateson’s anger is likely to
have been Leavis’s highlighting of many examples where he felt it could be shown that
Bateson had missed ‘essential themes’.73 Where Bateson attends to the belief that Pre-
Raphaelite poetry ‘had been made possible by the vagueness of Mid-Victorian English’;74
Leavis states that the focus should have been on the relationship ‘between Victorian poetry
and the English spoken in the age.’75 Where Bateson states that Pre-Raphaelite poetry and its
function disappeared when language became precise again; attention should have centred, in
Leavis’s view, upon an explanation of ‘what this language was that became precise again
(and by what agency)’.76
Toward its latter stages Leavis’s review extends to a brief comment upon several
centuries all of which, he argues, would be misunderstood if explored by the limitations of
Bateson’s literary history. The first example to which Leavis attends is Bateson’s claim that
due to the constant importation of new words into Elizabethan society, the Elizabethans ‘had
an uneasy feeling all the time that their vocabulary was slipping away from under them, and
suspecting and distrusting it, they did not dare to confide the whole of their meaning to a
single word or phrase.’77 With this, Leavis stated he was in complete disagreement, arguing
that: ‘who from a reading of the verse itself could bring away any other impression than that
69 Bateson, ‘Alternative to Scrutiny’, p.13.
70 ibid.
71 ibid., p.10
72 Bateson, ‘A Reply’, p.181.
73 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.100.
74 ibid., p.99.
75 ibid., p.100.
76 ibid., Leavis concludes by saying that these issues show ‘the essential themes – or what should have been
such for Mr. Bateson, completely missed.’ Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.100.
77 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.98. F.R. Leavis quotes F.W. Bateson, E.P.E.L. p.31
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the poets delight in their prolix fluency, and cultivate it for owns sake’?78 Another example
relates to Bateson’s view that that drama and the novel were ‘relatively impure forms of
literature’79 because their ‘media’ constituted a specific engagement with ideas as opposed to
words. Whilst Leavis doesn’t challenge Bateson regarding the claim that impure language
existed, he does argue that such ‘impurity’80 had actually influenced the styles of the poets in
a profitable way and that this type of observation—of linguistic (literary) pressures of the
novel and play upon the poetry of the period—was precisely the kind which should have
formed the ‘underlying preoccupation of Mr. Bateson’s ideal historian.’81 Observing the
‘force’82 of Leavis’s argument it may be said that the effect is achieved either by exposing the
paradoxical elements of Bateson’s argument with a degree of manipulation or contextomy,
which, as the fallacies are weaved out, imply that the only logical approach remaining is that
of (as Leavis himself promotes) ‘present-centric’83 and ‘lived’84 literary analysis. Or, as an
78 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.98. The issue here is not that of attempting to determine who is ‘correct’ between
Leavis or Bateson. Rather the significant point to consider is that by holding a differing view to Bateson Leavis
demonstrates that such views are subjective, and by implication, critical, as opposed to factual. That said it
should be noted that disagreement in itself does not necessarily constitute evidence that something is subjective
as opposed to factual. We may consider that if Leavis disagreed with a mathematician that 2 + 2 = 4 it would not
appear to destabilise the justification of the mathematic equation in the same way.  See Introduction (fn.56) and
conclusion where I discuss the epistemological implications surrounding the study of literature as a discipline
and field of knowledge. The surface point of expression, however, is equally significant: even if one were to
argue that Leavis was accurate in his assessment that linguistic change provided ‘delight’ (and not ‘unease’) it
may equally be argued that Leavis’s basis for such a claim is unjustified. He refutes Bateson the basis that no-
one ‘could bring away’ a different view. What is evident from Bateson’s E.P.E.L. and the excerpt that Leavis
reprinted was that Bateson brought away a different view, thus invalidating Leavis’s supporting logic (even if
the supporting logic may be more accurately defined as merely the assumption upon which the ‘logic’ of
assertion is expressed).
79 ibid., p.99.
80 ibid. Leavis speaks of ‘the advantages of the ‘impurity’ by which Shakespeare, Marlowe, Jonson, Tourneur
and Middleton profited might be regained for poets—this should be the underlying preoccupation of Mr.
Bateson’s ideal historian. Not that it be obtruded, or even explicit, anywhere.  But it would direct and inform the
eye with which the historian observed the changing conditions determining, from age to age, the use of genius
and talent (in the foreground of the field of attention coming those that fall under the head of literary tradition—
the current heritage of conventions, technical proclivities, habits of expression and approach...’ and as such, in
failing to observe this, Bateson’s historian would thus in turn, fail to have indentified the development that
‘brought the full vitality of the age into poetry and produced a poetry representing a marvellous development of
the language.’ Leavis ‘A Review’, p.99
81 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.98
82 F.W. Bateson, 1964. ‘Alternative to Scrutiny’, Essays in Criticism, XIV, 1, 10-20. p.13.
83 Tae Chul Kim refers to, and explains what he means by, the ‘present-centric’ nature of Leavis’s criticism,
stating that:  ‘Insofar as literature goes, [Leavis] argues, “a lack of interest in the present means usually an
incapacity for any real interest ... in literature at all” (Education 130). He does not believe in “so much claiming
permanent value” of great literature, for “inert concurrence in conventional valuations and reputations” gets “in
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argument of better faith might entail; in exposing the fallacy of the ‘separation’ central to
Bateson’s thesis, Leavis had simply brought to Oxford scholar’s attention several
methodological and hermeneutic issues that he himself had more astutely considered in the
process of arriving at his own method in the months and years earlier.85 The latter, if it is the
case, would thus appear to account for Leavis’s opening statement that, due to Bateson’s
failure to realise these flaws within in his E.P.E.L. thesis, his performance proved
‘unprovided’, ‘unprepared’, and ‘unaware’.86
Leavis’s review, Bateson would go on to say, was ‘the most unfavourable the book
received’.87 ‘Disappointed not to have pleased Leavis’,88 and ‘determined not to take his
the way of life” (Anti-Philosopher 24). By his repeated assertion that English literature has “its reality and life
(if at all) only in the present” or not at all, he does not mean only to see in new literary creation the
“continuation and development” of the past literature, or rather “the decisive, the most significant, contemporary
life of tradition,” but also to actualize the human meaning of the cultural past at the present stage of modernity
(Sword 111 & 120, Valuation 130; Revaluation 9). If “life is growth” (Valuation 223), as he puts it, the
signification of literature “in and of our time,” which is not necessarily the same as that in the original context,
is performed in accordance with the age's demand (Sword 23). It is exactly the case with the function of
criticism in his project of modernity, when he says that criticism is “concerned with the life in the present of the
literature of the past” (Valuation 283). Tae Chul Kim, 2004. ‘F.R. Leavis, or the Function of Criticism under
Specialist Modernity’, Journal of British and American Studies, 10, 1, 81-112. p.95-96.
84 By ‘lived’ criticism I refer to the type initially described by Leavis in Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture
(1930). Leavis states: ‘The minority capable not only of appreciating Dante, Shakespeare, Donne, Baudelaire,
Hardy (to take major instances) but of recognising their latest successors constitute the consciousness of the race
(or a branch of it) at a given time. For such capacity does not belong merely to an isolated aesthetic realm; it
implies responsiveness to theory as well as to art, to science and philosophy in so far as these may affect the
sense of the human situation and of the nature of life. Upon this minority depends out power of profiting by the
finest human experience of the past; they keep alive the subtlest and most perishable parts of a tradition. Upon
them depend the implicit standards that order the finer living of an age, the sense that this is worth more than
that, this rather than that is the direction in which to go, that centre is here rather than there. In keeping, to use a
metaphor that is metonymy also and will bear a good deal of pondering, is the language, the changing idion,
upon which the living depends, and without which distinction of spirit is thwarted and incoherent.’ F.R. Leavis,
1930. Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture, (Cambridge: Minority) p. 5-6. [Also reprinted in For Continuity
and Education and the University (2nd edition: 1948)] in which case p. 14-15. This position Leavis would
reformulate as ‘the living principle’ which I discuss in chapters 4 and 5.
85 See chapter 1 where I have noted that although this argument was made in New Bearings it was also
expressed in the editorial manifesto of Scrutiny’s first issue (1932), as well in Leavis’s introduction to Towards
Standards of Criticism in 1933. The wider effectiveness of Leavis’s argument becomes apparent in that these
admonitions lead to the critical conclusions that inform the approach Leavis set out to establish in New Bearings
and the early critical doctrine of Scrutiny – that being, (to a large extent) a criticism that is intelligent about, and
interested in, poetry that is ‘alive for us now’. Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.97.
86 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.96.
87 F.W. Bateson, 1978. ‘Editorial Postscript: F.R.L and E in C: A Retrospect’, Essays in Criticism. XXVIII, 4,
353-361, p. 355. Also see Chapter one where it is detailed that Bateson requested permission to publicly defend
Leavis’s negative review of E.P.E.L., and for his response: ‘A Comment’ to be made ‘public’; that is, printed in
Scrutiny in the journal’s following issue.  Bateson, however, despite having later expressed an admiration for
Scrutiny is equally noted to have ‘refused to allow the Corpus Christi College library to stock . . . or acquire the
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displeasure lying down’,89 Bateson enquired as to how many words Scrutiny could spare for a
retort. The reply from Leavis was that he could have 2,000 words and his response would
appear in the following September issue. Bateson’s carefully written90 reply began by
highlighting that Leavis’s review raised a more significant issue than the particular merits or
demerits of his E.P.E.L. thesis, that being; the nature of the relationship between literary
history and literary criticism. Bateson writes:
I have devoted more than half my Introduction [of E.P.E.L.] to defining, or attempting
to define, what I conceive to be the essential differences between the two activities.
Dr. Leavis, however, will have none of this. If I understand him he will not allow that
there can be any such thing as literary history. A literary history, he writes, ‘could be
successfully attempted only by a critic and would then be essentially literary
criticism.’91
The reason Leavis’s review was so negative, argued Bateson, was that he did not properly
understand the differences between criticism and literary history as explained in E.P.E.L.
With this belief set out the objective of Bateson’s reply was to ‘state the case for literary
history in different and more concrete terms’.92 Bateson began the reply by providing an
assertion with which he hoped Leavis would agree: ‘that the majority of propositions about
literature, other than mere statements of fact, can be subsumed in a final analysis under two
types.’93He continues:
The formula for type I, a simple example of which would be Dryden’s tribute to
Waller (‘Unless he had written, none of us could write’), might be ‘A derives from B.’
And similarly Type II, which is exemplified by Arnold’s dictum that ‘The best of
Addison’s composition (the “Coverley Papers” in the Spectator, for example, wears
reprint edition of Scrutiny. Valentine Cunningham, 1979. ‘F.W. Bateson: Scholar, Critic, and Scholar-Critic’,
Essays in Criticism, XXIX, 2, 139-155, p. 145.
88 Bateson, Editorial Postscript: F.R.L and E in C: A Retrospect’, p.355.
89 ibid.
90 In reflecting on the writing of his reply, Bateson recalls: ‘I seem to remember taking a good deal of trouble
with those two thousand words’. The reason being, that Bateson was adamant to prove his thesis valid by re-
stating its proposal in clear (and as close to irrefutable terms) as possible within 2000 words. F.W. Bateson,
1964. ‘Alternative to Scrutiny, Essays in Criticism, XIV, 1, 10-20. p.13.
91 Bateson, ‘A Reply’, p.181.
92Despite the conciliatory tone of Bateson’s reply (his aim initially was to please Leavis); in re-stating his case
for the distinction between criticism and literary history, he would claim that it was now to prove Leavis
‘demonstrably wrong’. Bateson, ‘A Reply’, p.181.
93 Bateson, ‘A Reply’, p.181.
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better than the best of Pope’s,’ could be reduced to ‘A is better than B,’ or even just
‘A is good.’94
For Bateson ‘Type I’ constituted ‘literary history’, whereas ‘Type II’, ‘literary criticism’. But
these ‘labels’, he argued, were less important than the ‘realization that the two types of
proposition represent two different orders of truth.’95 The proposal of Type I, that A derives
from B, naturally must extend to – ‘and I can prove it.’96 Via examining parallel literary
passages, Bateson argued, sufficient evidence of derivation and influence could be identified
as ‘proof’, and thus, in turn, that proof would constitute ‘fact’97—the principal component of
literary history.  The statement of type 2, however, that A is better than B, was different in
that it ‘merely’98 represented a statement of ‘opinion’.99 Stating that such ‘analysis can be
taken a step further’ Bateson states:
A critical judgment, such as that cited from Arnold, is the expression of an immediate
intuition. In its entirety it is necessarily inexplicable and incommunicable. Arnold, if
one comes to think of it, was comparing the total impression made on him by years of
familiarity with Addison’s prose not only with the analogous impression he had of
Pope’s verse but also with his more diffused feeling of what in general constitutes
good writing. And the half-conscious balancing of all these impressions against each
other resulted in the dictum.100
Bateson’s argument is that the process through which Arnold arrived at his judgement is
unavailable for all in that in order to assent to such a judgement (that exact judgement of
Arnold’s) we would have to read Addison and Pope in precisely the same way, and against
precisely the same literary experience, background, and criterion, as Arnold himself. When
discussing the nature of the critical function—such as the example here of a critical
judgement made by Arnold—Bateson raises the inherency of the subjective (or relativist)
94 ibid.
95 ibid.
96 ibid.
97 A precise understanding of what Bateson means by ‘fact’ (the epistemological entity in a literary context) can
be seen in his definition, that‘fact[:] Its truth or falsehood can be tested by a simple examination of relevant
evidence, e.g. that provided by parallel passages, just as a fact is tested in a court of law.’ Bateson, ‘A Reply’,
p.182.
98 Bateson, ‘A Reply’, p.182.
99 ibid., ‘Opinion’ for Bateson (his italics) constituted a different order of judgement than ‘factual’ judgements
that were ‘proof’-based or evidentially-supported.  As with the problematic (oxymoron) of ‘objective opinion’,
the semantic and logical implication of the term ‘factual judgement’ is examined further in the conclusion.
100 Bateson, ‘A Reply’, p.182.
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problematic: that individual readers approach a phenomenological viewpoint from the shape
of their own experience.101 By distinction however, when discussing the function of the
literary historian the issue of subjective ‘opinion’ is not perceived as a concern or inherent
feature of the process. Indeed, ‘for the literary historian’ argues Bateson, ‘life is much
simpler’,102 and simpler because:
A historical thesis, such as Dryden’s remark already quoted, either proves or
disproves itself. The historian has simply to present his reader with the evidence upon
which he has himself based his conclusion, and if the evidence proves to be
trustworthy and adequate his reader can have no alternative except to concur in it.103
From this is it clear to see why, in seeking to establish an objectively positivist approach to
the study of literature, Bateson perceives the facticity of literary history as preferable over the
subjective nature of criticism. Having outlined his position Bateson returns his attention to
Leavis’s ‘demonstrably wrong’104 belief that literary history is essentially literary criticism.
In his attempt to disprove this Bateson argues that ‘Dr. Leavis’s paradox can mean three
different things’:105
He may mean: (1) that a historical proposition (‘Pope derives from Dryden’) is
indistinguishable from a critical proposition (‘Pope is better than Dryden’); or (2) that
101 Bateson’s argument here is that due to the subjective nature of ‘critical’ judgements of literature, such
judgements can only at best amount to a concept of values rather a fact or universally accepted truth. Bateson
sees this as problematic. While Bateson is correct is saying this is problematic for the discipline (hence the
importance his bestows on the corrective properties of factual scholarship) to term it as a ‘problem’ is inaccurate
if by extension ‘problem’ presupposes the possibility of resolution. A resolution would require the presence of
what—in the interpretational ‘critical’ domain of literature—is ontologically elusive; that being, as stated: a
means to validate a method or interpretation as correct. The subjective or ‘individualising’ nature of criticism
then, as distinct from the law-like nomothetic domain of, say, the natural sciences, thus encounters an impasse
which may be understood most accurately as a condition that is immanent. The shift, however, from calling
subjectivity a ‘problem ‘ to calling it a ‘condition’ does not in itself assail the implications the impasse has upon
the critical act as a discipline in which principles of criterion and standards of practice are sought. Ultimately is
for these reasons that Bateson seeks a method conducive to ‘fact’ in the belief that ‘fact’ can determine
‘authority’. In chapter 5 and the conclusion I will further explore the argument that wider attempts made
throughout twentieth-century discourse to unify or calibrate critical perceptions of literary merit and methods of
analysis result consistently in the type of conflict amongst critics and theorists which can be seen to emerge here
in Bateson’s reply to Leavis.
102 Bateson, ‘A Reply’, p.182.
103 The only thing Bateson says by way of admonition regarding his historical method is that its function
requires mutually accepted rules of evidence. Such evidence can adduced from ‘fact’ (see fn.83) which in turn
can be can be adduced by the comparative exercise of observing, simultaneously, the literary text, and the
biographical, political, or social history surrounding it.
104 Bateson, ‘A Reply’, p.181.
105 ibid. By ‘Dr. Leavis’s paradox’ Bateson was referring to what he deemed to be Leavis’s paradoxical belief
that that literary history was literary criticism.
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a historical proposition is just not worth making; or (3) that historical propositions are
of subsidiary importance and can be taken by the critics in their stride. But (1) is
nonsense and the strict application of (2) would make any continuous survey of
literature an impossibility. It is (3) therefore that Dr. Leavis probably intends, and (3)
has a certain plausibility.106
For Bateson, while ‘historians may be subordinate to the critic’,107 it was important to
recognise that without the work of the historian critics like Leavis would be without texts,
without dates, and ‘without half the data out of which their judgements emerge.’108
Furthermore, he added, ‘only a very exceptional critic’109 could himself do the work of the
historian because the skills required are distinct from those skills required in criticism. The
skills—‘the desiderata’110—of criticism are, noted Bateson: ‘Taste, literary skill, a certain
self-confidence, and finally a strong urge to impose order in the chaos of contemporary
opinion.’111 By distinction the literary historian required ‘the more prosaic virtues of
curiosity, learning, patience and accuracy.’112 Despite most likely being aware that Leavis
would retaliate,113 Bateson nevertheless used this presentation of distinguishing skill-sets to
tell Leavis that he felt him to be devoid of those necessary to the practice of literary
history.114
106 Bateson, ‘A Reply’, p.182. Observation of Bateson’s style of argumentation will identify a tendency to
provide logical breakdowns comprising clearly numbered distinctions. While in the case of his reply to Leavis
this may seen as an attempt to ensure clarity given Leavis’s claims that his argument in E.P.E.L. was ‘not clear’,
it may also be noted that similar numerical breakdowns were used throughout E.P.E.L. to explain certain points
prior to Leavis’s accusation that he was ‘not clear’ and even later (in 1953) Leavis’s accusation that Bateson
was guilty of obscurantism.
107 ibid., p.183.
108 ibid.
109 ibid.
110 ibid.
111 ibid.
112 ibid.
113 The possibility that Bateson knew Leavis would retaliate if charged with lacking skills increases in direct
relation to how well Bateson was acquainted with Leavis’s other clashes in the correspondence section of
Scrutiny. I detail this in more detail as it becomes evident in the  tensions surrounding the second phase of the
debate, but it is worth noting that prior to Bateson’s reply (1935) accusations of incompetence (either directed to
himself personally or more widely at the Scrutiny journal) were met with “neurotic,” “petty,” “authoritarian,”
[and] “impossibly haughty,” responses from Leavis. Paul Dean, 1996. ‘The Last Critic? The Importance of F.R.
Leavis’, The New Criterion, 14, 1, 28-35. p.28.
114 This in effect ended what had thus far been a rather conciliatory tone of dispute from Bateson’s side.
However, the repercussive significance of the attack becomes evident when Leavis, in his rejoinder, remarks
that the comment caused him particular offence. Henceforth the tone of Leavis’s attacks on Bateson increased in
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Stating that Scrutiny was the right place to discuss the failings of eminent critics
Bateson argues that T.S. Eliot’s Sacred Wood (1921) although a generally ‘good’115 book,
demonstrated precisely the type of ‘indifference’116 to scholarship which gave it a certain
‘regrettable capriciousness’.117 In an effort to expose the consequences of neglecting
scholarship in literary evaluation, Bateson writes of Eliot:
Some of his observations are reckless almost to a point of impudence. I must content
myself with one example, selected almost at random, from ‘Some Notes on the Blank
Verse of Christopher Marlowe’:
‘The rapid long sentence, running line into line . . . marks the
certain escape of blank verse from the rhymed couplet, and
from the elegiac or rather pastoral note of Surrey, to which
Tennyson returned. If you contrast these two soliloquies with
the verse of Marlowe’s greatest contemporary, Kyd—by no
means a despicable versifier—you see the importance of the
innovation:
The one took sanctuary, and, being sent for out,
Was murdered in Southwark as he passed
To Greenwich, where the Lord Protector lay.
Black Will was burned in Flushing on a stage;
Green was hanged at Osbridge in Kent . . .
118
which is not really inferior to:
So these four abode
Within one house together; and as years
Went forward, Mary took another mate;
But Dora lived unmarried till her death.
(Tennyson, Dora).’
For several reasons, argued Bateson, a scholar would reject Eliot’s reading of Kyd and
Tennyson. 119 First, ‘he would want to know what was meant by Tennyson’s ‘return’ to
their pejorative contempt. Furthermore, this method of aggravating Leavis was also used by Bateson in 1953,
and as I detail in chapter 3 can be seen as contributing a degree of personal antagonism within the discourse.
115 Bateson, ‘A Reply’, p.184.
116 ibid.
117 ibid.
118 See (fn.124)
119 Bateson would elaborate his criticism of Eliot on this matter thirty-seven years later. See the attack in which
Leavis is also mentioned in a footnote of on p.21. F.W. Bateson, 1972. Scholar Critic, (London: Routledge &
Kegan and Paul). p.19-22.
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Surrey.’120 For Bateson, Eliot’s ‘reckless’ equating of Tennyson’s style with Surrey’s
evidenced a failure to identify that ‘Tennyson’s blank verse, though less varied than
Marlowe’s, is not end-stopped like Surrey’s’,121 and furthermore, would that Tennyson’s use
of the ‘long sentence’122 wasn’t merely a point of difference, but rather a ‘prominent’ and
central ‘feature’ of distinction.123 In addition, says Bateson, a scholar would protest Eliot’s
‘unqualified attribution of Arden of Feversham (from which Mr. Eliot’s quotation comes) to
Kyd.’124 Indeed, due to Eliot’s lack of scholarly concern for accuracy125 he appears unaware
that such an ‘attribution is still entirely conjectural.’126 It was also, in Bateson’s view, a
failure of Eliot’s criticism to claim that Kyd was ‘Marlowe’s greatest contemporary.’127 It
wasn’t the nature of the judgement per se that Bateson was calling into question (for he knew
criticism was essentially ‘opinion’128) but rather Eliot’s potential oversight of the ‘fact’ that
‘Shakespeare was born in the same year as Marlowe’.129 Indeed, unless Eliot was of the view
that Kyd was ‘greater’ therefore, than Shakespeare, then his own statement would be in
contradiction to his own critical values, and it would have been an error born out neglect of
scholarly consideration of history. An even more serious problem with Eliot’s reading,
according to Bateson, was that of failing to identify the difference between ‘the deliberate
naïvety of Tennyson’s Dora’ and ‘the artlessness of Arden.’130 Again, if he had been more
scholarly in his criticism, Eliot would have known that ‘Tennyson’s poem (which Mr. Eliot
120 Bateson, ‘A Reply’, p.185.
121 ibid.
122 ibid.
123 ibid.
124 Bateson highlights the fact that in ‘Some Notes on the Blank Verse of Christopher Marlowe’ Eliot does not
source the first stanza. He does attribute it to Kyd, but under where the stanza is printed there is no author/title
as there is under the stanza from Tennyson’s Dora. See (fn.118) for place of omission.
125 ibid.
126 ibid.
127 ibid.
128 ibid.
129 ibid.
130 ibid.
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incidentally misquotes) is a clever, if hollow, pastiche of Wordsworth’.131 Eliot’s claim then
that Tennyson’s stanza is not really inferior to the crude metrical prose of the Elizabethan
dramatist is about ‘as helpful’, states Bateson, ‘as saying that chalk is not really inferior to
cheese.’132 The wider effect of Bateson’s attack, however, can be seen in that it demonstrated
to Leavis, that in refusing to acknowledge the distinct properties (and value) of scholarly
engagement, such critical oversight could occur in his own criticism just as it evidently had in
even the best of Eliot’s critical work.133
With his point made, Bateson moved toward his conclusion by stating that while
scholarship was distinct from criticism due to its ability to attend to those issues raised above,
his argument should not be understood as one proposing a ‘total divorce’134 of the two
activities.135 Indeed his argument was of the contrary that both suffered from an ignorance
and suspicion of each other. His reason for writing E.P.E.L., he reflected, was to ‘bridge the
gulf between them’136 by showing critics that a scholar ‘could be aware of their problems’,137
whilst at the same, highlighting that the scholarly approach must be ‘different from theirs’:138
‘What I desiderate is not a deletion of the frontiers between the two professions but a more
intimate co-operation between them.’139 Leavis’s review of his book, he admits, may have, at
131 ibid.
132 ibid.
133 Leavis, however, would provide the caveat that while he ‘admired’ Eliot’s criticism, it would be wrong for
Bateson to imply that its type was identical to Eliot’s and therefore equally guilty of any such ‘failings’. In
discussing Eliot’s influence on his own critical practice, Leavis would later add, that although he admired Eliot,
that didn’t make him a ‘follower’ of Eliot—‘ (The suggestion that I am one must, I think, be as surprising to him
as it is to me.)’ ‘To call me a follower of Dr. Johnson and Matthew Arnold and D.H. Lawrence, critics with
whom I find myself much more in sympathy, would be less misleading.’ F.R. Leavis, 1951. ‘The Legacy of the
“Twenties”’, The Listener, 29, 3, 495-505. p.502-3
134 Bateson, ‘A Reply’, p.183.
135 Bateson’s conclusion which advocates an ‘intimate co-operation’ of criticism and literary history, offers in its
final analysis, a similar proposal of balance to that which Bateson would also raise in his ‘The Function of
Criticism at the Present Time’ essay of 1953. On both occasions, Bateson would promote the importance of
balance (acknowledging that in doing so his proposal may come as a surprise to some). That such isolation
between the activities of criticism and history had occurred in the public-academic sphere, Bateson evidenced
by asking: ‘How many of the subscribers to Scrutiny and The Criterion are also readers of the Review of
English Studies and the Modern Language Review?’ Bateson, ‘A Reply’, p.184.
136 Bateson, ‘A Reply’, p.183.
137 ibid.
138 ibid.
139 Bateson, ‘A Reply’, p.184.
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most, highlighted that it was, in places, a little ‘presumptuous’,140 but that the argument was
correct and important, Bateson remained certain. Certain that: ‘our critics ought to be more
scholarly and our scholars more critical.  This, however, was not achievable by merely
conflating criticism and scholarship together and ‘pretending’,141as ‘Dr. Leavis’ was inclined,
that they were one and ‘the same thing.’142 Bateson concludes on a somewhat triumphant
note with a final re-statement to this effect, by writing:
My moral is, I trust, fairly obvious. Literary history and literary criticism both have a
perfectly good right to exist, and each can learn something from the other. If Dr.
Leavis will try and persuade his fellow critics to adopt a somewhat less arrogant
attitude towards scholarship, I will see if I can induce some of our scholars to think
less harshly of him—and perhaps even to read his books.143
Leavis begins his rejoinder by stating:
I did not intend to give Mr. Bateson any excuse for supposing that I despise
scholarship and I am very sorry if I have given him any. I intended to criticize his
scholarship for being incomplete; to insist that it was inadequate for his undertaking
because (a) it relied fundamentally upon such concepts as ‘word’ and ‘language’
without, apparently, any realization of the difficulty or any acquaintance with the
relevant analysis, and (b) it was insufficiently informed and guided by criticism.144
Bateson’s defence was inadequate in Leavis’s opinion. Inadequate because, as he had stated
in his initial review, ‘the kind of history that he undertakes, could be successfully attempted
only by a critic and would then be essentially criticism.’145 Leavis wished to make clear that
his objection to ‘Bateson’s type of history’ was not of the ‘generality that Mr. Bateson
imputes’:  as an attack on the possibility that literary history could exist at all. Leavis writes:
I have no doubt at all that there may be histories consisting, in so far as they have any
use, of mere statements of fact about works of literature—works the assumed values
of which the historian takes as fact too, without asking how it came to be fact. 146
140 ibid.
141 ibid.
142 ibid.
143 ibid., p.185.
144 Leavis. ‘A Rejoinder’, p.186.
145 ibid.
146 ibid.
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Leavis’s remark, ‘in so far as they have any use’ ‘slipped in’ he states, because he knows of
no history, that when the judgements within are assessed ‘doesn’t make a show of
criticism’.147 Leavis’s view on this matter is also seen in his argument that ‘any history that
deals in influences is committed to criticism—as Mr. Bateson, in his own way, is
committed.’148 The point here, and that which may be understood as the central point of
Leavis’s rejoinder, was that Bateson’s ‘radical distinction’149 comprises, at its core, a view
that scholarship is defined by an engagement and interest in ‘fact’,150 whereas criticism, an
engagement and interest in ‘opinion’.151 This was not acceptable to Leavis, and he made his
case accordingly:
The distinction that he reduces to the difference between fact and opinion, seems to
me extraordinarily uncritical (I hope he won’t think this begging the question). What
is this ‘fact’ of the ‘dependence’ of Dryden’s poetry on Waller’s’? I should like to see
by what ‘sober-evidence weighing’ Mr. Bateson would set out to establish it. The
only evidence he specifies is ‘that provided by parallel passages’—by which, indeed,
Dryden can be proved to have read Waller just as he can be proved to have read
Cowley and Milton. But the most sober weighing can go no further, except in terms of
critical judgments of a most complex and delicate order. 152
Leavis argues that Bateson’s theory stems from an ‘absurdly simple notion’153 of what
criticism is, that being, that critics simply invoke judgements such as ‘this is good or bad’.154
In observing the first of two related points Leavis makes in regard to this over-simplified
notion, Leavis states:
Mr. Bateson as a literary historian can have access to the works he proposes to deal
with—to his most essential facts—only if he is sufficiently a critic; only by an
appropriate and discriminating response to them; a response, that is, involving the
kind of activity that produces value-judgments. And these judgments are not, in so far
as they are real, expressions of opinion on facts than can be possessed and handled
neutrally (so to speak).155
147 ibid.
148 ibid.
149 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.98.
150 Leavis. ‘A Rejoinder’, p.186.
151 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.97.
152 Leavis. ‘A Rejoinder’, p.186.
153 ibid., p.187.
154 ibid.
155 ibid.
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The argument presented by Leavis here is one of dialectical return in that he assumes reason
in what he believes to be Bateson’s straw-man so as to show that if such a claim were true—
that that criticism was merely about ‘value’156 judgements—then it would be true also of
literary history, because literary history depended on the same type of judgements as
criticism. The second aspect of Leavis’s response sees him express that he ‘deplores Mr.
Bateson’s attitude because it encourages a lazy notion of criticism.’157
The critic should be at least as arduously concerned for ‘fact’ as the scholar; not
merely because he should pay due attention to the relevant facts of scholarship, but
because he should be controlled by the determination to justify his treating as a fact of
the public world something that cannot be tripped over, passed from hand to hand,
brought into a laboratory, or, in any literal sense, pointed to.158
In order then, Leavis suggests, for the critic to justify his ‘opinion’ and set it into the public
world-sphere as a type of non-nomothetic ‘fact’, the judgement and the process by which the
judgement is arrived at must be a process extraordinarily critical itself; critical in the sense
that it precludes a consciousness of its own responsibility. The method Leavis proposes to
achieve this (rather metaphysical) doctrine of self-aware critical responsibility sees him
produce a list that correlates to (and corrects) the parallel passage in Bateson’s reply where
Bateson listed the performative qualities of criticism and scholarship in order to demonstrate
that their skill-sets, and as such, their functions, were distinct. Where Bateson had argued that
the essential ‘qualifications’159 of a critic must be (as I have discussed above): ‘Taste, literary
skill, a certain self-confidence, and finally an imperious urge to impose order upon the chaos
of contemporary opinion’, Leavis argued that critic should assume a state of ‘not self-
confidence, but cultivated self-mistrust; not assertiveness, but disciplined and strenuous
humility and docility.’160 These qualitative features of criticism, Leavis notes, pre-suppose a
156 ibid.
157 ibid.
158 ibid.
159 Bateson, ‘A Reply’, p.183.
160 Leavis. ‘A Rejoinder’, p.187.
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dependence on the virtues of, ‘curiosity’, ‘patience’ and ‘accuracy’.’161 What can be seen is
that these terms are direct quotations from what Bateson deemed essential to the literary
historian. As such Leavis can be seen to make the point that the qualities Bateson claimed
were fundamental to the literary historian, were fundamental also to the skills of the literary
critic,   thereby again dissolving the construct of Bateson’s ‘separation’ between the
functions. Leavis’s moves toward his conclusion by stating that he was aware of short-
comings in some of Eliot’s criticism (particularly the passage Bateson had analysed),
however he was of little doubt that Eliot would observe Bateson’s response, as it stood, as
combining ‘pedantry with inaccuracy’.162 ‘And as for Mr. Bateson’s book, I did not think it
necessary to say in my review (what I say now) that I found it well worth disagreeing with
and that I was grateful for the opportunity’163 to do so.164
161 ibid.
162 ibid., See (fn.133)
163 Leavis. ‘A Rejoinder’, p.187.
164 The debate of 1935 would, in Scrutiny at least, draw to a close at this point. The issues contested in the
debate, however, would permeate throughout several published works in the following period. The first to note
of these was Leavis’s Revaluation: Tradition and Development in English Poetry (1936). Though Revaluation
constructs its own poscēre, as distinct from the issues of the debate per se, many significant parallels
nevertheless can be identified between it and New Bearings four years earlier. Leavis argued that an effort
should be made to differentiate or distinguish authors whose work was still ‘living’ and therefore representative
of the tradition of ‘culture’ that descended from Shakespeare. This concept had previously been introduced by
Leavis when in New Bearings he expressed a belief that ‘certain key figures represented the Shakespearean
tradition but in the nineteenth century, poetry became the vehicle for an escape into a dream world.’ Richard
Storer, 2009. F.R. Leavis, (London: Routledge) p.83. Revaluation’s preoccupation with the culture of influence
can be seen, certainly in a synoptic sense, in the attempts it makes to distinguish literary styles, lines of
influence, and of course, traditions throughout literary history. Though this is achieved on a level gauge-able
only through a reading of the text, it is worth noting that all judgements within Revaluation stem from explicit
value judgements made by Leavis. While this is not uncommon, it fails as a methodology in overturning the
inevitable subjective mechanism of critical performance, the very concern Bateson held with Leavis. In this
sense, even Revaluation which was a text more influential and identifiable than the Leavis-Bateson debate itself
pivots on the meta-critical inquiries of Leavis’s clash with Bateson. In simple terms this means that Leavis’s
judgements about what work is worthy of merit, and what work has provided influence or impact upon wider
literature, stems from a source, and that source; is his own critical standards. Later, when writing ‘Retrospect of
a Decade’ (1940) Leavis felt the significant achievement of Scrutiny was, in many ways, evident in its mission
and therefore seen through its success in achieving its aims. But as Leavis asks Bateson, ‘What are these facts?’
the same must be applied in question of Leavis, ‘What is this intelligent criticism?’. This specifically is
Bateson’s central attack.  In ‘Retrospect of a Decade’ Leavis makes no reference to his debate with Bateson.
What can be found though is the statement from Leavis that: ‘there is one aspect of the unfavourable state of
civilization that especially concerns Scrutiny and its specific function. In all ages, no doubt, there have been
cliques and coteries, and young writers have founded mutual-admiration societies and done their best to make
these coincident with the literary world—the world that determines current valuations. F.R. Leavis, 1940.
‘Retrospect of a Decade’ Scrutiny, IX, I, 70-72. p.71. In this sense, while not directly acknowledging Bateson,
Leavis situates his philosophy (and its committed focus upon contemporary or ‘current valuations’) in direct
opposition to Bateson. Between Leavis’s ‘Retrospect of a Decade’ and ‘Scrutiny: After Ten years’ published
CHAPTER TWO The Leavis-Bateson Debate: The 1935 Exchanges
58
two years later in 1942, Bateson had completed the editing of his Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature
(1940). The theoretical friction with Leavis is maintained due to the type of criticism (scholarship) that the
Cambridge bibliography offered. This was very much the collection of ‘dates, figures, names,’ etc. that Leavis,
within the 1935 debate, had stated were an insufficient guiding-tool of criticism, and yet depending as they do
upon critical judgements made from the perspective of the present about the past, were inseparable from
criticism. See (fn. 42). In ‘After Ten Years: Editorial’ (1942) Leavis would again state this belief, expressing
also that he sought to bring together concerns of culture and art with the ‘contemporary civilization’, and
furthermore, that he viewed the ‘university’ as the setting by which such a responsibility rests. F.R. Leavis,
1942. ‘After Ten Years: Editorial’, Scrutiny, IX, 4, 326-239. p.327. His assessment of Scrutiny’s efforts in
representing this ideology and propagandizing it throughout the educational and academic worlds was that it
could influence a university setting. It would thus form the focus of his Education and the University written
and published the following year in 1943.
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE LEAVIS-BATESON DEBATE: THE 1953 EXCHANGES
Bateson’s essay that outlined the mandate for his Oxford journal Essays in Criticism is a
good place to begin an understanding of the exchanges between Leavis and Bateson in 1953.
And a useful point of departure is to consider Richard Storer’s view that behind Bateson’s
essay and the ensuing exchanges:
Was a battle between the old and the new journal over which could rightfully claim to
be in the Arnoldian tradition (‘Essays in Criticism’ and ‘The Function of Criticism at
the Present Time’ were the titles of well-known works by Arnold). The traditional
rivalry between Oxford and Cambridge perhaps also played a part, although both
Bateson and Leavis regarded themselves as outsiders in their respective
establishments.1
The excerpt from Storer comprises two main observations; the first being that both journals
sought above the other the claim of being a more authentic representation of the critical
ideology of Matthew Arnold. The second observation of Storer’s suggests that a duality or
uncertainty exists in relation to how much the debate can be seen as an extension of Oxford-
Cambridge rivalry. Starting with the latter claim it may be said that certain elements of the
critical values and approaches contested by Leavis and Bateson were rooted, in part, in the
critical traditions and ideologies of their respective universities. But Storer’s caveat that they
were both ‘outsiders’ is a well documented sentiment.2 With regards to Leavis, I have noted
this in the first chapter, and refer here to his statement that the literary-critical ideology of
Scrutiny represented, ‘the essential Cambridge in spite of Cambridge’.3 Records of Bateson’s
relationship with his employers and colleagues at Oxford indicate a similar type of unease to
1 Richard Storer, 2009. F.R. Leavis, (London: Routledge) p.91-92.
2 Beyond Storer, several other critics also regarded both Leavis and Bateson as ‘outsiders’ in their relation to
their respective universities.  As this is commonly present in accounts of both men, I will two other examples:
Valentine Cunningham (who knew Bateson) stated that ‘his voice was always a dissenting one, from outside’.
Valentine Cunningham, 1979. ‘F.W. Bateson: Scholar, Critic, and Scholar-Critic’, Essays in Criticism, XXIX,
2, 139-155. p.149. And Graham Martin states ‘Bateson was as much an outsider to his English Faculty as Leavis
to his’. Graham Martin, 1996. ‘F.R. Leavis and the Function of Criticism’, Essays in Criticism, XLVI, 1, 1-15.
p.2.
3 Ian Mackillop, 1997. F.R. Leavis: A Life in Criticism (London: Penguin) p.142.
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that which had existed, as MacKillop suggests, between Cambridge and Leavis. Bateson
would recollect in an ‘Editorial Commentary’ in 1965 the following memory of Essay in
Criticism’s reception at Oxford:
I remember breaking the news of our project to F.P. Wilson, a kindly scholar who was
then the Merton Professor of English Literature. ‘You must make it absolutely clear,’
he insisted, ‘that your journal has not received any official blessing whatever.’ I think
he was perhaps a little surprised at the degree of enthusiasm with which I accepted the
limitation. ‘We don’t want an official blessing,’ I assured him, ‘what would be nice
would be an official curse.’ Of course, Oxford being Oxford, the curse if there was
one, was only pronounced sotto voce.4
Bateson’s ‘outsider’ attitude and character and his personal and ideological relationship with
the English Faculty at Oxford form a central focus of Valentine Cunningham’s essay ‘F.W.
Bateson: Scholar, Critic, and Scholar-Critic’ (1979). Cunningham writes that Essays in
Criticism ‘was founded because [Bateson] had let the Oxford English School down for too
long’ . . . [his] voice had always been a dissenting one’—both ‘zestily irresponsible as well as
dutifully responsible’ . . . he ‘made no bones about what rankled him, nor about the amount
of himself he had invested in his choosing to live as a scholar-critic in Oxford.’5 But
Cunningham also notes that Bateson ‘craved acceptance from the system he scorned’,6 a
similar type of contradiction that Leavis harboured with regard to Cambridge as suggested by
his disappointment at not receiving tenureship in 1931. The point here is that a certain
animosity (particularly in their early careers) had led to a feeling in both men of only partial
personal and ideological loyalty to their respective institutions. As such whilst Essays in
Criticism was founded by Bateson at Oxford, and Scrutiny, by Leavis at Cambridge, care
must be taken to avoid associating the ideology of either men, or indeed the journals they
4 F.W. Bateson, 1965. ‘Editorial Commentary: The Second Breath’, Essays in Criticism, XV, 1, 1-5, p.1.
5 Cunningham, p.147.
6 ibid.
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edited, as completely representative of their universities, or the prominent critical-ideological
positions their universities held.7
If a less than perfect relationship with their institutions was shared by Leavis and
Bateson, another similarity it can be said, and that of Storer’s second point, was the respect
they held for the critical philosophy of Matthew Arnold. Bateson begins ‘The Function of
Criticism at the Present Time’ (1953) by outlining what he terms as his essays ‘real
concerns’:8
MY title, it will be seen, repeats that of a well-known essay of Matthew Arnold’s. In
what is intended to be an editorial pronouncement on Essays in Criticism’s point of
view and programme it seemed appropriate to invoke the ‘idea of the critic’s
business’, as it was outlined by Arnold in the first of his own Essays in Criticism
(1865). Let it be admitted at once, however, that Arnold’s essay is only a stalking-
horse. Although I shall be referring to it more than once in the following pages, my
real concern here is not with what Arnold thought the critic’s business was when he
wrote that most admirable essay – it was originally published, in somewhat different
form but under the same title, in The National Review for November 1864 – but with
the English-speaking critic’s business today, here and now, in the 1950’s. In the
course of this inquiry, however, I hope to show that Arnold’s essay can be useful to us
not only as an academic symbol (it is, I suppose, the best critical essay ever written by
an Oxford professor), but also perhaps as a guide and exemplar in our present literary
discontents.9
Bateson’s championing of Arnoldian critical ideology stems, he goes on to say, from his
belief that Arnold’s literary criticism could offer a template for the 1950s. ‘Today we have, I
think, exhausted the critical edification [of Dr. Johnson] . . . whose partial demise is
attributable, as much as to anyone, to the influence of Arnold.’10 Bateson’s argument was that
if Oxford was to play a significant role in the second half of the twentieth century it would be
through example of ‘three virtues that are especially associated’11 with Arnold: ‘intellectual
7 Storer’s eventual conclusion on the issue of how much the influence of their universities played a role in
shaping their  respective literary ideologies, and furthermore, how much the traditional rivalry between the their
institutions contributed to the antithesis of the debate  was only that such influences ‘perhaps played a part’.
Storer, p.91.
8 F.W. Bateson, ‘The Function of Criticism at the Present Time’, Essays in Criticism, III, 1, 1-27, p.1.
9 ibid.
10 ibid., p.2
11 ibid.
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clarity, spiritual integrity, [and] social conscience.’12 So commendable, in Bateson’s view,
were these virtues that he and his co-editors in tribute gave Essays in Criticism ‘its Arnoldian
title’.13 It has been said of Leavis, as I have noted in the first chapter, that he consistently
‘refused to define a clear theoretical basis for his work’.14 Though B.K. Grant argues that this
was his ‘greatest strength’15 several Leavisian critics are united by the view that through a
career long endorsement of Arnold’s methods and critical ideology, Leavis (like Bateson) had
also ‘explicitly located himself in the Arnoldian Tradition’.16 As such it may be said that it
would seem unlikely that Leavis would have objected to Bateson’s promotion of Arnoldian
values if expressed in Arnold’s terms. The stress here of course is: Arnold’s terms. Indeed
Leavis’s objection to Bateson’s essay (and its mobilization of Arnold as the critical prototype
for the argument presented) centred, as Leavis put it, on Bateson’s ‘misunderstanding’17 of
Arnold’s thinking in order support his own ‘confused’18 ideology.  That this misapplication of
the nineteenth-century poet and critic could occur, and occur so ‘disastrously’,19 as Leavis
felt it had in Bateson’s manifesto for Essays in Criticism, was something that Leavis can be
said to have concluded from his initial debate with Bateson in 1935. Evidence of this is
perhaps most apparent in his essay ‘Arnold’s Thought’ (1939) where Leavis states that ‘no
concession can be allowed that denies Arnold remarkable distinction of intelligence’,20 but if
12 ibid. Bateson’s italics.
13 ibid.
14 B.K. Grant, 2006. ‘Criticism-Ideology’, Shirmer Encyclopaedia of Film, (Ontario: Shirmer Reference) p.3.
Grant’s view had also be expressed a year earlier (and in several subsequent occasions) by G. Singh. See G.
Singh, 1995. F.R. Leavis: A Literary Biography, (London: Duckworth) p.43-48.
15 B.K. Grant, ‘Criticism-Ideology’, p.3.
16 Storer, p.13. For additional support on the view that Leavis’s criticism was heavily influenced by Arnold see
Walter James Caulfield, 2010.  ‘Poetry is the Reality’: Matthew Arnold Tackles the Athletes of Logic (and
Theory)’, Cambridge Quarterly, 39, 3, 237-259. Gary Day, 1993. Editorial notes to F. R. Leavis’s, ‘Literary
Criticism and Anti Philosophy’, in The British Critical Tradition: A Re-evaluation, (London: Macmillan) p.
188-211. And also R.P. Bilan, 1979. The Literary Criticism of F.R. Leavis, (Cambridge: CUP). p.18-21, 72-74,
100.
17F.R. Leavis, 2008. ‘The Responsible Critic or The Function of Criticism at Anytime’, Scrutiny, XIX, 4, 1952-
1953, (Cambridge: CUP) p.162.
18 ibid.
19 ibid.
20 F.R. Leavis, 1939. ‘Arnold's Thought’, Scrutiny, VIII, 1, 92-99. p.96.
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his ‘virtues are to be properly recognised it is important not to apply wrong criteria’21 to their
understanding. And it was precisely this type of ‘misunderstanding’ that, for Leavis, had
characterised Bateson’s essay.
After detailing the origin of Essays in Criticism’s title, Bateson states:
Between the death of Arnold and the emergence of Eliot’s literary criticism in
England and America had almost reached its lowest ebb. A short reign of terror was
needed to discredit once and for all the Watts-Dunton and the Stopford Brookes, the
Gosses and the Clutton-Brocks, the Herbert Warrens and the Sidney Lees, et hoc
genus omne. Unfortunately those eminent bores and charlatans were not the only
causalities. As is usual in revolutions, some of the innocent and inoffensive perished
with the guilty, and the critical losses included here and there such solid literary
virtues as factual accuracy, awareness of the historical background, linguistic
expertise, and even sometimes the ability to write lucid English.22
Again, while Leavis would have been unlikely to dispute the importance of the critical values
that Bateson viewed as lost — such as ‘factual accuracy, awareness of the historical
background, [and] linguistic expertise’,23 the contention emerged in that Bateson made clear
his belief that such losses were exactly those ‘deficiencies that characterize’24 the critical
writing of Leavis. ‘It is no longer desirable,’ writes Bateson, ‘or indeed possible, to continue
to turn a blind eye to certain deficiencies that characterize, in greater or less degree, the
critical writings of such men as Leavis is one.’25 While Bateson eases the insult slightly in
acknowledging qualities of stature and personality in Leavis and some of the other critics he
attacks, 26the principal emphasis of his essay attends to their ‘defects’,27 defects that he felt
exerted a ‘corrupting influence on the criticism of the younger generation’.28 In stating this
Bateson goes on, what he terms, a ‘critical sottisier’29 examining I.A. Richards, C.S. Lewis,
William Empson, and John Crowe Ransom (in that order), to demonstrate central aspects of
21 ibid.
22 Bateson, ‘Present Time’, p.2.
23 ibid. (Bateson’s italics)
24 ibid., p.3.
25 ibid.
26 Others whom Bateson noted were T.S. Eliot, J. Middleton Murry, I.A. Richards, John Crowe Ransom,
Kenneth Burke, C.S. Lewis, G. Wilson Knight, William Empson, and Yvor Winters.
27 Bateson, ‘Present Time’, p.2.
28 ibid.
29 ibid., p.3.
CHAPTER THREE The Leavis-Bateson Debate: The 1953 Exchanges
64
their criticism as ‘irresponsible’.30 His collective charge is that each of them mislead their
readers, that they evade their social duty, and that while this ‘abuse of social-function’31 and
critical irresponsibility may occur accidentally (or ‘unconsciously’) in the criticism of
Leavis, Empson, Lewis, and Ransom, because of their failure to recognise it despite their
prominence and influence it was therefore ‘reckless’32 and ‘insidious’.33 Bateson’s main
grievance is the refusal of these critics to pay necessary attention to the social-context of
literature in their critical judgements.  To see ‘the object in itself’,34 as they do, he adds,
originated as ‘a plea for objectivity amid the subjectivism of Victorian criticism’.35 ‘No doubt
the actual words on the page are read as closely as ever before, but all that lies behind the
words and the word-order—the forces, conventions and precedents that have made and
modified them—is too often taken for granted.’36 This loss of ‘context’ had led directly to an
incompetence and lack of essential ‘critical’37 knowledge that Essays in Criticism would not,
Bateson pronounced, tolerate in its own critical approach.
The most immediate observation that can made of Bateson’s position is that it
constituted a re-expression of the argument in his E.P.E.L. thesis and in the exchanges with
Leavis that ensued in 1935. However, it also comprised a development from his argument
back then, in the sense that Bateson now sought to distinguish between ‘context’ and
‘background’:
A literary context must be distinguished, of course, from a literary background. The
latter is best limited, I think, to the constituents of a literary work before and after
their momentary synthesis in it. An author’s biography, the social history of his age,
30 ibid.
31 ibid.
32 ibid.
33 ibid., p.4.
34 ibid., p.12.
35 ibid.
36 ibid., p.13.
37 ibid. By stating essential ‘critical’ knowledge, Bateson implies (much as he had in 1935 with the Eliot
examples) that in order for it be successful criticism requires a scholarly consideration of context. Hence
consideration of socio-history, context and background, although they were the ‘tools of the scholar, according
to Bateson, were vital to ‘critical’ knowledge and where they were absent or too limited (as in the case of the
critics mentioned in (fn. 25) the criticism was irresponsible.
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an account of earlier treatments of his subject-matter—these are all background topics
and have only, on this basis, a limited critical relevance. Context, however, is the
framework of reference within which the work achieves meaning. To read a poem and
ignore its context is, in fact, to misread it. A similar ignorance of its background may
make a poem a little more difficult to understand but can do no positive harm.
Background, in short, is extrinsic, context is intrinsic.38
The importance Bateson attributes to knowledge of ‘context’ (and the critical consequences
where an attention to it is absent) thus became the ideological anlace to his essay’s most
sustained attack— the attack on Leavis’s reading of Marvell and Pope in Revaluation (1936).
While I have spoken briefly of Revaluation in the previous chapter my comments on it are
independent of Bateson’s perspective, but it is worth re-iterating that it was published by
Leavis during his exchanges with Bateson, and that its leading argument (made apropos of
two four-line extracts from Marvell’s ‘A Dialogue between the Soul and Body’ and Pope’s
‘Dunciad iv’) was that Pope’s wit ‘represented a continuation of the Metaphysical tradition’39
of Marvell. For Bateson, the ‘affinities’40 Leavis saw between the two poems depended
entirely from an observation of verbal similarity in the last line of each excerpt. And these
can be seen here, as I have italicised:
A Soul hung up, as ‘twere, in Chains
Of Nerves, and Arteries, and Veins.
Tortur’d, besides each other apart,
In a vain Head, and double Heart.
From Marvell, ‘A Dialogue between the Soul and Body’.
First slave to Words, then Vassal to a Name,
Then Dupe to Party, child and man the same;
Bounded by Nature, narrow’d still by Art,
A trifling head, and a contracted heart.
From Pope, ‘Dunciad’ (iv: 501-4).
38 Bateson, ‘Present Time’, p.3.
39 ibid., p.14.
40 ibid., p.15.
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Bateson recognises that the verbal similarity is ‘of course, striking and obvious’,41 however,
his concern is that ‘Leavis makes the collocation in order to establish a resemblance between
Marvell’s and Pope’s poetic styles’42 in a wider (and unjustified) general sense, whereas
Bateson believed that beyond the ‘verbal similarity’43 the ‘affinities disappear’.44 Stating his
case for why the stylistic similarity in both passages should not to be taken as evidence of
something beyond the verbal, Bateson writes:
In terms of literary tradition the meanings of ‘head’ and ‘heart’ are demonstrably
quite different in the two passages. In Marvell’s lines the vivid images of the first
couplet almost compel the reader to visualize the torture chambers of the ‘vain Head,
and double Heart’. It is the kind of allegory that was popularised in the early
seventeenth century by Emblem Books, in which a more a less conventional concept
is dressed up in some striking new clothes, the new clothes being the real raison
d’être. In Pope’s last line, however, the abstract or quasi-abstract words which lead up
to it make almost impossible to see either the ‘trifling head’ or the ‘the contracted
heart’. Obviously Pope’s ‘head’ and ‘heart’ belong to the same order of reality as his
‘Nature’ and ‘Art’.45
In his account of the essential differences between Marvell’s lines and the lines of Pope’s
poem, Bateson traces the influence of tradition that becomes apparent through a wider
contextual consideration of the respective periods of the poets, the ‘climate of opinion’46 and
‘thought-patterns current in their time’.47 In discussing the literary-historical context of
Marvell’s and Pope’s poetry (as would continue to do throughout his essay), Bateson asserts
that ‘the most interesting feature in the lines is that the Metaphysical style in which he was
writing had forced Marvell to say what he cannot have wanted to say’,48 and that ‘Pope’s
Augustan style had forced his hand in the same way.’49 The historicist method Bateson uses
whereby via establishing a literary-context he feels able to identify what Marvell and Pope
41 ibid., p.19.
42 ibid., p.20
43 ibid.
44 ibid., p.15
45 ibid.
46 ibid., p.16.
47 ibid.
48 ibid.
49 ibid.
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would have preferred to say as distinct from what they were forced to say, remains a
problematic issue in modern theoretical criticism. While I shall attend to this in chapter 5, it is
worth noting that in the United States, Wimsatt and Beardsley’s influential essay ‘The
Intentional Fallacy’ (1946) and Cleanth Brooks’s The Well Wrought Urn (1947) (which
Bateson would vehemently attack) had paved the way for a widespread discussion on
authorial intention (its legitimacy and importance) on both sides of the Atlantic. A few
significant examples of what would become an extended branch of literary theory saw critics
and theorists such as Roland Barthes, Jerrold Levinson, Gary Iseminger, and David Newton
de Molina examine the issue of intention in relation to critical evaluation and judgement.
Leavis’s response to Bateson’s assumptions regarding authorial intention can be seen parallel
to further positions taken up before and after his debate with Bateson. One such aspect of
Leavis’s challenging of Bateson on this matter is the fundamental question of whether the
author’s intention holds (or should hold) significance in the understanding, evaluation, and
judgment of the merit of a work. Bateson appears, however, to side-step the anti-intentionalist
argument that ‘extrinsic’ contextual information such as authorial intention is illegitimate
territory for the literary critic, in that, as stated above, he regards these considerations not
merely as important extrinsic knowledge, but as essential to the understanding of the
‘intrinsic’ poetry itself. Indeed, it was this, Bateson claimed, that enabled the critic to
understand ‘the contradictions between what Marvell and Pope would like to have written
and what they actually wrote’.50 Bateson’s belief was that literary critics are not
‘immoralists’51 simply trying to make arrangements from ‘black marks on the page’52 nor
neurotically interested in mere metrical and verbal stylistics. For Bateson literary values are
the embodiment of ‘human experience’53 in literature. Thus the original social context at the
50 ibid., p.16.
51 ibid., p.19.
52 ibid., p.18.
53 ibid.
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time of the work’s composition was necessary if such human experience was to be ‘realized
and re-enacted’54 by the reader and a true evaluation of a work’s merit was to be critically
achieved. Though it is often difficult, even tedious, Bateson expressed, to achieve this
‘degree of self-absorption’55 in the social and historical context of a writer and work,
difficulty in itself was not an excuse for not doing it. To ‘be called the responsible reader’56,
‘it is important’ states Bateson, ‘to emphasize the utile as well as the dulce of criticism.’57
Bateson’s conclusion, however, (much like his 1935 reply to Leavis) was not ‘as might
perhaps have been anticipated, a simple recommendation to extend the function of criticism
to the exploration of literature’s social roots’.58 His conclusion was in fact an assertion that
neither a purely sociological approach of contextual consideration nor a restricted analysis of
the poem itself (such as that in the criticism of I.A. Richards) were dependable or useful as
isolated approaches. It would be, for Bateson, a combination of both that offered a way
forward. While Leavis’s type of criticism was ‘stimulating, ingenious, provocative and
original’59 comprising, as it did, detailed studies of single poems as intrinsic objects,
Bateson’s concern was that:
In total effect, instead of taking us closer to the human situations and the statements
on the human condition that the poems contain – in other words, to whatever gives
them their value to other human beings – is to bemuse the reader with the structural
patterns . . . juggling with terms like ‘ambiguity’, ‘paradox’ and ‘irony’ replaces any
serious attempt to analyse the profounder meanings of the poems . . . this, indeed, is
the trouble with many of the technical terms coined or popularized by ‘New Critics’.
So far from binging the reader nearer the concrete actualities of what this or that
stanza, scene or chapter really means in human terms, words like ‘tension’ and
‘texture’ (there are many others) tend to divert him from them by concentrating his
attention of abstract relationships that may have a certain logical interest but that, in
most cases, have little or no immediate human relevance.60
54 ibid.
55 ibid.
56 ibid., p.19.
57 ibid., p.21.
58 ibid., p.23.
59 ibid., p.24.
60 ibid., p.23. What we see here, is a concern that much attention has been paid to in autotelic criticism both,
before, during, and after the Leavis-Bateson clashes. As noted, the American debates on the role of extrinsic and
intrinsic evidence would later define an era of contention between intentionalist and anti-intentionalists. One of
these major causes of disagreement, dividing both these critics and theorists alike can be seen here between
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On the other hand, continued Bateson, a ‘purely contextual’61 reading where there was
insufficient focus on the literature as it stood on the page, also suffered its own evaluative
limitations. Bateson argues this point by stating:
The sociological school fails because of even more disastrous error in the opposite
direction. It is in such a hurry to get to the implicit ideas and social attitudes that it
skims literature instead of reading it. The conclusion about it all will now be obvious.
It is simply that if we are to see the object as it really is we must use both methods—a
balance, in other words, of literary and sociological criticism, in which one mode of
may serve as the complement of the corrective of the other.62
Ultimately then for Bateson, the method necessary to correct the losses and failures of the
period would be achieved through a positive balance of sociological ‘contextual’ criticism,
and the type of practical criticism in which analysis pays due attention on the work’s internal
stylistics. The interesting and memorable way in which Bateson phrased this amalgam of
methods was summed up in his plea: ‘Let us go to school with both Mr. Empson and Mr.
Trilling.’63 The reason why Bateson deemed it necessary to incorporate the evaluative
practice of Empson and Trilling together (into one) was that the effect of the merger would
produce a method whereby the deficiencies of both Empson’s and Trilling’s critical
approaches (in their singular application) would be corrected by the particular qualities of the
other. That such a ‘balance’ was necessary (and the reason why Bateson was not prepared to
Leavis and Bateson. Extrinsic evidence is any information or knowledge from outside of a literary text itself; for
example, information relating the author’s life, influences, social, political or historical circumstances. Bateson
supports the use of extrinsic evidence in the belief that contextual knowledge from outside of the text itself
influences reading and evaluation of a literary work and thus places the critic in the best possible position from
which to understand the work as it relates to the life, intentions and nature of the author. Through identifying the
circumstance of the author, a critic may then feel able to evaluate how successfully a work expresses the
intention or designing ambition of its artist. In contrast, Leavis, in what is his central difference to Bateson (as it
had been in the 1935 exchanges) argues against the use of extrinsic evidence, viewing the effect of such
extrinsic influences not only as irrelevant to the judgment of the merits and qualities of the text, but even, to use
Wimsatt and Beardsley’s admonition: ‘unavailable’, and even ‘[un]desirable’in terms of bringing us closer to
the author. For Leavis the relevant and significant context should be realised through engagement with the text
itself. Though Leavis was not quite as decisive in removing context from analysis as  Wimsatt and Beardsley,
his theory and position (in the sense that it is similar) preceded Wimsatt and Beardsley by eleven years in
expressing what M.H. Abrams would later reconfigure as a belief that a work of literature should be evaluated
as a self-sufficient and autonomous object: ‘as a world-in-itself, which is to be judged solely by “intrinsic”
criteria such as its complexity, coherence, equilibrium, integrity, and the interrelation of its component
elements.’ M.H. Abrams, (ed.) 1999. A Glossary of Literary Terms, (Boston: Heinle) p.70.
61 Bateson, ‘Present Time’, p.25.
62 ibid.
63 ibid.
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go with either Empson or Trilling alone) was that Empson, he argued, too often a displayed a
type of criticism in which verbal fragments (for example, words and particular literary
mechanisms) were lifted out of a wider context, and applied solely as if the page they were
printed on was the total world they existed in. Trilling’s critical approach, on the other hand,
was insufficient in that it displayed a lack of interest in the verbal and stylistic elements of the
literary piece, and in consequence, had a tendency to promote what Wayne Booth called an
‘over-standing’64 of wider contextual information. ‘Of this critical balance, this equilibrium
between literary meaning in the ordinary sense and the social sense in which the meaning
alone acquires value, “The Function of Criticism at the Present Time” remains to me’,65
concluded Bateson, ‘the supreme model.’66
Leavis, in his response ‘The Responsible Critic or: The Function of Criticism at Any
Time’ (1953)67 states from the offset that Essays in Criticism, although it had intended to
surpass Scrutiny as a journal, had, in his view, not achieved that. ‘We have not’, Leavis says
(referring to the editorial board of Scrutiny) found the pages of Essays in Criticism
‘characterized by such notable examples of scholarly or critical or scholarly-critical practice
as might call forth the blush of shame’ upon our own.68 Leavis states that he saw ‘no reason
for not pronouncing bluntly’69 on the ‘long statement of position and elaboration’70 of Essays
64 Peter Rawlings, in American Theorists of the Novel (2006) explains that Wayne C. Booth ‘defines
“understanding” as the “process” of “entering another mind”. Novels offer readers through their implied
authors various values, moral attitudes, and so on; arguing with these, even repudiating them, and coming up
with different perspectives on the world of the novel is what Booth means by “overstanding”. ‘Understanding’,
then, is the reader’s reconstruction of what the text demands; when the reader recognizes the point at which the
‘violation of its demands will prove necessary’; he begins to “overstand”. Peter Rawlings, 2006. American
Theorists of the Novel: Henry James, Lionel Trilling, Wayne C. Booth. (London: Routledge) p.101-102.  See
also Wayne C. Booth, 1979. Critical Understanding: The Powers and Limits of Pluralism, (Chicago: Chicago
UP) p.242, 262.
65 Bateson, ‘Present Time’, p.25
66 ibid.
67 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.162. Leavis’s essay although about Bateson and Essays in Criticism was published in
Scrutiny, XIV, 4, 317-331. (in the ‘Correspondence’ section.)
68 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.162.
69 ibid.
70 ibid.
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in Criticism’s programme, by which he meant Bateson’s essay ‘The Function of Criticism at
the Present Time’.
The first aspect of Bateson’s error-strewn and ‘confused’71 essay that Leavis
challenges is Bateson’s belief, as Leavis understood it, that ‘we [critics] may be too
precipitate in supposing ourselves in a position to judge a poem, and that sometimes more
scholarly knowledge may be necessary.’72 Leavis mockingly acknowledges this to be true in
so far as it is demonstrated to be true in the case of Bateson’s own critical deficiencies.73
Leavis’s position against Bateson, expressed here for the first time in eighteen years, was that
he did not like the distinction made between scholarship and criticism, especially not the
notion that scholarship is a distinctive act aimed at the cultivation of accuracy and precision.
This point, Leavis argues, he had made all those years ago when he contested that ‘accuracy
is a matter of relevance, and that in the literary field exactness and precision cannot easily
exist unless one is intelligent about literature’.74 While Leavis does not elaborate or specify
precisely what he means by ‘intelligent about literature’,75 he does make a firm commitment
to ‘practical criticism.’76 For Leavis this entailed that a text should be self-sufficient in
expressing its total meaning, thus a critic, ‘the kind trained in practical criticism, will
therefore, if they are intelligent about literature, be themselves, ‘aware of period peculiarities
of idiom, linguistic usage, convention, and so on. . .’77 He adds:
The most important kind of knowledge will be acquired in the cultivation of the
poetry of the period, and of other periods, with the literary critic’s intelligence. Miss
Tuve’s insistence on an immense apparatus of scholarship before one can read
71 ibid.
72 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.162.
73 Leavis does not refer to Bateson as a literary historian as he still clearly felt such a distinction to be
unnecessary given that Bateson’s ‘type of history’ (as he argued in 1935) was essentially literary criticism.
74 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.163
75 ibid. Phrases such as ‘intelligent about literature’ which, in this particular instance, centralises a dependence
on the sub-connotative term ‘intelligent’ (and what Leavis means by ‘intelligent’) I examine in greater detail in
chapters 4 and 5.
76 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.163. An interesting account of Leavis’s relation to the methods of practical criticism is
presented in Terry Eagleton’s chapter ‘The Rise of English’ in Terry Eagleton, 1983. Literary Theory: An
Introduction, (Oxford: Blackwell) p.43-44.
77 ibid.
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intelligently or judge is characteristic of the academic over-emphasis on scholarly
knowledge; it accompanies a clear lack of acquaintance with intelligent critical
reading. And of so extravagant an elaboration of ‘contextual’ procedures as Mr.
Bateson commits himself to one would even without the conclusive exemplifying he
does for us, have ventured, with some confidence, that the ‘contextual’ critic would
not only intrude a vast deal of critical irrelevance on his poem; he would show a
marked lack of concern for the most essential kinds of knowledge.78
Leavis’s inverts Bateson’s accusation of ‘irresponsibility’ by arguing that Bateson himself is
engaged in a type of critical irresponsibility ‘through a lack of concern’ with ‘essential
knowledge’ and through imposing ‘a vast deal of critical irrelevance’ into his critical
analysis. Leavis then turns his attention to what has been termed the ‘main battleground’79 of
his exchanges with Bateson; Bateson’s assault on the shortcomings of his reading of Marvell
and Pope. Leavis points out that Bateson’s efforts to undermine him are based on the
incorrect assumption that in affirming a poetic connection between Marvell and Pope he had
looked only as far as the verbal affinities between individual passages. Refuting this in strong
terms, Leavis argued that he made it perfectly clear in Revaluation that the affinity he spoke
of was one of ‘a certain crisp precision of statement, a poised urbanity of movement and
tone’.80 In stating his case against Bateson’s charges, Leavis contests that the passages show
not merely verbal similarity but an emotive equivalence in which Pope’s mixture of wit with
the polite had clear antecedents in the poetry of Marvell.  Leavis writes:
It is, then, plain enough that Pope’s reconciliation of Metaphysical wit with the Polite
has antecedents.’ I am indicating the way back from Pope to Ben Jonson, and if Mr.
Bateson had thought the whole presented case worth attending to he might have been
led to observe in Marvell some marked antecedents of the Augustan to which ‘the
implications and ramifications of context’ leave him blind.81
Leavis’s method of observing ‘antecedents’ and charting ‘the way back’ from certain poetry
to other poetry would appear, as he suggests it, to be exactly the aim of Bateson’s proposed
scholarship. In this sense, we may deduce that Leavis supposes his criticism, in effect, to
78 ibid.
79 Storer, p.2.
80 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.164.
81 ibid.
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already achieve or subsumes the aims of Bateson’s scholarly method, because it is intelligent
about the literature—and within that ‘intelligence’ there is the ‘necessary’82 social and
historical knowledge. Leavis at this juncture patronises Bateson by sympathising with his
deemed theoretical failure, stating that it is hard when in trying to be so precise, you are so
wrong. Leavis continues his faux sympathy with the hollow caveat that, the disservice
Bateson does to Pope and Marvell, is greatly worse than what he is about to inflict on
Bateson.
Leavis centres on Bateson’s detailed critique of Marvell’s ‘A Dialogue between Body
and Soul’ in which he outlines its differences to Pope’s Dunciad IV 501-4. Bateson, Leavis
notes, acknowledges that the use of ‘head’ and ‘heart’ in both poems obviously present verbal
similarities, but the differences in both poems are identifiable in the figures of speech and
stylistic convention employed by the poets. Bateson’s basis for distinguishing the poems,
observed Leavis, was that he deemed Marvell’s poem as a work of ‘imagery’,83 of ‘grey
abstractions’,84 and ‘psychological terminology’.85 This postulation however, according to
Leavis, shows nothing of any critical significance, arguing that Bateson has not sufficiently
demonstrated evidence of differing speech and stylistic conventions, rather he has ‘merely
asserted’86 a difference to exist—that difference being summed up by the claim that Marvell
uses ‘picture language’.87 Leavis’s belief is that a reader acquainted with Marvell would
know Bateson’s claim to be ‘false’.88 Printing the full first speech from Marvell’s ‘A
Dialogue between Soul and Body’, Leavis stresses that whilst there certainly exists some
potent vivid imagery; where can it be said to be visual in the sense that Mr. Bateson calls it
82 ibid.
83 ibid.
84 ibid., p.165.
85 ibid.
86 ibid., p.164.
87 ibid., p.166.
88 ibid.
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‘picture language’?89 For Leavis, the imagery that Bateson considers picture language is
neither factual nor presentable via description, and as such, the poetic content is irresponsibly
misunderstood and insufficiently framed by Bateson’s clunky phraseology of which the term
‘picture language’ exemplifies. Indeed for Leavis, no image could bear any relation to
Marvell’s poem, which, as he continues to explain, is a very different thing to what Bateson
says it is. Essentially, Leavis argues, the poem transcends visualization and thus, on this
basis, is surprised to hear a scholar ‘who should know better’90 provide such a limited
assessment as to refer to it as kind of allegory in the vein of the Emblem books popularized in
the seventeenth century.91
Indeed, Leavis states, to call it an allegory at all is to mislead, and furthermore, to say
it ‘dresses up a conventional idea in new clothes’ is to convey the opposite of the truth about
it. For it is a profoundly critical and inquiring poem devoted to some subtle exploratory
89 ibid.
90 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.172
91 In Storer’s study of the debate he states that: ‘Bateson’s argument is that the poem must be understood  in
relation to the genre of the ‘Emblem book’, popular in the early seventeenth century and particularly associated
with the poet Francis Quarles (1592-1644), in which a poem appeared alongside a picture, both illustrating a
familiar concept. He cites an actual example from Quarles’s Emblemes of ‘the convention in which Marvell was
writing – a skeleton lolling in a sitting posture (the Body) with a kneeling figure inside it (the Soul)’. In
Marvell’s case, Bateson argues, the use of the convention results in a poem which is too visual; we are
encouraged to visualise the soul being tortured in the different parts of the body, including the head and heart –
but Marvell cannot have meant to suggest that the head and heart were just parts of the body like any other, and
so he has ended up saying something he did not mean. Marvell has in effect let the Emblem ‘convention’ take
over his poem; once we know the convention, we realise all that needs to be said about the poem. Storer, p. 92.
A colleague of Storer’s, fellow Leavisian Chris Joyce, provides reflection on this aspect of the 1953 dispute by
saying that ‘Leavis could be a formidable controversialist, as F.W. Bateson discovered in the pages of Scrutiny
for Spring and October 1953. Bateson had challenged Leavis's reading (in Revaluation) of Marvell's poem ‘A
Dialogue between the Soul and Body’ (and an associated comparison with Pope) alleging deficiencies in
Leavis's scholarly knowledge. He concentrated in particular on what he called Marvell's ‘picture language’
enlisting the Quarles emblems in support. The truth, Leavis pointed out, was the opposite. Marvell presents us
with paradoxes in which a visual element is present but far from dominant: ‘How do we see the Soul? What
visual images correspond to ‘fetter’d’ and manacled’? We certainly don't see manacles on the Soul’s hands and
feet: the Soul's hands and feet are the Body's, and it is the fact that they are the Body's that makes them
‘manacles’ …’ Leavis does not deny that a certain amount of specialist knowledge may assist the reading of a
poem but it is always the intelligent reading of the poem itself that takes priority. The historical context in which
Bateson proposes to anchor the reading is something much less determinate. Leavis takes the opportunity to
make a point which is especially valid today in relation to theories of 'cultural materialism' and 'new
historicism': To suggest that their purpose should be to reconstruct a postulated 'social context' that once
enclosed the poem and gave it its meaning is to set the student after something that no study of history, social,
economic, political, intellectual, religious, can yield. The poem … is there; but there is nothing … that can be
set over against the poem, or induced to re-establish itself round it as a kind of framework or completion, and
there never was anything.’ Chris Joyce. 2008. Centre for Leavis Studies [Online]
http://mypages.surrey.ac.uk/eds1cj/f-r-leavis-life-and-work.htm. [Accessed 04 December 11].
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thinking’92 that questions and challenges conventional concepts and ‘current habits of
mind’.93 Leavis’s argument here is that while readers will undoubtedly observe a visual
element to essentially non-visual words such as ‘soul’ ‘fettered’ or ‘manacled’, to become too
majorly fixed on seeing manacles and fetters is the reading of someone not adjusted to the
poem’s further significance. Whilst it is not expressed directly by Leavis, the further
significance he speaks of may be the existential nature of the poem’s inquiry and the
efficiency of the language in encapsulating the body’s physical appropriation of Marvell’s
metaphysical torment. Leavis writes:
Reading this rightly, we feel, as something more than stated, the Soul’s protest
(paradoxically in part physical—this is where ‘imagery’ comes in) against the so
intimately and inescapably associated matter: the introduction ‘with bolts of bones’
makes the antithesis, Soul and Body, seem clear and sharp.94
Several of the key complaints Leavis holds against Bateson are noted in a short section of
R.P. Bilan’s The Literary Criticism of F.R. Leavis (1979). Bilan believes that part ‘of the
hostility Leavis generates comes from his intransigent opposition to scholarship, ‘work on,
about and around the great works of literature, which is not directed by a serious and relevant
critical interest’.95 It is not difficult to identify the basis of Bilan’s understanding. Leavis
makes clear his belief that the poem ‘is a determinate thing; it is there; but there is nothing to
correspond—nothing answering to Mr. Bateson’s “social context” that can be set over against
the poem . . . and there never was anything’.96 As such, for Leavis, Bateson’s proposal that in
order to achieve a correct reading of a poem one must put it back into the ‘total context’97
was a methodological illusion, due to fact that ‘context’, as something determinate, was itself,
an illusion. Bateson’s approach, according to Bilan’s critical assessment, would thus make
‘literary criticism completely dependent on extra-literary studies in a way that is anathema to
92 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.166.
93 ibid.
94 ibid.
95 R.P. Bilan, 1979. The Literary Criticism of F.R. Leavis, (Cambridge: CUP) p.81.
96 ibid.
97 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.172
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Leavis’,98 who as I noted earlier began his response with the very clear indictment that the
‘inordinate apparatus of “contextual” aids’99 that Bateson sought to deploy, were in fact
unnecessary to the intelligent critic, the critic that by virtue of ‘intelligence’100 and
‘responsibility’101 will have an acquired an ‘understanding of the civilisation that the poem is
written out of’.102 It is important to note however, a point Bilan makes, that Leavis isn’t
merely suggesting that his method is more preferable than Bateson’s in adducing a total
social context; rather it is the firm judgment that no such social context is possible, and in
consequence, Bateson, in proposing that it is, ‘is setting the student, and critic, after
something no study could yield.’103
In assessing the poem over and beyond Bateson’s ‘limited’104 evaluation of it as
‘simple scheme’ of ‘emblematic’, ‘allegorical’, and ‘diagrammatic’105 devices, Leavis
expresses an uncertainty as to whether Bateson can be said to have read the poem at all.
Leavis draws attention to his surprise that Bateson, in an essay where he had sought to correct
other critics, had performed so poorly himself. Moreover he was surprised that no-one on
Essays in Criticism’s editorial board made note of Bateson’s errors prior to the essay reaching
print, as it did, as the first feature in the first issue of the third volume. Leavis’s remark that
Bateson had not read the poem, however, interestingly comprises a double-connotation in
that it highlights what Leavis means by ‘reading’ the poem; the implication being that
98 Bilan, The Literary Criticism, p.81.
99 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.174.
100 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.166.
101 ibid.
102 Bilan, The Literary Criticism, p.81.
103 ibid.  Bilan adds that for Leavis, ‘the essential knowledge the critic needs can come only from the reading of
poetry and not from background knowledge’. It is perhaps arguable that Bilan has, in reaching this view, failed
to acknowledge Bateson’s separation of ‘context’ from ‘background’ as such. The tendency of course, to
conflate them, seems, on surface, innocent - but it is nevertheless a simplification that enters the logical trap
Bateson had originally set for Leavis. Bilan, however, is invariably sharp off the mark, particularly in noting the
significance of Leavis’s belief (Bilan’s ellipses) that ‘some of the essential meanings that one has to recognise
are created by the poet, but this possibility . . . Mr. Bateson cannot permit himself to entertain’. Leavis, suggests
Bilan, believes that ‘neither scholarship nor literary history is fully adequate to grasp the nature of the poet’s
enquiry; only the discipline of literary criticism can properly come to terms with the poet’s work.’ Bilan, The
Literary Criticism, p.81-83.
104 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.165.
105 ibid. p.167.
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Bateson’s reading had focused on external contexts to the point of allowing only an
inadequate reading of the internal literary device of the poem itself.106 Of course, Bateson’s
counter view would be that contextual knowledge, aids meaning. Leavis, argues Storer,
ridicules Bateson’s ‘scholarly method of control’107 which has the effect of making this
‘much more fruitful’108 reading of the poem ‘illicit’.109 An important emphasis in Storer’s
understanding of Leavis’s method is stated as follows:
Leavis’s close reading of the poem has had the opposite of a limiting or controlling
effect. He has discovered ‘illicit’ meaning denied by Bateson’s more controlling
approach; his meaning, moreover, affirms the poet’s creativity over his dependence
on convention. He has in effect (to recall his terms in ‘Literary Studies’) made more
of a profit from the poem than Bateson – and in the pragmatic, production orientated
terms (as in the Wellek exchange) Leavis is more appealing.110
The issue here is again one of intentionality. Bateson’s concern with Leavis’s reading method
is that ‘produces’111 meaning—often a ‘more fruitful meaning’112 than that intended by the
author, and thus he judges the work according to this new reader-created meaning. By
contrast, Leavis’s charge is that Bateson as a scholar believes by evaluating context that he
can arrive at such claims as to what the author did or did not intend.  A good example of
Leavis making this concern clear can be seen when he writes:
Bateson’s ability to believe, and judicially to pronounce, that Marvell has been guilty
of a ‘breach of the poem’s logic’ such as ‘cannot possibly have been intended’ goes,
we have seen, with his decision that Marvell shall have intended what, on the
unequivocal and final evidence of the poem itself, it clearly didn’t.113
Leavis’s belief is that speculation over what Marvell intended is dubious particularly where it
cannot be evidenced in the poem itself. As this point has been made raised earlier, let us
106 As I have suggested, Leavis’s approach is that whereby evaluate analysis is deemed best that centres on the
poem itself and not allowing knowledge of context to dictate a meaning or value that, when ‘intelligently’’ and
duly pondered’ would ‘yield’ itself from the literary object.
107 Storer, p.92.
108 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.169.
109 Storer, p 93.
110 ibid.
111 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.170.
112 Storer, p 93. R.Storer quotes F.W. Bateson, 1953. ‘The Responsible Critic: A Reply’, Scrutiny, XIX, 4.
(Cambridge: CUP) p.317.
113 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.170.
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further an understanding of what is meant by it. Certainly, it holds notable parallels to the
principle tenet of a critical position termed ‘The New Criticism’ by John Crowe Ransom in
his 1941 publication of the same name. Stephen Matterson in his article ‘The New Criticism’
(2006) points out that the use of extrinsic evidence was dismissed as an appropriate way to
study a literary work by the New Critics on two fundamental grounds:
The first is that authorial intention is never clear and may always be a matter of
dispute. The second ground, and a more important one for the New Critics, was that to
invoke intention was to threaten the integrity of the text by introducing the figure of
the author. Once the text’s boundaries were threatened, then the system could not be
seen as a system of language operating with its own rules.114
As Leavis offers detailed study and commentary of Marvell’s poem, he continually observes
aspects of significance glanced over by Bateson, all the while debasing Bateson’s critical
performance. A strong part of this, and again what links Leavis to certain New Critical and
Formalist ideologies, is that his emphasis appears central to the belief that the history and
contexts of language can be observed with close attention to the text as opposed to the socio-
political domains of history and language from realms beyond the immediately artistic world
of the text.115 The degree and severity at which Leavis expresses dismay in Bateson’s critical
(or scholarly) position becomes, in-itself, a notable feature of the debate, certainly, at least, of
the debate’s character. Angered, for example, at how Bateson veers toward endless and
indeterminate social contexts as a mode of analysis, Leavis polarises his opposition by
referring to such an approach as ‘flimsy’ and rooted in ‘gratuitousness’ and ‘arbitrariness’.116
114 Stephen Matterson, 2006. ‘The New Criticism’, Literary Theory and Criticism, ed. P.Waugh, (Oxford: OUP)
p.171.
115 That Leavis’s arguments against Bateson’s ‘social-context’ and Bateson’s un-evidence-able (as Leavis sees
it) post-supposition of Marvell’s poetic intention, can be identified in various works of New Critical ideology is
also a view shared by Terry Eagleton in his chapter ‘The Rise of English’ in Terry Eagleton, 1983. Literary
Theory: An Introduction, (Oxford: Blackwell)
116 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.172. Looking at the poem as an object or objective entity is a source of major
discussion in twentieth century autotelic literary criticism. Andrew Bennett, in his article ‘Expressivity: The
Romantic Theory of Authorship’ (2006) argues that in the expressivist aesthetic of Romantic criticism, there
was elevated regard for the successful conviction of authorial expression. He states that: ‘The author, as he or
she is increasingly conceived in the late in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, has ideas, feelings,
intentions, and desires which emerge in the act of composition and result in a pre-linguistic artefact – a poem,
play, novel, essay, or other literary work. The act of composition is seen as a way of representing in language an
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Leavis’s deconstruction of Bateson continues with his statement that Bateson’s posited
relation between ‘poem’ and ‘social context’ is a matter of ‘vain and muddled verbiage’.117
‘The business of the literary critic’, writes Leavis, ‘is with literary criticism’,118 and as such
original, pre-linguistic work, an idea of a work that is constituted in – and as – the author’s consciousness.’With
this, we can identify a departure from the authorial and intention-based focus of Romanticism, to the reader-
based focus of modern literary movements. These modern schools, it may be said, have drifted so far to one
extreme of the interpretive spectrum that not only has the author faded from the text, but regard for the
intentions of the author have become, as Wimsatt and Beardsley say, ‘[un]desirable’ and ‘unreliable’. For,
Leavis, it is not that he wishes to insulate poetry as a pure or insular realm of literary study, rather that he feels
that its value pertains to the inherent subjectivity of the reader, and thus contextual background is not sufficient
in-itself as an analytical method to transcend a contemporary reader (as all readers essentially are) into the
domain of the work’s original audience. Most principally, it may be said, that this was held as belief by Leavis
because he felt that such a context and extension of text beyond its artistic boundary would be limitless. But also
because Leavis does not believe a preoccupation with context would involve, as he felt it necessarily must, a
continual reference back to the poem.  This is evidenced in his claim that Bateson does not pay any attention to
the poem, and someone looking for the correct meaning would not look at ‘the phantom concept of context.’
The issue that arises from the fallacious concept of context as Leavis sees it, is whether or not Leavis, by
making something better of the poem than Bateson, is guilty too of appropriating virtue upon the work via his
critical method. However, as Storer points out, providing a more appealing mode of criticism, or, for that matter,
a criticism that produces a more appealing interpretation of the poem, is ‘not the level, of course, at which
Leavis justifies his reading – the issue is not, who can do more with the poem, but what is the poem in itself?’
With this, Leavis continues to grapple, in a defamatory way, with Bateson’s essay, arguing that ‘nothing is
plainer than the arbitrary odds and ends of fact, assumption, and more or less historical summary that [Bateson]
produces as context’. These ‘serve him’ Leavis adds, in no way to a ‘serious’ reading of the poem. Leavis
reproduces Bateson’s extract in which he (Bateson) states that ‘the discipline of contextual reading…should
result in the reconstruction of a human situation that is demonstrably implicit in the particular literary work
under discussion.’ Leavis here expresses that he does not know what Bateson means entirely, but supposes that
he means that ‘one may reconstruct the ‘essential drama’ of a poem correctly without responding to it correctly;
that the taking possession of it is independent of valuing.’ Feeling that he had corrected Bateson on this matter
eighteen years ago, he reminds him again that ‘one judges a poem by Marvell not by persuading a hypothetical
seventeenth-century ‘context’’, or any ‘social context’, to take the responsibility, but, as one alone can, out of
one’s personal living’ (which inevitably is in the twentieth century). Leavis says the value is in the works
inseparability from the response, not merely the social context, as this in-itself would assume that the context be
considered part of the work. Value, Leavis adds, and the process of valuing a work of literature, is more
complex than simply ‘putting a price on’ it. Andrew Bennett, 2006. ‘Expressivity: The Romantic theory of
Authorship, Literary Theory and Criticism, ed. P.Waugh, (Oxford: OUP) p.51-52. Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.176-
178, 180.
117 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.178.
118 ibid. Leavis’s dislike for Bateson’s use of the word ‘social’ stems from his belief that it is neither accurate
nor detailed enough in relation to the subsequent critical concepts in which Bateson claims the influence of the
social can be seen. As such, when Bateson’s uses phrases and words such as ‘trained-reader’, ‘contribution’,
‘context’ and ‘muddled mass society’,  Leavis seeks elaboration (which he cannot find in Bateson’s argument):
‘What are these contributions of a trained reader to the muddled mass society...?’ he asks, and furthermore, on
an equally fundamental level: what is ‘purely literary criticism’ and ‘social context’? Indeed for Leavis, the term
‘social context’ in itself cannot be synonymous with context in the widest sense, as the word ‘social’ precedes
‘context’ and thereby limits context to the merely social. Leavis suggests that Bateson’s argument is confusing
and ambiguous, and it is confusing and ambiguous for its very purpose, that is to say, that it looks impressive
but that in order to remain impressive requires no-one to ask or question its meaning. Stylistically, Leavis’s own
composition incorporates a continual reprinting of Bateson’s paragraphs (as noted earlier in verbatim
reproduction). With this approach Leavis can be seen to enable himself to descend upon Bateson’s words with a
spree of semantic arrests, enquiring and challenging what he expresses as Bateson’s ‘over simplifications and
assumptions’.  In addition to this associations can be evidenced between Leavis and several ideologies and
theorists from outside of the debate. In this instance, for example, Leavis can be seen to suggest that Bateson’s
dismissal of Cleanth Brooks’s views, in itself, sums up the extravagant irresponsibility that characterizes
Bateson’s entire essay.
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while it is pleasant to think that when a critic speaks of social or political matters his
understanding (of the literature itself) will be engaged, his special responsibility must be to
serve the literary critical aspect of his inquiry, to the best of his powers. In this sense, Leavis
makes it clear that he does not agree with Bateson’s statement that the function of criticism
matters ‘because a skilled reader of literature will tend, by the nature of his skill, to
understand and appreciate contemporary social processes better than his neighbours’.119
Indeed Leavis believes this to be misleading in that even if a critic possessed a clear
conception of social matters, unless he understands how such a context matters in relation to
the literary work in question, it would be of little literary critical value.
Leavis explains his position further by highlighting Bateson’s distinction between the
‘utile’ and ‘dulce’ of criticism; that is, between what is useful and what is considered pleasant
or rewarding. The argument he makes is that such a distinction is flawed. For Leavis, ‘[t]he
utile of criticism is to see that the created work fulfils its raison d’être; that is, that it is read,
understood and duly valued, and has the influence it should have in the contemporary
sensibility.120 By this Leavis means that the critic who relates his business to a full conception
of criticism conceives of himself as helping, in a collaborative process, to define, and thus
form, the contemporary sensibility. As such, Leavis’s argument is that what Bateson should
have said, is that the objective of ‘the skilled reader of literature, is that he will tend, by the
nature of his skill’121 to understand and appreciate contemporary literature better than his
neighbours. We note of course that this is a reconstruction of Bateson’s postulation in the
earlier passage where Bateson instead of using the word ‘literature’ uses the words
‘contemporary social processes’.122 Leavis’s revision of Bateson’s words again point to the
necessity of literary focus as the determining factor of a criticism that seeks to deem itself
119 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.175.
120 ibid, p.178.
121 ibid.
122 ibid.
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literary. Leavis adds, that ‘[t]he serious critic’s concern with literature of the past is with its
life in the present; it will be informed by the kind of perception that can distinguish
intelligently and sensitively the significant new life in contemporary literature.’123 Indeed for
Leavis, if literature is important, then what is most important about it is what it ‘ought to be
in contemporary life’124—that is, that there should be such a public who is intelligent and
responsive and decisively influential to its reading and reception. Essentially for Leavis,
Bateson, ‘the editor of a literary review’125 ought also to have these beliefs.126
Bateson, in his reply to Leavis, admits that due to personal circumstances in which ill
health had forced him to compose his piece in a hospital ward, there are passages in his
‘Function of Criticism of the Present Time’ that are ‘ill-considered or clumsily expressed’.127
‘But is it’, Bateson appeals, ‘taken as a whole, the absolute nonsense’128 that Leavis claims it
is? Arguing that Leavis had (again) exaggerated the article’s deficiencies, Bateson’s defence
is that to attempt a coherent position in twenty-six pages naturally runs the risk of occasional
over-simplifications, and in that sense even ‘Arnold’s classical essay’129 is guilty of such.
Bateson then begins his composition of defence by noting that Leavis’s first paragraph
suggests that Essays in Criticism was set up to expose and combat the unscholarliness of
Scrutiny. Bateson states that in matter-of-fact the founders of Essays in Criticism are all
admirers of Scrutiny, and simply wished to set up a journal at Oxford that could perform as
123 ibid.
124 ibid.
125 ibid.
126 For Leavis, it is worth noting, where there is an intelligent public, and a good education in place – ‘then
literature can matter as an influencing factor in realms where critics are not commonly important, or do not
count for much.’ Leavis does not give an example as to the particular realms in question, but does add that in
contemporary cultural society where such conditions offer no such faith to the critic, Bateson’s claim that the
critic holds an important role in de-muddling the masses is ‘trifling and self-deceiving.’ Bateson, ‘Present
Time’, p.23.Leavis stresses, in an unrelenting charge, that Bateson’s essay fails to note that he (Leavis) has in
fact done more both in terms of ‘relating literary criticism with other studies and disciplines’, and in ‘defining its
importance for any one seriously concerned with the problems of contemporary civilisation’. Leavis concludes
his piece by reminding Bateson, that in Education and the University (1943) he does pay critical attention to
wider concerns, but that ‘what matters most about a mainly literary review is its performance in actual literary
criticism’. Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.175-176.
127 F.W. Bateson, 1953. ‘Anytime Reply’, Scrutiny, XIX, 4, (Cambridge: CUP) p.317.
128 ibid.
129 ibid.
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‘brilliantly’130 as Scrutiny at Cambridge. While it is true, he adds, that Essays in Criticism
aspires to a higher level of scholarship than Scrutiny; this is less important than the serious
interest shared by both journals. Bateson then highlights Leavis’s claim that in the whole of
Scrutiny’s twenty-year life ‘its judgments have invariably turned out to be right’,131 this
Bateson regards as absurd (‘quod est absurdum’). On this note of Leavis’s ‘exaggerated
claim’132 Bateson adds: ‘this is not to deny that Scrutiny’s judgments have generally been
right (no critic now alive has made fewer mistakes than Dr. Leavis,) or that Scrutiny, when it
was at its best, was a far better journal than Essays in Criticism is now or is ever likely to
become.’133
Despite the magnitude of this concession, Bateson nevertheless takes note that Leavis
had committed half of his article to a ‘minute and sometimes rather niggling examination’134
of some brief comments he made on passages from Marvell and Pope. Bateson provides the
excerpts, and some of Leavis’s commentary on them, and declares that it is ‘clear as
houses’135 that Leavis’s point in making his collocation in Revaluation was to suggest that the
resemblances in the last line of each passage quoted typified in some way the affinities
between Marvell’s and Pope’s poetry. To Bateson here, it is clear that in 1936 Leavis
expected the ‘particularity of resemblance to help’136 the reader to take his point. Bateson
then details that as a result, he cannot understand why Leavis should now berate him for
attributing to him ‘an interest in the verbal similarity between the last lines of the passages
from Marvell and Pope’.137 Interesting to note in the evolution of the debate, that Bateson, in
wanting to attribute ‘verbal’ significance as a central feature of Leavis’s criticism, can
130 ibid.
131 Bateson, ‘Anytime Reply’, p.317.
132 ibid.
133 ibid. While the magnitude of Bateson’s concession is notable in its severity (for this is high praise especially
toward an opponent) it is possible that it can simply be attributed to genuine feeling of truth on Bateson’s behalf.
That is to say, there may have been no ‘strategic’ reason for the concession.
134 Bateson, ‘Anytime Reply’, p.317.
135 ibid., p.318
136 ibid.
137 ibid.
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therefore articulate an angle by which to point out how, in a striking example, words assume
different meanings in different periods. It is expressed by Bateson that Leavis makes
persuasive and acute elaborations on the two passages, but that essentially, he talks around
Bateson’s actual essay as opposed to directly and legitimately refuting it. By this, Bateson
refers to the fact that his argument was two-fold: ‘(i) that, as Marvell used the words head
and heart, the sense-impression predominated, whereas for Pope the words were primarily
conceptual, and (ii) that the general linguistic trend represented by these passages had
resulted here in a distortion or enfeeblement of the poetic argument.’138 With regards to (i)
Bateson says that Leavis fails to dispose of its validity through showing that there are non-
sensuous elements in Marvell’s poems, because non-sensuous elements appear also in the
emblem books. For Bateson, the emblem books demonstrated the type of convention of
which Marvell was writing; thus supporting his view that ‘influence’ could be identified as
present. Referring then to Leavis’s reading of Pope, Bateson believes, equally, that Leavis’s
‘face could have been saved had he paid the most perfunctory attention to the context of
Popes lines’.139 The central thesis of Bateson’s article outlined a frame-work of defence
against Leavis’s refutation (or as Bateson viewed it, his ‘attempt’140 at a refutation):
My mistake, according to Dr Leavis, is that by introducing this notion of context I am
abandoning ‘something determinate—something indubitably there’ (p.174) for
something indeterminate. ‘The poem’, he says, ‘is a determinate thing; it is there’,
whereas ‘there is nothing to correspond—nothing answering to Mr Bateson’s “social
context” that can be set over against the poem, or induced to establish itself round it
as a kind of framework’ (ibid.). Dr Leavis does not explain, however, in what sense
the poem is there (where there is). I imagine he must mean that the poem, as we meet
it on the printed page, consists of certain specific words arranged in a certain
determinate order. But strictly speaking, of course, there is nothing there, nothing
objectively apprehensible, except a number of conventional black marks. The
meanings of the words, and therefore a fortiori the meaning of the whole poem, are
emphatically not there. To discover their meaning we have to ask what they meant to
their author and his original readers, and if we are to recover their full meaning, the
connotations as well as the denotations, we shall often find ourselves committed to
precisely those stylistic, intellectual and social explorations that Dr. Leavis now
138 ibid.
139 ibid.
140 ibid., p.317.
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deplores. There is no alternative—except to invent the meanings ourselves.141
This excerpt (like the one to follow) reflects in its central poscēre the axis of contention
between Leavis and Bateson, in that it highlights Bateson’s view that Leavis’s approach to
literary evaluation opens ‘the door to subjectivism’; that is, to a literary exploration that
depends upon the ‘remoteness’142 of the particular poem to the reader, and as such
‘contextual readjustment’ is to be understood as present and inevitable at all times. Furthering
this point, Bateson states:
Dr Leavis’s further complaint that the explorer ‘may go on and on—indeterminably’
has more basis. I suppose we are all reluctant in reading Marvell to follow Miss
Wallerstein back to the Fathers—or Miss Tuve, in reading Herbert, into the intricacies
of medieval service. But the whole point of the contextual apparatus that I proposed in
my article was to simplify the reader’s problems by showing the final dependence of
the various levels of context on what I called the ‘social context’. I was not piling up
unnecessary difficulties so much as trying by formulation of an organon to prevent
the serious reader from succumbing to the time-wasting temptations to ingenious mis-
reading now dangled before us by the most talented contemporary critics, English and
American, including very occasionally Dr Leavis himself.143
Leavis’s rejoinder begins by acknowledging that Bateson had been ill and in a hospital ward
at the time of composing his 27 page ‘Present Time’ essay. For Leavis, however, this was an
insufficient excuse for the essay’s shortcomings in that the essay had come with the claim
that it had received the backing of the editorial board at Oxford. In such a circumstance,
stated Leavis, where Bateson had been ill it should have been the duty of his colleagues to
ensure that the quality of the work had not deteriorated.  But a greater concern for Leavis was
the fact that after having ‘exposed’144 the errors of Bateson’s essay, Bateson’s reply, instead
of recognising Leavis’s points, served only to further its claim that it had a ‘defensible and
sufficiently well-considered’145 point to make. This justified for Leavis reason for continuing
141 ibid., p.320. (Bateson’s italics).
142 ibid., p.320.
143 ibid.
144 F.R. Leavis, 1953. ‘Rejoinder’, Scrutiny, XIX, 4, (Cambridge: CUP) p.321.
145 ibid.
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debate, as did Bateson’s continuing belief that scholarship was ‘superior’146 to criticism. For
Leavis Bateson’s reading of Marvell and Pope as well as Essays in Criticism’s general output
had already demonstrated ‘with a truly remarkable conclusiveness’147 that such scholarship
‘can only promote an incapacity to read poetry’.148 Bateson’s ‘incapacity to read poetry’,
continued Leavis, stemmed from his confusing preoccupation with interpreting material from
beyond the poem itself. Indeed, Bateson’s reading of Quarles and the Emblem books, in
Leavis’s view, had led Bateson to a distorted reading of Marvell; distorted because he had
become determined to demonstrate how Marvell had undertaken a ‘crude exemplification’149
of other work in the period. The effect of this in Leavis’s view was that instead of reading the
poem for what it was—‘a superlatively successful poem of an extremely original kind’,150
Bateson had attempted to deprecate its value.
Leavis’s concern with Bateson’s reading of Pope also brings up some notable issues,
as can be gathered from Leavis’s sarcastic and clearly irritated following comments:
The nature of Mr. Bateson’s reliance on scholarship is perhaps, if not so
astonishingly, even more revealingly exemplified in his fresh demonstration upon
Pope. He has caught me out!—this time (the happy confidence speaks in his prose)
there can be no question:
‘It will not be necessary to refute Dr. Leavis’s analysis in detail. All I need do
is to quote the first sentence of the Pope-Warburton note on these lines’.
All he need do!—the scholar-critic knows of the note that tells us authoritatively the
official meaning of the lines, he produces the note, and that settles the matter. It will
not be necessary to read the lines. And in his assurance of the finality of his piece of
scholarship he remains still happy about his assertion  that ‘slave’, ‘vassal’ and ‘dupe’
are ‘virtually interchangeable’, as also are ‘Bounded’, ‘narrow’d’ and ‘contracted’
(‘These tautologies can’t have been meant by Pope’.151
146 ibid.
147 ibid.
148 ibid., p.322.
149 ibid.
150 ibid.
151 ibid., p.323
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Bateson’s reading, as Leavis observes it, depends too heavily upon a ‘contextual
interpretation’152 (Leavis uses the term pejoratively) of the Warburton-Pope note. But Leavis
points out that he too had read he note, and though that may come as a surprise to Bateson,
the significant point is, that having read it, he found ‘nothing essential’153 that he ‘hadn’t
already gathered from the text itself.’154 This at first comes across as slightly conceited in
what would appear to be an implied suggestion by Leavis that he does not require support
from outside of the text, and that he has the ability or ‘intelligence’ to identify all relevant and
necessary contexts from the process of close analysis itself. But Leavis’s point is one of
principle; in having found ‘nothing essential’ what he means is that nothing—in his
opinion—could be essential that is not in itself a part of the text. Leavis expresses it this way:
‘I say ‘nothing essential’, since I assumed—and assume still—that how such a text is to be
read, and how much (or how little) such a note helps towards the attainment of a right
reading, must be determined finally by a study of the text.’155
From here Leavis goes on to defend his reading of Marvell and Pope in more detail
than I can afford to analyse in this chapter. If I am to summarise Leavis’s principal points of
conclusion, however, I should note that three emerge above all else both in recurrence and
emphasis. The first being that he felt Bateson’s charges against him were indicative more so
of the myopic and limited nature of Bateson’s own ‘scholarly’ approach rather than any
ideological short-coming in his own critical position. With this Leavis declares that Bateson
had not offended him in the way the Oxford scholar suspects he may have, and that
ultimately, his challenge was not ‘even a serious challenge’.156 The second important issue to
note is that of Leavis’s decision to ‘not write in too great a length’.157 This, however, was not
152 ibid.
153 ibid.
154 ibid.
155 ibid., p.324.
156 ibid.
157 ibid., p.325.
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merely for reasons of practicality per se; rather Leavis made it clear that to do so would
inevitably lead to an engagement with matters of an epistemological nature (a point noted by
Storer158 and by Guy and Small.) Indeed, though he felt strongly that he was correct and
Bateson incorrect, Leavis was aware that his argument was beginning to resemble one that
sought the rejection of extrinsic context in an almost absolute sense. In Leavis’s case (as I
will discuss in chapter 5) it is unlikely that he wished to promote a method with quite such
formalist extremity; rather it was Bateson’s ‘irritating’159 championing of the opposite—a
vast ‘apparatus’160 of ‘contextual interpretation’161 — that brought out of Leavis a strong
defence of the text as an entirely self-sufficient entity.162 That Leavis may not have applied
158 Storer states ‘Bateson challenged Leavis on this particular phrase, and Leavis recognises that it opens up a
theoretical issue, an opportunity for a ‘plunge into epistemology’ – epistemology meaning the study of how we
are able to know anything; in what sense the poem is ‘there’ for us to know. To a certain extent he tries to get
round this by making it appear that the poem’s thereness is something natural and obvious, so the ‘plunge into
epistemology’ is unnecessary.’ Storer, p.93. R. Storer quotes F.R. Leavis 1953. ‘Anytime Rejoinder’, p.319.
Guy and Small state equal concern with the absence of epistemological consideration or resolve in noting that:
‘The exchange between Leavis and Bateson is marked by a failure to relate the particular case of value-
judgments in English to the general case of value-judgments in disciplines of knowledge.’ Guy and Small,
Politics and Value, p.75.
159 Leavis, ‘Anytime Rejoinder’, p.324.
160 ibid.
161 ibid., p.325.
162 Whether the type of ‘contextual’ consideration that Bateson promotes in the process of evaluation should be
used in the analysis of a literary text is an undeniably difficult theoretical issue that extends in complexity as a
dispute dependant on wider philosophical problems relating to fundamental concepts of literary art. Leavis it
would appear seeks to elevate the work of art above the factors surrounding its creation. His approach to study
and criticism therefore centres on the internal analysis of structure and language, viewing the literary text as an
almost free-standing autonomous object and promoting the notion of an artistic composition as a self-sufficient
entity. The idea of ‘keeping distanced’ the study of the related or otherwise ‘context’ in the study of a text is an
attempt almost to separate a work of art from the extended consideration of the social, historical and political
circumstance of the author. Leavis’s approach therefore, although respectful of artistic composition as an
autonomous entity, nevertheless suffers from its rejection of extrinsic information, particularly, in regard to
devices as Bateson indicates in Marvell and Pope, of parody and imitation and so forth, which can be
unidentifiable without extrinsic knowledge of intent. Leavis’s approach also suffers from an inability to
construct cross-referential evaluations of the author; and in this case with regard to Pope, such an example is the
Pope-Warburton note. However, whilst it would seems incumbent to view such little regard for context as
limiting, such a removal of extended contextual consideration—though severe in its principle—is able as a
result, to provide definition and principle to the art of criticism, through a frame-work of intrinsic textual
boundary. On the other hand, Bateson’s approach appears more inclusive as a methodology. But as Leavis
argues, is it a methodological approach at all? It has no boundaries, encompassing a ‘half-realisation’ of intrinsic
text with extrinsic study, promoting the analysis of textual linguistics alongside intentional psychology and
biographical evidence. Having no boundaries, this approach may appear to possess the type of ‘best of both
worlds’ ‘balance’ that Bateson argues to be its virtue. However, Leavis’s concerns may be justified, in that such
an approach , not only doesn’t engage with the text sufficiently, it offers little faith in the belief that a text can
present its meaning via its own autonomous frame-work.  While the furthest exploration of artistic conception
may seem the truest and the most sincere way of engaging in analysis, it may equally be argued that there must
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such a degree of textual isolation in his own practice, we may evidence in light of that fact
that had read the Warburton-Pope note. Indeed despite the fact that Leavis claims that his
reading of Pope did not avail of the note’s information, he still read the note , and therefore
any critical decision made with regard to the poem, may (even on a sub-conscious level)
have influenced his decisions, understanding, or judgement of it.163
be ‘rules’ or ‘limitations’ in order to calibrate each judge, or otherwise such contextual exploration can only
remain as subjective as the art it seeks to assess.
163 Though Leavis doesn’t discuss the applied problems of decisions made regarding the inclusion or exclusion
of extrinsic evidence, he does appear consider that such critical subjects do suffer from complex theoretical
implications. And implications, Leavis states, ultimately lead to a crisis in English studies and literary criticism.
However, he furthers this admonition by stating that such a crisis is seldom spoken about because the writers
who could write about it, choose not to, because fortune (or misfortune as he sees it) has left them exempt from
its immediate consequences upon them; that is to say, they are supported by the educational establishments,
intellectual academies, and public media. Thus because they have reached the top of the ladder, there is no
longer the prerogative to challenge the theoretical justifiability or foundations of such a ladder’s ideological
construct.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
THE LEAVIS-BATESON DEBATE: AFTER 1953
The previous chapters have shown that the Leavis-Bateson debate comprised two specific
phases of direct exchange, the first set in 1935 and the second set in 1953. It has also been
shown that although this eighteen-year interval was to separate the exchanges, both sets
nevertheless centred on the same issues of critical contention; namely the relationship
between literary criticism and literary history. Given the fundamental nature of such inquiry
and its implications to the study of literature, it is not surprising then that both Leavis and
Bateson were to continue to address matters of critical function throughout their respective
writing and publications after the debate. The objective of this chapter is to examine these
post-debate writings and to observe the underlying theoretical nature of the critical–
ideological positions which can be said, in sum, to have divided Leavis and Bateson.
By the last exchange in 1953, Leavis appears to have emerged the victor. Bateson’s
own writing in these later years would state that as he ‘read and re-read’1 the exchanges it had
become clear that not only was Leavis ‘right’, but that the ‘force’ of his argument had since
played a ‘crucial’ role in his own ‘literary education’.2 Though Bateson on more than one
occasion had expressed the desire ‘to please Leavis’,3 his various expressions of Leavis’s
triumph4 were evidently more than a tribute of lip-service or a desire to please, and from
1953 to 1978, Bateson, in several notable ways, can be seen to utilize the lesson or
1 F.W. Bateson, 1964. ‘Alternative to Scrutiny’, Essays in Criticism, XIV, 1, 10-20. p.12.
2 ibid., p.13.
3 Bateson was ‘disappointed not to have pleased Leavis’ with his E.P.E.L. thesis.  F.W. Bateson, 1978. ‘F.R.L.
And E in C: A Retrospect’, Essays in Criticism, XXVIII, 4, 353-361.p.355.  Bateson referred to himself as the
‘lesser man’ because he ‘thought it would please Leavis. Bateson, ‘F.R.L. And E n C.’, p.361.
4 ‘Leavis was right and I was wrong’. Bateson, ‘Alternative to Scrutiny’, p.19. ‘[Leavis] made me realize that
my confidence in the kind of fact-finding represented by CBEL was naive, logically untenable, indeed dishonest,
because it pretended to exclude ‘value’ from the process of literary communication’.  Bateson, ‘F.R.L. And E n
C’, p.356.
CHAPTER FOUR The Leavis-Bateson Debate: After 1953
90
‘medicine’5 of ‘Dr. Leavis’s writing as a model of how to combine synthesis with analysis in
the study of literature.’6 Later in the chapter I explore the series of shifts in Bateson’s
position, and particularly the degree to which Leavis’s ‘force’ within the debate can be seen
to have influenced an almost entire U-turn in his critical-ideology by the end of his career. I
focus my attention first, however, on the nature of Leavis’s victory and how it can be seen as
particularly significant in terms of revealing the true underlying contention of the debate. In
order to make this point clear, I start with Leavis’s essay ‘Scrutiny: A Retrospect’ which was
published as the introduction to Maurice Hussey’s collection of Scrutiny’s Indexes and
Errata. (1963).7 In the essay Leavis recollected Scrutiny’s conception8 as a journal, in part
by presenting a thorough re-statement of its editorial doctrine regarding how literary works
and their writers should be evaluated. Given the nature of this focus, the text can be seen to
rekindle the matters centrally contended within the debate. Leavis states:
What governed our thinking and engaged our sense of urgency was the inclusive, the
underlying and overriding, preoccupation: the preoccupation with the critical function
as it was performed, or not performed, for our civilization, our time, and us.9
Leavis’s main argument was that the fundamental requirement of an intelligent criticism was
‘the creative interplay of real judgements—genuine personal judgements, that is, of engaged
minds fully alive in the present.’10 His belief that a ‘preoccupation’ with the contemporary
intelligence was vital to a proper working of a responsible criticism reflected his position
against Bateson throughout the debate and that which informed his central argument in New
Bearings in 1932. However, while Leavis emphasises throughout ‘RETSP’ that
‘contemporary’ and ‘present’ day values must constitute the guiding light of intelligent
5 Bateson, ‘Alternative to Scrutiny’, p.19.
6 ibid.
7 Although ‘Scrutiny: A Retrospect’ was published in 1963, it had been written in the August of 1962.
8 The other focus of the essay centred on technical aspects of Scrutiny’s production, editorial arrangements,
legislation of membership, initial reception, and publicity.
9 F.R. Leavis, 1963. ‘Scrutiny: A Retrospect’, Scrutiny, XX, 1-24, (Cambridge: CUP) p.2.
10 ibid., p.5.
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criticism, he nevertheless makes a significant remark regarding the use of the ‘past’ in critical
evaluation. Leavis writes:
[Scrutiny] established a new critical idiom and new conception of the nature of critical
thought. Its critical attention to the present of English literature was accompanied by
an intimately related revaluation of the past — for the attention paid to the past in a
sustained series of critiques and essays amounted to that.11
While Leavis presents his term ‘intimately related revaluation of the past’ as a valid critical
objective, it is worth recalling that he had vehemently refuted Bateson’s proposed
‘reconstruction’ of ‘original historical setting’ (i.e. a poem’s ‘religious, political, and
economic factors’) as an ‘illusory’ aim.12 A similar type of contradiction is seen in the fact
that Leavis is happy to propose a method in which ‘the present of English literature’ is
‘accompanied’ by consideration of the past, however, he had deemed Bateson’s proposal of a
‘critical balance’13 between historical scholarship and practical critical approaches as
fallacious. This latter refutation stemmed from Leavis’s belief that whatever a scholar may
deem important about the past, would in fact stem from a contemporary critical decision
made in the present, and would therefore be ‘essentially literary criticism’.14 This means, as
far as Leavis was concerned, that Bateson’s literary history did not (independently) exist in
its own distinct evaluative right, in the sense that, its aims, and the values of its practice,
would be sufficiently incorporated or subsumed into the expected critical duties of the
‘intelligent critic’.15
If Leavis’s argument is valid, and a true reconstruction of original setting and ‘social
context’16 is an ‘illusion’,17 then his accounting for Scrutiny’s success as being due in part to
its intimate consideration of the past appears to depend considerably upon an emphasis of
11 ibid.
12 F.R. Leavis, 2008. ‘The Responsible Critic or The Function of Criticism at Anytime’, Scrutiny, XIX, 4,
(Cambridge: CUP) p.173.
13 F.W. Bateson, 1953. ‘The Function of Criticism at the Present Time’, Essays in Criticism, III, 1, 1-27, p.25.
14 F.R Leavis, 2008. ‘A Review’, Scrutiny, IV, 1935-1936, (Cambridge: CUP) p.96.
15 ibid., p.97.
16 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.174.
17 ibid.
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semantic distinction. This can be seen elsewhere in examples such as that between
‘reconstruction’18 and ‘revaluation’,19 whereby the latter suggests a methodological stress on
an assessment of the past, on the basis that this is a more achievable aim than attempts to
reconstruct a genuine or true knowledge of historical context. These terms and their implied
connotative differences thus serve to suggest that although Leavis and Bateson factored ‘the
past’ into the mechanics of their ideologies with different measures of emphasis, the
argument that they held diametrically opposing positions, appears, at least to a certain extent,
to dissolve behind certain nuances of connotation. The term ‘intimately related revaluation’ is
merely one example of what appears to be an inherent characteristic of Leavis’s unspecific20
style of persuasive discourse. The most consistently used terms by Leavis within the debate,
such as ‘intelligent reading’,21 ‘contemporary sensibility’,22 ‘genuine’23/‘personal’,24 ‘real
judgments’25 and ‘engaged minds’,26 are, like his term ‘intimately related’, pre-engendered
with associations of established and traditionally reinforced high critical values.27 There are
several argumentative advantages to this for Leavis. One is that a non-committal on the
specificity of such terms places him in a position to (A) pre-suppose any perceived virtues of
Bateson’s argument as incumbent within the ‘high-values’ of his own (such as in the virtues
of Bateson’s scholarship being assumed as incumbent in the task of criticism), and (B), safely
highlight any perceived flaws in Bateson’s argument without the risk of necessarily
contradicting any particular specification presented in his own. In several instances where
18 F.W. Bateson, 1934. English Poetry and the English Language: An Experiment in Literary History, (Oxford:
Clarendon) p.vi.
19 F.R. Leavis, 1936. Revaluation: Tradition and Development in English Poetry, (Harmondsworth: Penguin in
assoc. with Chatto & Windus), p.1.
20 The unspecific nature of Leavis’s language is discussed in greater detail in chapter 5.
21 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.97.
22 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.179.
23 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.97.
24 ibid., p.99.
25 ibid., p.101.
26F.R. Leavis, 1932. New Bearings in English Poetry: A Study of the Contemporary Situation, (Harmondsworth:
Penguin in assoc. with Chatto & Windus), p.11-12.
27 See chapter 5 p.3. and chapter 5 (fn.23).
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Bateson requests28 further specification or elaboration on what Leavis means by certain
terms, the emphasis is seldom on Leavis to commit to an expression of exactly what they
mean, their justification as values, how they can be achieved, or furthermore, how their
achievement could be measured within disciplinary practice. 29
A further demonstration of this point, though it emerges from a slightly broader
context, can be seen when analysing Leavis’s ‘Valuation in Criticism’ (1966), an essay which
directly addresses the issue of determinable and verifiable standards and criteria in literary
criticism. The essay begins with Leavis’s statement that: ‘You can’t discuss “valuation”
intelligently except in a general account of the nature of criticism’,30 and furthermore, that
‘you can’t profitably discuss the “standards” of criticism apart from the purposes and the
methods, or apart from the actual functioning of criticism in the contemporary world.’31 The
admonition that mere ‘theory’ in the ‘abstract’ sense ‘can amount to little’32 when
approaching the field of literary ‘standards and criteria’33 is a particularly interesting view in
relation to several works of post-Structuralist theory that emerged in-and-around the same
time.34 The principal connection between these works was that they examined the value of
applying theoretical approaches to the understanding of literary criticism in both its function
as a performative act and as a discipline of knowledge.
28 ‘Dr. Leavis does not explain, however, in what sense is there (wherever there is)’. By ‘real judgment’, ‘Dr.
Leavis is in fact opening the door to sheer subjectivism’, Bateson, ‘Anytime: A Reply’, p.318. Another
observation of Bateson’s with regard to the nature of Leavis’s proposed evaluative approach is that in ‘such an
approach...there is no alternative but to invent the meanings of such terms for ourselves’, Bateson, ‘Anytime: A
Reply’, p.320.
29 See chapter for argumentative consequence of challenging established assumptions and values and the
possibility that Leavis’s argument comprises an ‘appeal to tradition’.
30 F.R. Leavis, 1966. ‘Valuation in Criticism’, Orbis Litterarum, 21, 61-70, p.61.
31 ibid.
32 ibid.
33 ibid., p.62.
34 The ‘anti-philosophical’ stance of Leavis’s essay appears rooted in several key concerns that were soon to re-
emerge in the post-Structuralist theory of Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, and Jacques Lacan. Whilst many
works classified under the term ‘post-Structuralism’ held complex and competing critical assertions; a clear,
certain, and important parallel nevertheless can be drawn between Leavis’s essay and several essays by the
deconstructionist literary critic and theorist Paul de Man. In an essay entitled ‘Criticism and Crisis’ (1967) de
Man explores the value of a purely ‘theoretical’ approach in establishing disciplinary standards and principles
with a similar focus on the matter as that presented in Leavis’s essay.
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A notable parallel of this can be seen in Paul de Man’s essay ‘Criticism and Crisis’
(1967) where de Man asks: ‘Is criticism indeed engaged in scrutinizing itself to the point of
reflecting on its own origin? Is it asking whether it is necessary for the act of criticism to take
place?’35 These questions, de Man felt, whilst abstract, and thus seemingly unprofitable in
their immediate application to the practice of evaluative criticism, were nevertheless
unavoidable in any true ‘authentic’36 consideration of the critical function. For De Man, just
as for Leavis, three primary or initial levels of critical ‘activity’37 were distinctly apparent.
The first of these was literature itself (for example, a poem, novel, or play). The second was
the performance or act of criticism in which a literary work was subject to an evaluative
response, and ultimately to a ‘judgment’38 made upon the deemed basis of its merit or value.
The third was that of a tertiary criticism more commonly distinguished as theoretical
criticism or literary theory, in which the performance of the critical act, and the principles and
criteria of the critical performance, became subject to analysis. In the case of Leavis’s
‘Valuation in Criticism’ essay and throughout his debate with Bateson, the main focus was on
how criticism (the act of evaluation and judgment) could be made ‘more ‘objective’, and by
implication, more authoritative.’39 However, where de Man and several other notable
theorists conclude that an inherent and unassailable ‘crisis’ exists in any attempt to apply the
subjective process of critical performance to a field of discipline or standards,40 Leavis
35 Paul de Man, 1983. Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, 2nd ed.
(London: Routledge) p.8.
36 ibid.
37 ibid.
38 Translated from the Greek language to the English as ‘judgment’, the word ‘criticism’ can therefore, at least
in this etymological sense, be understood to mean the judgment of literature. See Martin Gray (ed.) 1984. A
Dictionary of Literary Terms, 2nd ed. (London: Longman)
39 Josephine Guy, and Ian Small, 1993. Politics and Value in English Studies: A Discipline in Crisis?,
(Cambridge: CUP) p.75.
40 Guy and Small write: ‘poststructuralist programmes are negative rather than positive in their attitude towards
authority. Unlike structuralists, who were and are concerned with new methods of authorising literary judgments
(including those of structuralism). The consequence of this strategy is that post-structuralist concepts of what
would constitute an appropriate mechanism of intellectual authority remains relatively unelaborated—it is
implied in a method of critique rather than positively argued for within the general context of disciplinary
knowledge. In this respect, post-structuralists exhibit something like the same weakness inherent in Leavis’s and
the New Critic’s work . . . [The] distinguishing feature, then, of most post-structuralist approaches to the
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argued differently, ‘insisting’41 that it was possible to vindicate ‘the legitimacy of literary
criticism as a specific discipline with its own field of approaches and intelligence’,42 and
furthermore, that it was possible to arrive at ‘sensitive judgments’ regarding how the critical
act and ‘standards and criteria’ could be applied, measured, and validated in ‘concrete’43
terms. However, when elaborating on these ‘concrete’ terms, Leavis presents the argument,
that criticism, and the application of critical principles to a discipline of practice, must come
not from theoretical consideration, but from ‘the living strength of real experience’ and ‘real
judgment’,44 adding that: ‘A real judgment is a judgment that has been really judged’— it
must be ‘personal and sincere’45— ‘informed by real critical experience’ and ‘real critical
engagement’ with the contemporary scene’.46 While Leavis demonstrates a highly engaged
understanding of the performative critical process,47 the values of ‘real understanding’,
‘intelligence’, and ‘experience’, are nevertheless notably distinct in nature48 from a statement
regarding how such values could be applied or measured49 to a discipline of validity or
problem of value in the discipline exists in the rejection of the objective/subjective dichotomy which had
informed previous responses. This is to say that post-structuralism’s interest in literary value is produced by a
perception that objectivity – the search for non-evaluative criteria – is an impossible goal.’ Guy and Small,
Politics and Value, p.78.
41 Leavis, ‘Valuation in Criticism’, p.61.
42 ibid.
43 ibid., p.62.
44 ibid., p.61.
45 ibid., p.62.
46 ibid., p.63.
47 Leavis goes on within the essay to present a highly engaged understanding the critical process, particularly on
the phenomenological and experiential level. He insists that a judgement should be, and must be, personal. It
must therefore acknowledge its basis as that, and as such, acknowledge that however ‘serious’ and ‘energize[d]’
the ‘conception’ of judgment is, it nevertheless requires, (and furthermore ‘aims’) for ‘exchange’; that is,  ‘a
collaborative exchange, a corrective and creative interplay of judgments’ with others. (Note, however, that this
does not equally equate to critical postulation or theory on an epistemological level) Indeed, the depth of
understanding on this level does not in itself conclude or resolve the problem of criticism as it is applied to a
system of standards, rules, measures of right or wrong etc. It may be said therefore that Leavis is unable to
produce the kind of methodological objectivity that he had exposed Bateson for attempting to do and failing.
48 Gary Day writes: ‘Leavis refused to define what he meant by ‘life’, except to say that, as it was about growth
and change, the demand for a precise formulation was neither relevant nor appropriate.’ Gary Day, 1996. ‘F.R.
Leavis: Criticism and Culture’, Literary Theory and Criticism, (ed. Patricia Waugh) (Oxford: OUP) p.137. Such
an example where critics note that Leavis’s terms were not supplied with specific meaning are prevalent, and as
noted, are discussed in chapter 5 when accounting for the ways in which it may be argued that Leavis defeated
Bateson in the debate.
49 The subjective nature of the values Leavis presents, that is, the indeterminate nature of terms such as ‘real
judgment’ and ‘real experience’ do not equate to a sufficiently guided expression of how such features of the
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standards. This is precisely the aspect of methodological omission that characterizes his
argument against Bateson. It therefore would seem evident that throughout the debate
Bateson appears to have pitched his theoretical efforts against a dual difficulty: firstly, the
epistemological problem of attempting to make objective the subjective nature of critical
performance for the benefit of a workable disciplinary practice, and second, the strength of
Leavis’s refutations empowered as they are by free-associations with high aesthetic, but
methodologically unspecific, critical values. While this accounts, in part, for Leavis’s
deconstructive victory over Bateson, Leavis’s overall argument suffered inversely in the
sense that it failed to offer an actual resolution to the problem of defining methodological
standards and criterion in disciplinary practice. This is also the view in Josephine Guy and
Ian Small’s analysis, where it is stated:
The connection between the objectivity of literary judgments and their intellectual
authority was one never actually addressed by Leavis. In fact Leavis only countered
half of Bateson’s proposition – the assumption that objective literary judgments are
possible in the first instance. Leavis omitted to make a coherent argument for the
intellectual authority of value-judgments in themselves. Leavis of course did make a
strong argument for the authority of the particular values he believed literary
judgments to embody, and which he took to be self-evident: ‘if you don’t see that
literature matters for what really gives it importance, then no account you offer...can
be anything but muddle and self-delusion.’ But to argue for the prestige of literary
criticism on these grounds is quite a different matter from arguing that value-
judgments in themselves do not compromise the intellectual authority of English
studies, and it was precisely this kind of answer that Bateson’s original proposition
properly required (although Bateson’s rejoinder suggests he did not fully realise it at
the time). The rightness or otherwise of Leavis’s particular values is irrelevant to this
more general question. The exchange between Leavis and Bateson is marked by a
failure to relate the particular case of the value-judgments in English to the general
case of value-judgments in disciplines of knowledge.50
Guy and Small’s statement in parenthesis that ‘Bateson’s rejoinder suggests he did not fully
realise it at the time’ appears to remain equally valid when applied beyond 1953. Shortly after
the publication of Leavis’s ‘Scrutiny: A Retrospect’ (1963) Bateson wrote ‘Alternative to
critical act (however inherently present they may be within the process) could be applied to a discipline of
validity or standards.
50 Guy and Small, Politics and Value, p.75.
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Scrutiny’ (1964), an essay which bears no evidence that Bateson had later identified the
aforementioned nature of Leavis’s victory. In explaining the basis of his critical white-flag
Bateson states that Leavis and his associates at Scrutiny had achieved ‘the disinterestedness
that Arnold pronounced the essential critical virtue’,51 and that, in reflection:
Scholarship’s most serious limitation is that its mode of procedure is analytic. A scholar will date a
poem, or track down an allusion, or correct a text, but the analysis that provides the evidence by which
such problems are solved is single-minded, almost tautological. The work of literature has remained
static in the scholar’s mind while the particular research has been conducted, and the new fact that
emerges when a conclusion has been reached is merely additional to the work’s meaning’.52
The statement that scholarly analysis becomes ‘additional’ to the ‘meaning’ of a literary
work, as opposed to constituting (in its own right) a method of analytical evaluation, re-
confirms Bateson’s principal shift of position which unexpectedly53 emerged  in ‘Present
Time’.54 In 1972, eight years on from ‘Alternative to Scrutiny’ Bateson published two works:
a volume of collected essays entitled Essays in Critical Dissent,55 and The Scholar-Critic: An
Introduction to Literary Research. In the opening pages of the latter Bateson would re-state
51 Bateson, ‘Alternative to Scrutiny’, p.18.
52 ibid.
53 Bateson, ‘Present Time’, p.23.  The surprise conclusion of Bateson’s ‘Present Time’ essay (similar, as noted,
to the conclusion of his reply to Leavis is 1935, begins with the warning it ‘is, not as expected’. By not
‘expected’ Bateson refers to the fact that is advocates a balance of methods as opposed to singular application of
the scholarly method on its own (without textual engagement of the type associated with Leavis’s criticism and
Practical Criticism).
54 Prior to 1953 and particularly in E.P.E.L. as well as in his ensuing exchanges with Leavis in 1935, Bateson
had argued that scholarship, and judgments reached via the scholarly method, should centre on an historical
examination of the past. By this Bateson meant a factual consideration of a work’s original audience and the
socio-political circumstances of the author, the language a work used, and other relevant historical factors
surrounding its composition. Bateson deemed this necessary in part because it provided a methodologically
objective task for the student of literature as opposed to a dependence upon purely subjective ‘personal
judgments’. The caveat that this belief is only applicable to Bateson’s position up until ‘Present Time’ is due to
the fact that within ‘Present Time’ Bateson retracted, what Leavis called his ‘radical’ historicism for what he
would term a ‘supreme’ critical model. This supreme model, in distinction from his former method, promoted a
‘critical balance’ whereby assessment of a work’s external history would be performed alongside a practical
analysis of the work as an autonomous object. Bateson, in his essay’s conclusion, was to express this
compromise between contextual scholarship and practical criticism with the cri de coeur: ‘Let us go to school
with both Mr. Empson and Mr. Trilling’. (see chapter 3, p. 64).
55 Although E.I.C.D. was published at this time it should be noted that all essays within it (twenty-four in total)
had been written by Bateson throughout various stages of the 1960s. Only two ‘Ye gete namoore of me:
Chaucer’s Merchant’s Tale’, and ‘The Novel’s Original Sin: A Lecture’ are printed for the first time. As such it
provides an understanding of Bateson’s critical position as it had developed over the course of twelve years
(1960-1972), whereas The Scholar-Critic, in its form as a singular doctrine, promoted the complementary
balance of scholarly methods with contemporary critical methods.
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his belief that literary criticism and literary scholarship were ‘complementary disciplines’.56
However, in an editorial response57 to a question contributed to Essays in Criticism in the
same year, Bateson would also make clear, that whilst he felt the methods complementary, he
nevertheless firmly believed that they were distinct in the nature of their particular evaluative
function. This became apparent when Roma Gill,58 an English tutor, well acquainted with
Leavis’s work,59 had written to the editors of Essays in Criticism with a concern relating to
the teaching60 of the past from the values and perspectives of the present. Gill specified the
nature of her concern by asking: ‘How can we prevent the too easy reading of poets of the
past, reading them ‘as we read the living’, without at the same time destroying the meanings
that come with the recognition and identification of what is traditional?’61 Bateson responded
with:
Can a poem be read separately as "art" and as "life"'? —the answer must surely be that a proper literary
response combines both attitudes together.  The 'art', however, is historically determined, a mode of
aesthetic communication between the particular poet and his original readers or auditors that was right
or wrong. The 'life', on the other hand, though it may evolve under pressures from a language and a
society, is essentially a total continuum— a mirror of the ways of life, constantly available to all of
us.62
It can be seen from his response that Bateson did not believe that ‘art’ and ‘life’ were to be
‘read separately’, and as such, his reply entailed that a ‘proper’ response should mobilise an
evaluative balance of both methods. However, also evident in the response was the belief that
literary criticism held its concern with ‘the ways of life’, whereas ‘literary history’, with the
meaning, mode, and aestheticism of the ‘art’. The underlying basis of this position is that
56 F.W. Bateson, 1972. The Scholar-Critic: An Introduction to Literary Research, (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul) p.vii.
57 F.W. Bateson, 1973. ‘Editorial Response: As We Read the Living?’ Essays in Criticism XXIII, 2, 167-175.
58 Roma Gill was a Shakespeare and Marlowe scholar, who at the time was a Senior Lecturer at Sheffield
University.
59 ‘As a sixth-former I discovered the poems of Donne and the criticism of Dr. Leavis almost simultaneously:
one spoke to me and the other one for me.’ Roma Gill, 1973. ‘As We Read the Living?: An Argument’, Essays
in Criticism, XXIII, 2, 161-175. P.167.
60 ‘I want to try to set the balance straight, for myself at least, and in offering thoughts about the reading of
Donne's poetry also raise questions about the teaching of Donne, of the metaphysical poets as a group, and
perhaps even of poetry in general, to the undergraduate of the 1970s.’ Gill, ‘As We Read the Living?, p 167.
61 Roma Gill’s question in Essays in Criticism ends with ‘It is, I submit, the urgent business of any teacher of
literature to find an answer to this question. And I confess myself baffled.’ Gill, As We Read the Living?,  p
175.
62 Gill, ‘As We Read the Living?’, p.167.
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Bateson had accepted from Leavis, that because all evaluation is performed from the
perspective of the present, then the ‘life’ of the art (though the art be from the past) assumes
its significance from the values of the ‘living’ point at which the evaluation (or reading)
occurs. The claim that Bateson’s position on this matter had been influenced by Leavis seems
likely for several reasons. Firstly, this view of criticism was precisely that which constituted
Leavis’s argument against Bateson within the debate, and that which Bateson had later
reflected he had been wrong to argue against. Another is that four years earlier Leavis (with
his wife Queenie Dorothy) had expressed an identical view of criticism in stating that ‘the
judgments the literary critic is concerned with are judgments about life’.63 This can be traced
more broadly to Leavis’s ‘living principle’64 which entailed that:
The purpose of evaluating literature is to keep alive the tradition of the human world,
not by admiring its achievements, but by bringing its values, purpose, and
significance to bear on the present. The revaluation of literary works revitalizes the
linguistic and conceptual resources for thinking about human ends in a rapidly
changing world. But the critic’s duty is not only to the past, it is also ‘to establish
where, in the age, is the real centre of significance, the centre of vital continuity.’65
While the parallels between Leavis’s and Bateson’s view of criticism in this regard are
clearly evident, Leavis’s view that criticism should focus on ‘life’ only accounts for half of
the proposition Bateson made in his response to Gill. Indeed, while Bateson adopts Leavis’s
view on criticism there is no evidence that Leavis subscribed in equal measure to Bateson’s
adjoining view that history’s role therefore, was to consider ‘art’.66 While doubts have been
expressed (particularly by René Wellek)67 that Bateson could have ‘seriously defended’68 or
63 F.R. Leavis and Q.D. Leavis. 1969. Lectures in America (London: Chatto and Windus) p.23.
64 ‘The critic maintains that ‘living principle’—Leavis’s other term for tradition—by making the works of the
past live in the present, and by identifying the significant new life in contemporary literature.’ Day, ‘F.R.
Leavis: Criticism and Culture’, p.133.
65 ibid., p.137.
66 There is no evidence in Leavis’s lecture or in his wider writing to suggest that he himself equated the belief
that criticism’s concern is with life, to mean, or imply, that therefore literary history’s role was to consider the
‘art’.
67 ‘I cannot believe that Bateson could have seen this and could have seriously defended the position that
criticism is only about life’. René Wellek, 1979. ‘The Literary Theories of F.W. Bateson’, Essays in Criticism,
XXIX, 2, 112-123. p.117.
68 ibid.
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accepted the first proposition (that criticism was about life), or even truly believed in the
second (that art was for history), the distinction, as a dual postulate, held key advantages for
Bateson.  Bateson had lost his argument to the force of Leavis’s, and had since ‘come to
recognise’69 that literary history, as Leavis’s suggested, could not function sufficiently on its
own as an independent evaluative method without itself ‘essentially’70 being criticism. As
such Bateson may have been seeking to justify a role for literary history; a role of its own
value and functional identity distinct that from that of literary criticism. Though Bateson
accepted Leavis’s ‘present-centred’71 critical values, eventually to an almost full embodiment
of its principal basis within his own writing, it can nevertheless, not be forgotten that this was
still a concession72 for him. This would certainly be implied in Patricia Waugh’s evaluation
that: ‘Even in the first few decades of the twentieth century, there was still much resistance to
the use of the term ‘criticism’ to describe the academic study of literature (in the work of
prominent literary scholars such as Helen Gardner and F.W. Bateson, for example).’73
However, by ‘relegating’74 the focus of literary history to the art or object, Bateson was
simultaneously able to (A) re-install an independent value to the scholarly function (a value
of focus upon the artwork, the ‘facts’ of the past, and the ‘then-meaning’, 75and (B), do so
69 Bateson, ‘The Alternative to Scrutiny’, p.12.
70 Leavis, ‘A Review’, p.96.
71 Tae Chul Kim, 2004. ‘F.R. Leavis, or the Function of Criticism under Specialist Modernity’, Journal of
British and American Studies. 10, 1, 81-112. p.81.
72 The difficulty in Bateson’s acceptance of Leavis’s ‘victory’ and critical argument, can be seen in such details
as the fact that wherever Bateson would praise Leavis, he would always follow his praise a caveat that in some
small, but nevertheless worth-mentioning way, Leavis was still in some senses wrong, and he was still right, or
that Leavis failed to provide evidence to some of his claims against him, and so forth. Such an example is found
in The Scholar Critic where on p.21 (fn.2) Bateson: ‘I made these points in a letter to Scrutiny, 4, (1935), 181-5.
F.R. Leavis agreed in his reply that he had been ‘in the habit of making certain critical comments on the passage
that Mr. Bateson criticizes’, but he added that, ‘Mr. Eliot might reply to Mr. Bateson’s criticisms that, as they
stand, they combine pedantry and with inaccuracy’. The charge of pedantry invites a repetition of McKerrow’s
epigram quoted earlier in this chapter; the inaccuracies, if there are any, have not as yet been specified either by
Leavis or by anybody else.’ Bateson, The Scholar-Critic, p.21.
73 Patricia Waugh, 2006. ‘The Rise of the Professional: Criticism in the Modern Academy’, Literary Theory and
Criticism, (Oxford: OUP) p. 29
74 Wellek, ‘Literary Theories of F.W. Bateson’, p.117.
75 Bateson, The Scholar-Critic, p.16.
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without having to contradict or challenge Leavis’s notion that as ‘literature was for life’,76
therefore, ‘life’, should also be the critical focus.
The nature of Bateson’s distinction between literary criticism and literary history may
also have emerged from an argument made by E.D. Hirsch in his Validity in Interpretation
(1967) in which a distinction was made between ‘meaning’ and ‘significance’. Hirsch’s
argument77 was that meaning is different from significance, in that the latter, significance,
referred to meaning that had been acquired or brought to a text from perspective of the
viewer. Hirsch states:
Meaning is that which is represented by a text; it is what an author meant by his use of
a particular sign sequence; it is what the signs represents. Significance, on the other
hand, names a relationship between that meaning and a person, or a conception, or a
situation, or indeed anything imaginable.78
When looking at the connection between Hirsch’s argument here, and Bateson’s distinction,
there are several notes to be made. The first is that it had only been in the previous issue of
Essays in Criticism that Bateson had reviewed Hirsch’s text and paid particular (and
favourable) attention to this aspect of its argument. The second is the theoretical parallels
themselves. Indeed, if ‘significance’ meant the relationship between original meaning and
that which comes from observation thereafter, for example, from the perception of the
observer, then criticism, particularly the present-centric type vindicated by Leavis, was
precisely a function of this. Indeed Leavis’s stress on the importance of judgments being
made from the ‘contemporary’ and ‘living’ perspective of the present, would thus mean that
irrespective of what a reader or critic brought to a text by way of evaluation made from such
a view-point, unless it was to correlate to the ‘original meaning’, then it would instead be an
76 F.R. Leavis: Criticism and Culture’, p.137.
77 Wellek notes Hirsch’s distinction as ‘itself derived from Gottlob Frege’s “Sinn and Bedeutung”’ Wellek,
‘Literary Theories of F.W. Bateson’, p.117.
78 E.D. Hirsch, 1967. Validity in Interpretation, (New Haven: Yale U.P.) p.3.
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evaluation of the work’s ‘significance’.79 As such, the further the degree to which Leavis
argued that present ‘living’ values should constitute the true functional purpose of criticism,
the further applicable Hirsch’s interpretational model seems.
Bateson’s application of Hirsch’s model to the wider distinction between the critical
and historical function, nevertheless, comprised an issue of contradiction from an earlier
position he held. In ‘Alternative to Scrutiny’, as noted earlier, Bateson had conceded that
historical analysis, like criticism, becomes ‘additional’ to the ‘meaning’ of a literary work
due to the impossibility80 of retrieving the original meaning of a text without imposing
‘significance’ in the methodological process of the study itself. This would suggest that the
logic of Bateson’s new distinction was centrally dependent on a return to his former belief
that literary history could effectively identify original meaning through knowledge of original
context. From my research I have to conclude that this appears to be a direct contradiction.
This said it would also appear that a very small window of opportunity, if any at all, existed
in which a charge of contradiction could have been put to Bateson. This is because at the time
of responding to Gill, Bateson had also began making strong claims that while literary
history, in its general application, may be insufficient in retrieving original meaning,
biographical analysis of a writer’s historical situation, and intention, could. Indeed, in EICD
Bateson rejected Wimsatt and Beardsley’s ‘intentional fallacy’ on the understanding that it
79 Further understanding of term ‘significance’ can be found in Terry Eagleton’s Literary Theory: An
Introduction, and particularly the chapter ‘Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, Reception Theory’, 54-90. Eagleton
states: ‘it does not follow for Hirsch that because the meaning of a work is identical with what the author meant
by it at the time of writing, only one interpretation of the text is possible. There may be a number of different
valid interpretations, but all of them must move within the ‘system of typical expectations and probabilities’
which the author’s meaning permits. Nor does Hirsch deny that a literary work may ‘mean’ different things to
different people at different times. But this, he claims, is more properly a matter of the work’s ‘significance’
rather than its ‘meaning’. The fact that I may produce Macbeth in a way which makes it relevant to nuclear
warfare does not alter the fact that this is not what Macbeth, from Shakespeare’s own viewpoint, ‘means’.
Significances vary throughout history, whereas meanings remain constant; authors put in meanings, whereas
readers assign significances.’ Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction, (Oxford: Blackwell) p.67.
80 The impossibility here refers to the hermeneutic impasse discussed in chapter 3. Also see Burhanettin Tatar,
1998. Interpretation and the Problem of the Intention of the Author: H.-G. Gadamer vs E.D. Hirsch,
(Washington: RVP); Seán Burke, The Death and Return of the Author: Criticism and Subjectivity in Barthes,
Foucault and Derrida. 3rd edn, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh U.P.); Richard E. Palmer, 1969. Hermeneutics:
Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer, (Evanston: Northwestern U.P.)
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forbade ‘any attention to an author’s other writings, his biography or the social order to which
he belonged’.81 Referring to this as ‘obvious nonsense’ the argument may be made that
Bateson misunderstood the doctrine. Nevertheless, several essays of his E.I.C.D. comprised
specific efforts to highlight what Bateson termed, ‘the fallacy of the intentional fallacy’82
Though the recovery of original meaning was important for Bateson, he would not
agree with certain methods of attempting to make meaning available to modern readers, such
as through the modernization of spelling83 and recitations in the original accents of the
authors.84 At the same time he strongly refuted the critical style of William Empson (as he
had in 195385) for what he deemed to be a lack of any genuine basis in the history or fact of
the work.  In between these spectrums of purely subjective reading and an unattainable
absolute truth of historical context, Bateson’s argument in both The Scholar-Critic and
E.I.C.D. can be seen to reflect exactly that which he attempted to make to Leavis within the
debate. This being, that while the critical, and for that matter, scholarly process, were
inevitably subjective, scholarly research of genre, intention, literary history, and social
history (‘context’) could nevertheless serve to guide, what would otherwise be a purely
subjective evaluation, into one that was rooted, at least to some extent, in an awareness of the
fact and real meaning — the then meaning’86of a work. This was a point he had initially
expressed back in 1953 when he stated:
As a result of the series of limitations imposed upon word-meanings, and word-
associations at the various levels, a final meaning begins to emerge. It can be called
the correct meaning, the object as in itself it really is.87
Leavis’s attacks throughout the debate were generally aimed at the methods Bateson
proposed in how such factual awareness could be achieved in the first place. As such, the
81 Bateson, E.I.C.D., p.xv.
82 ibid.,p.14.
83 ibid., p.45.
84 ibid., p.27.
85 Bateson, ‘Present Time’, p.2.
86 Bateson, The Scholar-Critic, p.vii.
87 Bateson, ‘Present Time’, p.18.
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many shifts Bateson goes through towards the end of the debate and after it, can largely be
seen to reflect his continuing efforts to establish a method consistent with the aims of
objectivity in evaluation while at the same time acknowledging Leavis’s lesson that
reconstructions of the past were not exempt from subjective critical decisions.
Of all the shifts made by Bateson, one stands out above the others, that being his
eventual ‘abandoning’88 of the importance he placed on language and the role it should play
in literary analysis. Bateson’s insistence on this matter was not to wane from its initial
proposal in E.P.E.L. or throughout any stage of the exchanges with Leavis. Even in the
second phase of the debate in 1953 where his central promotion of historicism as a
singularised approach, changed to one of balance, his emphasis on a close analysis of the
historical evolution of linguistic patterns and trends remained evident.89 However, in a paper
contributed to Disciplines of Criticism (1968) entitled ‘Linguistics and Literary Criticism’
Bateson would eventually change his view. This is a point Wellek makes in observing that
Bateson replaced ‘his emphasis on the continuity between language and literature’90 for a
position that centred on the assertion that ‘language is only a remote originating factor in
critical response’.91 Bateson’s new position, Wellek equates to a diagram that Saussure in his
Cours de Lingustique Générale called ‘le circuit de la parole’.92 Wellek’s point is that this
shift from Bateson saw his focus enter the modernist domains of response theory93 and
88 Wellek, ‘Literary Theories of F.W. Bateson’, p.118.
89 I have referred in my last chapter to the centrality of this in several of his attacks on Leavis’s reading of
Marvell and Pope. As previously stated, Empson was not exempt either from claims made by Bateson of
linguistic negligence, nor were René Wellek and Austin Warren. A footnote to this effect in ‘Present Time’
made clear Bateson’s belief that Wellek and Austin’s Theory of Literature was limited due to ‘the failure to
realize the crucial role played by language in the literary object.’ Bateson would continue that ‘in its absence the
authors have left themselves no firm connection between literature and life. The result is an over-emphasis of
the formal elements in literature (rhythm, style, symbolism, genres, etc.), which are considered ‘intrinsic’, and
the disparagement of such ‘extrinsic’ constituents as ideas and social attitudes’. Bateson, ‘Present Time’, p.23.
90 Wellek, ‘Literary Theories of F.W. Bateson’, p.119.
91 ibid.
92 ‘The composition of a work of literature starts with an idea in the author’s head, is then verbalized and
transmitted by physical sounds to the ear of the receiver, who, in inverted order, transmits the physical sounds to
be mentalized.’ Ferdinand De Saussure, 1955. Cours de Linguistique Générale, 5th ed. trans. W. Baskin. (Paris,
Payou) p.28.
93 Wellek, ‘Literary Theories of F.W. Bateson’, p.119.
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‘reader psychology’.94 And it is evident that emphasis upon these approaches formed a
notable theme not only in ‘Linguistics and Literary Criticism’, but throughout ‘The Scholar-
Critic’95, several essays in E.I.C.D.96 and also a debate Bateson would have with Roger
Fowler.97 Given the centrality of linguistic emphasis in Bateson’s ideology for over thirty
years, the shift would come as a ‘surprise’,98 but more significantly, it came with an explicit
renouncing of integral historicist values. Indeed, Bateson would now claim that ‘to become
accessible to us critically, the literature of the past must in fact be translatable into the present
tense’,99 and as such, a degree of ‘anti-historicism is the price that has to be paid for the
continuing vitality of an English literary tradition.’100
When reflecting on Leavis in his ‘A Retrospect’ editorial postscript (1978) Bateson
would state that ‘what had begun in an almost total disagreement ended, as it turned out
paradoxically, in the beginning of a sort of friendship.’101 Recalling that they had only met
94 ibid.
95 See Bateson, The Scholar-Critic, p.vii, 79-89, 112, 114.
96 See Bateson, E.I.C.D,  p.79 - 89. 112, 114, 154-156.
97 This new emphasis upon the process of response, which is necessarily individual and subjective, yielded the
main argument against the importance of linguistics for criticism in the exchange with Roger Fowler. See Roger
Fowler (ed.) 1971. Languages of Literature: Some Contributions to Criticism,  (London: Taylor and Francis)
98 Wellek, ‘Literary Theories of F.W. Bateson’, p.119.
99 F.W. Bateson, 1968. ‘Linguistics and Literary Criticism’, Disciplines of Criticism: Essays in Literary Theory,
Interpretation, and History. (New Haven: Yale University Press) p.7.
100 ibid., p.8.
101 F.W. Bateson, 1978. ‘Editorial Postscript: F.R.L and E in C: A Retrospect’, Essays in Criticism. XXVIII, 4,
353-361, p.356. Though Bateson would suggest ‘a sort of friendship’ emerged from the dispute, Graham
Martin’s account of Bateson’s relationship with Leavis would suggest otherwise. Martin writes: ‘I can perhaps
begin by recalling the one and only meeting, so far as I know, between the two most influential English literary
critics of the 50s and 60s: F.W. Bateson and F.R. Leavis. As director of a 1956 British Council Summer School,
and having been responsible for inviting his distinguished opposite to contribute a lecture, Bateson decided that
on Leavis’s arrival at Exeter College, Oxford, where the School was being held, he ought to greet him in person.
He was not looking forward to it. In an early editorial contribution to Essays in Criticism (Janurary 1952) (sic)
entitled ‘The Function of Criticism at the Present Time’ he had intended to offer Leavis the hand of literary-
critical friendship, only to have the gesture rebuffed by Leavis’s Scrutiny reply (January 1953, the last number),
‘The Function of Criticism at Anytime’. So it was agreed that, as an Assistant Director for the School and
having as an undergraduate met Leavis, I should effect the actual introductions. Bateson – and, to keep up his
spirits, Mrs Bateson – were to wait in the College bar where I was to bring Leavis after meeting him at the
Lodge. A steep little staircase descended into the bar’s twilight shade. Reaching the bottom, I turned to Leavis,
to ask if I could introduce him to Mr and Mrs Bateson, who were seated a few feet away. Talking one look at
Bateson, Leavis stopped in his tracks like a Brahmin confronted with an Untouchable, or as if, say, E M W
Tillyard had suddenly materialised in hitherto empty space. Muttering some scarcely audible greeting, he turned
swiftly towards a corner of the bar from which no second visible contamination could reach him, where, for
after a moment’s exchange with an astounded Bateson, I reluctantly joined him, saying I know not what. A keen
admirer of Leavis’s work (it was Bateson, as my tutor, who had early put me on to New Bearings and
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for the first time ‘1950 or so’102 but despite their differences they were ‘occasionally able to
help each other at a modest level’,103 Bateson was to set out on a reflection of the debate,
made poignant by the fact that Leavis had died 6 months earlier in April 1978. Bateson too,
as it turned out, was to pass away before the piece itself had gone to print.104 As such,
constituting the last direct commentary upon the debate by either of its two participants, the
‘A Retro’ centrally engaged with what, for Bateson, were the essential issues ‘all those years
ago’.105 The first was the distinction between literary history and literary criticism. Bateson
recalls that Leavis’s attack on the distinction made in his E.P.E.L. ‘was in a way the
beginning of E in C’,106 because it had made him realize that his ‘confidence in the kind of
fact-finding represented . . . was naive, logically untenable, indeed dishonest, because it
pretended to exclude ‘value’ from the process of literary communication.’107 In this sense, he
was grateful to Leavis for making this clear, but in retrospect, felt it necessary to ask:
Was not ‘fact’ equally indispensible in the critical process? Were not Leavis and I
both mistaken on the critical theoretical issue—he in overrating literary criticism as
the be-all and end-all, I in that book of mine overstating the case for literary
history?108
Feeling that the ‘overrating’ and ‘overstating’ in effect represented two ‘biases’ — Leavis’s
for criticism, and his own for literary history — Bateson would state that in choosing one, he
would, in retrospect, cast his ‘vote for criticism’.109In expressing his reason for choosing
Revaluation), this was my first experience of il puritano frenetico as he was to be dubbed twenty years later by
Italian journalists, much to his dissatisfaction. As for the meeting, such as it was, his entire demeanour
announced that it had not happened. How could his earlier exchange with Bateson have justified – in his mind –
such behaviour, in one noted for exceptionally courteous public manners?’ Graham Martin, 1996. ‘F.R. Leavis
and the Function of Criticism’, Essays in Criticism, XLVI, 1, 1-15. p.1-2.
102 Bateson, ‘Editorial Postscript: F.R.L and E in C: A Retrospect’, p. 356.
103 ibid., p. 356.
104 At the end of Bateson’s essay the Essays in Criticism’s editorial board printed a note reading as follows: ‘It is
with profound regret that the editors record the death of F.W. Bateson on October 16th, 1978. Editorial add. To
Bateson, ‘Editorial Postscript: F.R.L ...’ p. 356.
105 ibid., p.359.
106 ibid., p.356.
107 ibid.
108 ibid.
109 ibid.
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criticism, the complete degree of Bateson’s U-turn from his once historicist position, would
become evident. He writes:
The proper way to read anything, especially anything claiming to be literature, is to
begin with the text and leave the context, and all those introductions, footnotes and
appendixes until later (if at all).110
This ‘concession’,111 as Bateson would term it, was followed nevertheless, with what would
turn out to be his final statement on the matter of criticism vs. scholarship, that being, that it
still seemed to him ‘possible and desirable to encourage a university Eng. Lit. man to be both
critic and historian, or (to put it another way) a Scholar-Critic.’112
110 ibid.
111 ibid.
112 ibid.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
THE LEAVIS-BATESON DEBATE: IN WIDER THEORY
My aim in this chapter is to situate the Leavis-Bateson debate’s central dispute in relation to
wider theoretical inquiry. I begin by developing several observations made in the previous
chapter in order to present an understanding of the debate both in terms of its conclusion in
the pages of Scrutiny, and furthermore, in terms of the view that it left several significant
critical questions unresolved. The crux of my argument will be to demonstrate that both
criticism and scholarship, as they are presented by Leavis and Bateson, engender three
subsidiary issues of methodological and aesthetic dispute; that of the use of extrinsic and
contextual information in critical assessment, the availability and value of authorial intention,
and the evaluative distinction between a present-centric1 analysis of literature versus an
assessment with emphasis on the original context of a work’s composition. In exploring these
sub-conflicts as stemming, in large part, from subjective literary values, I aim to examine the
degree to which subjective relativism poses a problematic issue to the epistemological status
of literary criticism as a discipline and as field of objective knowledge.
In chapters 1 and 3 I made note that Bateson harboured a characteristic determination
to be seen as ‘demonstrably right.’2 Cunningham suggests that this can be related to certain
competitive tendencies, anxieties, and even animosities, which existed between Bateson and
various higher-achieving men at Oxford. Bateson himself stated that his desire for personal
triumph also reflected in various conflicts of textual interpretation he would have with his
students whereby he would seek to leave them ‘limp and bewildered’ with historical facts, so
1 See chapter 2 (fn.83)
2 Valentine Cunningham, 1979. ‘F.W. Bateson: Scholar, Critic, and Scholar-Critic’, Essays in Criticism, XXIX,
2, 139-155, p.141.
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as he could ‘sail in’ with his ‘rival interpretation of the poem or poet’.3 Considering this
aspect of Bateson’s character it would seem unusual for a man of such inclination to
surrender as willingly as Bateson did, to Leavis by the end of the debate and in the years
after. Indeed despite claims that Bateson was ‘testy’4 and ‘determined’5 by nature, there is
little evidence of stubbornness either in the tone of his exchanges with Leavis,6 or in terms of
his broader critical and theoretical stance. To highlight this, we may reflect on the fact that in
1934 he held a belief in the value of historical scholarship. By 1953 he changed this view in
order to promote an approach incorporating a ‘compromise’7 of scholarship alongside
practical criticism. By 1968 he would retreat even further in stating that a degree of ‘anti-
historicism’8 was necessary to keep criticism relevant and vital to the English literary
tradition. And in 1978 (in his very last essay) he would remark, that whilst he felt a work’s
‘context’9 should be consulted only at the end of a reading ‘(if at all)’,10 he nevertheless still
believed somehow that literary history and scholarship were ‘possible and desirable’.11
Though aspects of circularity are present in the evolution described above, and though
Bateson was not a stranger to taking minor digs at Leavis,12 he was nevertheless, by-in large,
in public apologetic about the debate,13 openly admiring of Leavis,14 and often quick to
address internal contradictions that emerged in some of his own methodological projects.15
3 F.W. Bateson, 1975. ‘Confessions of an Eng.lit. Tutor’, Pelican: The Magazine of Corpus Christi College, III.
2. P.21.
4 Cunningham, ‘F.W. Bateson: Scholar, Critic...’, p.148.
5 ibid., p.149.
6 The general tone of Bateson’s exchanges were less vitriolic than Leavis’s.
7 F.W. Bateson, ‘The Function of Criticism at the Present Time’, Essays in Criticism, III, 1, 1-27, p.25.
8 F.W. Bateson, 1968. ‘Linguistics and Literary Criticism’, Disciplines of Criticism: Essays in Literary Theory,
Interpretation, and History. (New Haven: Yale U.P.) p.8.
9 F.W. Bateson, 1978. ‘Editorial Postscript: F.R.L and E in C: A Retrospect’, Essays in Criticism. XXVIII, 4,
353-361, p.356.
10 ibid.
11 ibid.
12 Bateson enjoyed a some jokes at Leavis’s expense. Cunningham remarks that Bateson ‘was tickled pink by
being offered “a double-bed” for himself “and Mrs Leavis” at a North American conference and that he loved
chuckling over the story with his audiences.’ Cunningham, F.W. Bateson: Scholar, Critic..., p.145.
13 ‘Considerations of this sort naturally suggested themselves to me as I read and re-read the important 24-page
‘Retrospect’ that Dr. Leavis has prefixed to the index-volume of the re-issue of Scrutiny. It is a more personal,
more detailed and explicit account or the Scrutiny drama than the unhappy ‘Valedictory’ with which he prefaced
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Leavis, who was more austere16 than Bateson, would less frequently back down on an
earlier position. Cunningham relates this to the ‘critical totalitarianism of a Leavis who
always pretended he never made mistakes.’17 Cunningham’s statement appears a little
harsh.18 The truth may lie more in an understanding that Leavis’s critical-ideology (certainly
compared to Bateson’s) was constructed around less definite terms and therefore, by-effect,
such terms (and their connotations) were sufficiently adjusted through a re-contextualisation
of what they meant rather than outright abandoning or retreat of original position or principle.
Believing this to be the case also, and putting the issue directly to Leavis, Wellek once
requested a more precise specification on the meaning of some of Leavis’s ‘key terms’—such
as ‘impersonality’, ‘concreteness, and ‘realization’.19 However, Wellek recalls, that in his
reply, Leavis ‘refused to make them more explicit’.20 Alongside Wellek, several Leavisian
scholars appear to make a similar observation on Leavis’s sometimes vague style. Bilan for
example states that ‘nothing is more difficult to pin down than [Leavis’s] use of the word
its last number, that for October 1953- That was exactly ten years ago as I write, and I had almost forgotten that
I had myself contributed four or five pages of embarrassed self-defence to it. Cet animal est michant, quand on
I'attaque il se défend. I had recently attempted then a formulation of Essays in Criticism's critical raison d’étre
on which Dr. Leavis’s disapproval fell like a ton of bricks in Scrutiny’s issue for Spring 1953. What it was all
about I have never quite understood.’ F.W. Bateson, 1964. ‘Alternative to Scrutiny’, Essays in Criticism, XIV,
1, 10-20. p.12.
14 Bateson would openly state ‘admiration’ of Leavis. In 1978 he would write: ‘It is true that my admiration of
Leavis was not immediately returned. His long and intelligent review...’ p.355. ‘Posterity, which will have
forgotten me, will surely retain a niche for F.R.L. as one of the most effective propagandists for criticism this
country has ever had.’ F.W. Bateson, 1978. ‘F.R.L. And E in C: A Retrospect’, Essays in Criticism, XXVIII, 4,
353-361.p.355.) p.355, 361.
15 Cunningham writes that Bateson ‘made mistakes...Better still though: for all his desire to be right, he could
admit he had once been wrong.’ Cunningham, ‘F.W. Bateson: Scholar, Critic..., p.152.
16 That Leavis was austere can be evidenced in several ways. In chapter 2 (fn.113) there is a strong suggestion
from Paul Dean (and others) that this was the case. A further example  is noted in Richard Storer’s Leavis where
it stated that Leavis was very defensive and severe in a long letter to Essays in Criticism criticising Fr. Jarrett-
Kerr who in an issue previous had contributed a short letter which had ‘only been mildly critical of Scrutiny’.
Richard Storer, 2009. Leavis, (London: Routledge) p.91. Also see Cunningham’s remarks about Leavis who
assumed a belief ‘that he never made mistakes’. Cunningham, ‘F.W. Bateson: Scholar, Critic..., p.152.. And
Donald R. Kelley’s view that Leavis was ‘notoriously opinionated’. Donald R. Kelley, 1995. ‘Intellectual
History in a Global Age’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 66, 2, 155-167. p.161.
17 Cunningham, ‘F.W. Bateson: Scholar, Critic..., p.152.
18 Valentine Cunningham is a notoriously direct critic, often truculent and scathing. I use the word ‘harsh’
above, however Cunningham shows little hesitancy in lambasting a wide array of writers and critics in his own
often colloquial, and informal, critical work.  For examples see severe attacks on Paul de Man, Ezra Pound,
Harold Bloom, George Eliot, and Harriet Beecher Stowe throughout Valentine Cunningham, 2002. Reading
After Theory, (Oxford: Blackwell)
19 René Wellek, 1981. [untitled]. Modern Language Review, 76, 1, 175-180. p.177.
20 ibid.
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“standards”’,21 and Gary Day observes that ‘Leavis refused to define what he meant by ‘life’
only to say that, as it was about growth and change, the demand for a precise formulation was
neither relevant nor appropriate.’22
This said, the point to be made, is that throughout the debate, when faced with
subjective terms such as ‘close reading’ and ‘intelligent reading’, Bateson was in fact
confronted, not with methodological specificity, but rather with ontological23 critical values,
21 R.P. Bilan, 1979. The Literary Criticism of F.R. Leavis, (Cambridge: CUP) p.50.
22 Gary Day, 1996. ‘F.R. Leavis: Criticism and Culture’, Literary Theory and Criticism, (ed. Patricia Waugh)
(Oxford: OUP) p.137. It should be noted, however, that Storer believes that such indictments of Leavis
(particularly the argument of Wellek) fail in their nature to ‘adequately’ consider how Leavis ‘intended his
words to work’. Storer, Leavis, p.9.
23 Claims that Leavis’s criticism comprised an ontological quality whereby his literary values were often
expressed by use of words that held unstable meaning (and thus imprecise and implied ideas) has recently led to
a long clash of views between Leavisian scholars Chris Joyce and Richard Stotesbury. The sequence of
correspondences between Joyce and Stotesbury began when Joyce published an essay in 2005 (originally a
paper at the Leavis conference at Downing College, Cambridge) entitled ‘Meeting in Meaning: Philosophy and
Theory in the work of F.R. Leavis’.  Joyce’s essay discussed the issue of Leavis’s distinction as a literary critic
in relation to his use of ‘“pre-theoretical” evaluative language and wider differences between literary criticism
and philosophy: ‘The style of writing in this chapter (“The Idea of a University”) is quintessentially
characteristic in a much more important sense than the term “style” would normally suggest: very precise and
intensive, and continually referring back to its own assumptions woven into a complex nexus. The key terms
include “civilization” and “culture,” the latter appearing, with “tradition,” in various permutations: “humane
culture,” “cultural tradition,” “living tradition,” “humane tradition,” “maintaining continuity,” and “cultural
sensibility in which tradition has its effective continuance.” It may be argued that Leavis is defining his key
terms or first principles by reference to themselves in numerous variant forms. And this is in fact the case. But
this is entirely consistent with his perception of the “relationship” between meaning and language. It explains
his rejection of theoretical approaches in the sense of first seeking to define one’s underlying principles in
general or abstract terms and then superimposing the resultant “diagram” on to the experience of reading a given
work.’  Chris Joyce, 2005. ‘Meeting in Meaning: Philosophy and Theory in the work of F.R. Leavis’, Modern
Age, 47, 3, 240-249. p.241-242. The argument of Joyce’s essay was later further explored in a 2009 contribution
to the Cambridge Quarterly entitled ‘The Idea of ‘Anti-Philosophy’ in the work of F.R. Leavis’, (38, 1, 24-44).
Joyce would claim that whether or not it was accurate to label Leavis a philosopher, or equate or distinguish his
criticism from philosophy, his ‘formulation of the idea of ‘anti-philosophy’’ had ‘serious bearings on
philosophical problems, most obviously in the field of ontology.’ Joyce states that: ‘Leavis is generally viewed
as a ‘formalist’ critic in the ‘liberal-humanist’ tradition, that is to say, as having concerned himself with ‘close
reading’ of literary texts and their formal properties against an assumed background of broadly shared values. I
challenge the restrictive character of this reading, which insufficiently summarises the nature of his interest in –
and conception of – the ‘literary’. He was, I contend, a more powerful thinker than has commonly been
recognised – much more so than the two critics with whom his name is often linked: Richards and Empson (a
significant point in relation to considerations about literary criticism), and very far indeed from exhibiting the
kind of pre-theoretical innocence or aversion often attributed to him. It is, I think, at least as true of Leavis as
Peter Hacker suggests of Wittgenstein, that he dug down to our most fundamental presuppositions regarding the
nature of language: assumptions so basic they escape our day-to-day recognition.’ Chris Joyce, 2009. ‘The Idea
of ‘Anti-Philosophy’ in the work of F.R. Leavis’, The Cambridge Quarterly, 38, 1, 24-44. p.24. Stotesbury
strongly disagreed with Joyce, stating that Joyce’s treatment of how aspects of Leavis’s theory relates to
philosophy ‘provides an opportunity for clearing up an important misconception. This is implicit in his claim
that “[Leavis’s] thought was . . . very far . . .from exhibiting any kind of pre-theoretical innocence.” According
to Stotesbury, ‘Leavis himself, rightly, disclaimed any “theoretical” or philosophical interest in language. It is
certainly true that his view of language as “collaborative creativity” is very like that of the later Wittgenstein.
However, if both men arrive at the same point, it is from opposite directions; and whether we call the end result
“philosophy” or not depends on the route by which it is reached. Leavis’s distinction is to make explicit—to
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each with a flexible meaning in their own right and thus perhaps subject to interpretative
distortion. While Bateson’s uncharacteristic surrender to Leavis’s ‘force’ may be understood
as one reason that the debate drew to a close, a related aspect may be that such resignation,
was in part, induced by Leavis’s presentation of isomorphically established literary and
critical values. I suggest that this is possible because of two reasons: firstly, given the
unspecific connotation of the words he used, Leavis’s values were difficult to attack or refute.
If Leavis presented his terms more specifically, detailing certain words in more precise terms,
or with necessary contexts of methodological instruction, the effect may have exemplified
aspects of antithesis or disagreement with Bateson’s views. The second reason is that
Bateson, unable to respond to the seemingly universal nature of some of Leavis’s values, may
have accordingly developed a sense that, as he was unable to disagree, therefore, he was most
likely incorrect in his own argument. This, however, is not to dispute the possibility that
Bateson was wrong in certain fundamental ways.
Indeed, while Leavis may have been unspecific in presenting how certain critical
values could be methodologically implemented in critical practice, he was not vague or
imprecise in the nature of his of attack where he felt Bateson to be guilty of proposing invalid
methodological direction. The most notable example of this, and thus the source of the
greatest damage to Bateson’s position throughout the entire debate, was Leavis’s incisive
refutation that genuine ‘time-travel’ through scholarly methods was an impossible aim. By
this Leavis was referring to Bateson’s argument which assumed that the literary historical
approach could grasp a genuine ‘understanding’ (as opposed to ‘reproduction’)24 of the past
through a keen scholarly engagement with socio-economic and linguistic historical contexts.
The futility of this, Leavis claimed, lay in the fact that such research would still require, in its
articulate in exceptionally powerful and illuminating terms—truths about meaning and objectivity that we
implicitly know and take for granted in our ordinary “pre-theoretical” use of language, and, a fortiori, the
evaluative vocabulary.’ Richard Stotesbury, 2006. “Theory”, Philosophy and F. R. Leavis: A Caveat’, Words in
Edgeways, Oct, 18-19.p.18.
24 F.W. Bateson, 1934. English Poetry and the English Language: An Experiment in Literary History, (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1934) p. v.
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methodological approach, a decision made as to what particular aspects of the past were
important to the evaluative process. Given this, Leavis argued, the practice of such
scholarship would in fact be indistinct in its performative function from literary criticism.
While Leavis was principally refuting Bateson’s definition of scholarship when highlighting
this particular hermeneutic obstacle, he extended his point to be applicable to all scholarship
by implying that he knew of ‘no literary history that doesn’t make a show of criticism’25—
and therefore, no literary history that could be truly regarded as exempt from the value-based
evaluative processes of criticism.
Leavis’s terminology has a very powerful effect on the debate in the sense that the
critical quality of say, ‘intelligence’ may be valued in an ideographic26 sense by both parties,
but without dialectical specificity, it could equally denote different meaning to both Leavis
and Bateson in practice. When we consider too the argumentative ‘force’ of Leavis’s
presentation of ontological values alongside the precision of his argument detailed above,
whereby he demonstrates literary history itself to be dependent upon criticism, it is not
surprising then that many critics including Guy and Small argue that by its end the debate had
in effect ‘resolved in Leavis’s favour’.27 Furthermore, several later statements from Bateson
in which he concedes to having been wrong to have argued against Leavis gives the debate a
certain distinctiveness from some other similar debates28 in the sense that resolution (or latent
agreement) to some extent, did emerge. However, while words such as ‘resolution’ may be
historically accurate in identifying the debate’s conclusion in the pages of Scrutiny, no
25 F.R. Leavis, 2008. ‘A Rejoinder’, Scrutiny, IV, 1935-1936, (Cambridge: CUP) p.186.
26 The ideographic sense here refers to the fact that the same word (‘intelligence’ in this example) may be in use
by Leavis and Bateson (in the context of dialectic return) however, that what is precisely meant by critical
‘intelligence’, if explored beyond the initial assumptions and connotations of the word, may hold differing
meanings to both parties. Thus the word may be the same, but its implications in a critical context, may not.
27 Guy and Small do however provide the caveat, as I explore, that whilst resolve emerged in the life-span and
context of the debate itself, the issue of objectivity and intellectual authority, was not resolved, and that
Bateson’s resignation may have been due in part to the fact that he did not identify the methodologically hollow
construction of the argument that defeated him. See Josephine Guy, and Ian Small, 1993. Politics and Value in
English Studies: A Discipline in Crisis?, (Cambridge: CUP) p.75.
28 There are more examples of debates in which neither party has accepted defeat than there are debates (such as
that between Leavis and Bateson) where Bateson eventually conceded that Leavis had been correct.
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genuine sense of resolution took place if we acknowledge that the underlying theoretical
issues were not resolved.
To understand this claim it is necessary to consider the central issue of the dispute
itself. While traditional disciplinary roles, in, say, academia, or in wider literary-critical
practice, may serve to construct a functional distinction between ‘literary criticism’ and
‘literary history’, it may equally be said that the terms are in fact empty without a precise
definition. In the debate (as well as in the thesis from which the debate ensued) Bateson’s
efforts can largely be seen as an attempt to provide such a definition: ‘I devoted more than
half my introduction [in E.P.E.L] to defining, or attempting to define, what I conceive to be
the essential differences between the two activities.’29 While it has been made clear already
that Leavis disagreed with these ‘essential differences’, feeling that they were constructed
upon a fallacy, it is also important to identify the basis of Leavis’s disagreement. To say, for
example, as Leavis does, that little distinction exists between scholarship and criticism
presupposes a notion of what criticism is in order that it can be demonstrated to be distinct
from scholarship. Leavis therefore can be seen both to register explicitly and implicitly a
view on what makes criticism criticism. The significance of this becomes apparent if we
analyse the various definitions he supplies to this effect, together with what Bateson deems
scholarship to be. When the terms ‘scholarship’ and ‘criticism’ are understood in this sense it
can be seen that they emerge as collective terms comprising a set of subsidiary critical
conflicts. These sub-conflicts can be divided into three sets, which represent more precisely
the contentions underneath the more general, umbrella terms of ‘criticism’ and ‘scholarship’.
The first sub-conflict relates to the issue of extrinsic evidence and particularly the critical
principles surrounding the use of extrinsic evidence in literary evaluation. The second relates
to the availability, use, and value of authorial intention in critical assessment. The third,
29 F.W. Bateson, 2008. ‘A Reply’, Scrutiny, IV, 1935-1936, (Cambridge: CUP). p.181.
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which can be indistinct from the other two is the conflict between critical approaches
promoting a present-centric critical perspective versus those with an emphasis upon the
historical perspective or situation of a text. Despite the debate being understood more
commonly as a battle between the critic and the scholar these sub-conflicts point to a more
fundamental conflict about critical and scholarly activity.
When considering the attitudes towards the use of extrinsic evidence within the
debate, it should be noted that neither Leavis nor Bateson sought to exclude absolutely either
extrinsic information or ‘context’ from the evaluative process. In the case of Bateson, it was
of course, completely the contrary. He believed that intelligent scholarly consideration of
context, even of information from beyond the contours of the text itself, was vital in that it
provided towards a true understanding of what lay on the page. The value, therefore, of
extrinsic study for Bateson can be understood as the basis of his E.P.E.L. thesis, where he
argued, to Leavis’s dismay, that the socio-cultural, political, linguistic, and economic factors
surrounding a text’s composition were entirely necessary in establishing the meaning of a
poem, the poet’s intention, the work’s original (and therefore truest) meaning, and ultimately,
the work’s literary value in relation to its time and place in English literary tradition.30
Leavis’s position regarding the use of extrinsic information is different to Bateson’s in
the sense that it did not change so dramatically either in the debate or in the years after. That
said critical efforts to understand his position are often made difficult because of what
appears to be a more nuanced31 stance regarding both the value and application of contextual
30 This point, while entirely accurate of Bateson’s position at the time, should not be left as a statement of his
general critical position as it is important to remember that Bateson completely changed his opinion on the
evaluative importance of context by the end of his career.
31 This difficulty is evident in various hesitant critical assessments made by several Leavisian scholars. His
position can be highlighted, however, with help of several useful extracts. Gary Day begins such an
understanding by suggesting that distinctions between text and context were not of particular importance in
Leavis’s wider critical agenda. Day writes: ‘Leavis’s point is that whereas we have, say, the poem in front of us,
we can only ever construct its context in part and imperfectly, and that weakens any explanatory value that may
be claimed for it. Yet, we should not assume that Leavis believed that literature existed in isolation from the
social-order—quite the contrary. He declared that he did not believe in literary values, that you would never find
him talking about them, and that the judgements with which the literary critic is concerned are judgements about
life. Leavis’s refusal to distinguish between text and context appears odd, because we take the distinction almost
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information in a critical assessment. One study, in which Leavis’s criticism is measured both
in its similitude and distinction from ‘Practical Criticism’—the approach Leavis states as his
method of choice in the debate32—is Storer’s Leavis (2009) and particularly the chapter
entitled ‘Close Reading’. A reading of Storer suggests that one way to understand Leavis’s
methods is to first consider the difference between ‘close reading’33 and closed reading. The
latter, epitomised in the ‘experimental projects’34 of  I.A. Richards, entailed denying students
any external information such as ‘name of author, date, previous critical commentary, etc’.
Such an approach, later defended by E.M.W. Tillyard,35 was seen as valuable in the sense that
it produced ‘a just if severe test of literary perception’.36 Within the debate Leavis would state
to Bateson that the ‘centre of interest’37 should always be in the literature; the focus, ‘always
upon literary values’.38 Here it would appear that certain aspects of the method were
favourable to Leavis—specifically the focus produced from a concentrated attention upon the
literature. That said, as Storer points out, ‘total isolation of text from any kind of context’39
for granted. He regards it a false opposition, which reduces literature’s role in developing the culture by keeping
us in touch with tradition. It is not that Leavis thinks that literature exists in realm apart from the rest of society,
only that he has a different understanding, certainly to many contemporary critics, of the part it plays in the
wider world. As an embodiment of the finest expression of the language, and an example of what can be
achieved with it, literature sets a standard of thought which should be make politicians and the media wary of
expecting an educated public to accept their clichés, slogans, and soundbites.’ Gary Day, 1996. ‘F.R. Leavis:
Criticism and Culture’, Literary Theory and Criticism, (ed. Patricia Waugh) (Oxford: OUP) p.137. Although
Day states that Leavis refused ‘to distinguish between text and context’ several of Leavis’s charges against
Bateson would appear to suggest, that while he may not have wished to make the distinction in explicit terms, he
did so, nevertheless, in principle and implication. One such example is Leavis’s statement that ‘the text, duly
pondered, will yield its meaning and value to an adequate intelligence and sensibility.’ F.R. Leavis, 2008. ‘The
Responsible Critic or The Function of Criticism at Anytime’, Scrutiny, XIX, 4, (Cambridge: CUP) p.163. I have
mentioned in chapter 3 that such a statement bears resemblance to the formalist position whereby the promotion
of a text as an autonomous entity is maintained as preferable to viewing the text as an extension of external, or
furthermore, externalizing, consideration.
32 Leavis states that ‘some of the most essential can be got only through much intelligent reading of the literary-
critical kind, the kind trained in “practical criticism”’. Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.163.
33 Richard Storer, 2009. F.R. Leavis, (London: Routledge) p.86.
34 ibid., p.85.
35 E.M.W. Tillyard was a scholar and literary scholar, Fellow in English (1926–1959) at Jesus College and later
Master of Jesus College (1945–1959), Cambridge.
36 Storer, Leavis, p.86.
37 F.R Leavis, 2008. ‘A Review’, Scrutiny, IV, 1935-1936, (Cambridge: CUP) p.97.
38 ibid.
39 Storer, Leavis, p.87.
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was not quite the approach that Leavis promoted.40 Indeed, for Leavis the textual focus was a
means in itself of discovering context, and from a close reading, a reader could peer outwards
into related and significant contexts.
Leavis’s aim was to encourage an evaluative process whereby the emphasis was on
attaining as close as possible a complete reading of the poem. This point can be seen in
Education and the University published in 1943 in between the debate’s two phases, where
Leavis writes:
We can have the poem only by an inner kind of possession: it is ‘there’ for analysis
only in so far as we are responding appropriately to the words on the page. In pointing
to them (and there is nothing else to point to) what we are doing is to bring into sharp
focus, in turn, this, that and other detail, juncture or relation in our total response; or. .
.  what we are doing is to dwell with a deliberate, considering responsiveness, on this,
that or the other mode of focal point in the complete organisation that the poem is, in
so far as we have it.41
Storer seems accurate in his assertion that ‘close reading’, for Leavis, was ‘essentially a way
of accessing context rather than cutting oneself off from it’.42 Indeed, Leavis presents the
view that not only must context be returned to the essential interest—the text—but that the
text itself must also be the source, or the origin and starting point of any recourse beyond the
page, while simultaneously maintaining the text as the focal mechanism of critical centricity.
What is apparent in Leavis’s stated method, however, is a troublesome proximity to what in
wider theoretical discourse has been called the ‘hermeneutic circle’, a term which refers the
seeming paradox that the whole can be understood only through an understanding of its parts,
while these same parts can be understood only through an understanding of the whole to
which they belong.
40 Storer notes that Leavis, unlike Richards, would permit ‘some reference to historical context’, assign passages
to their authors, and ‘texts to their periods’. Storer, Leavis, p. 86-87. This would indicate that whilst a focus
upon the text was essential to Leavis, the severing of any extrinsic information, was not itself Leavis’s aim. As
such a more accurate way to describe Leavis’s argument in this respect is to say he was against ‘external’
evidence. This is a delicate point because the emphasis rests on the important distinction between ‘external’ and
‘extrinsic’ information. The latter, extrinsic, can be understood in the sense that, while it also refers to a focal
point outside of a text, it nevertheless maintains an emphasis on an internal point of centricity from which any
such external consideration returns in its critical capacity.
41 F.R. Leavis, 1943. Education and the University: A Sketch for an ‘English School, (London: Chatto and
Windus) p.70.
42 Storer, Leavis, p.87.
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Bateson argues throughout the first set of exchanges that while the textual-centricity
of Leavis’s criticism places emphasis upon the artistic composition as an autonomous entity,
it nevertheless suffers from a rejection of wider contextual information that may be important
in the overall judgment of the work’s merit even if such intention is not directly apparent in
the reading of a text itself. Though the following examples were not given by Bateson in the
debate, it could be argued that devices such as, say, parody43 and sarcasm,44 may be
unidentifiable without external knowledge that the author intended them to exist within the
text. While Leavis does not exclude such information as authorial identity to the same degree
as Richards or Wimsatt and Beardsley did, his focus on the text nevertheless places him in a
situation where he is less able to take account of extrinsic information which some may deem
vital to a proper understanding of a work’s overall value.45 This is similar to the issue raised
by Bateson with regards to Leavis’s reading of Marvell and Pope, in which Leavis’s
evaluation was accused of not understanding the importance of external knowledge.46 It is
interesting that Leavis, who can be seen to argue the case that subjectivity is inevitable to the
critical and scholarly processes,47 and who was criticised by Bateson for being endlessly
subjective, actually appears to hold some notion of critical objectivity, in the sense of
proposing some kind of limitation (or boundary) upon the evaluative process. In Validity and
Interpretation (1967) Hirsch argues that extrinsic evidence is essential to the true
43 The intention to parody or lampoon – ‘If it were known, for example, that William McGonagall intended his
pathetic doggerel ‘The Tay Bridge Disaster’ to be a parody of sentimental poetry—i.e. to be deliberately bad
and exaggerated—the work might be reassessed as witty and amusing. The argument might be that only when
we know what kind of work it is intended to be, can we evaluate it. These are difficult cases for the anti-
intentionalist, who must insist that the parodic quality will show itself in the work and not rest entirely on
independent intention.’ Peter Lamarque, 2006. ‘The intentional fallacy’, Literary Theory and Criticism: An
Oxford Guide, (ed.) Patricia Waugh (Oxford: OUP) p178.
44 See above (fn.43)
45 It may be felt that a work’s overall value or merit may not necessarily have to be evident in its immediate
aesthetic impact.
46 Graham Martin understands Bateson’s claim as the belief that ‘Leavis, in proposing similarities between
Marvell’s verse and Pope’s, had failed to recognise that Marvell was relying upon a seventeenth century
tradition of pictorial allegory entirely familiar to his readers, of which Pope and his readers knew nothing. Each
poet had written within a distinct literary and cultural situation, each conveying to the readers who shared that
situation a distinct set of ideas. The verbal and other similarities Leavis claimed were nothing more than the
product of his unhistorical reading.’ Graham Martin, 1996. ‘F.R. Leavis and the Function of Criticism’, Essays
in Criticism, XLVI, 1, 1-15. p.12.
47 Guy and Small, 1993. Politics and Value, p.75.
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understanding and appreciation of a text because ‘a text means what its author meant.’48 He
continues that ‘almost any word sequence can, under the conventions of meaning,
legitimately represent more than one complex of meaning . . . a word sequence means
nothing in particular until somebody means something by it.’49 Whilst Hirsch accepts that an
author’s meaning itself may be ambiguous (where, for example, an author intends it to be) he
nevertheless argues that it is important to understand the difference between what a work can
mean and what a work does mean. Similar in this respect to the distinction between
‘meaning’ and ‘significance’ raised in the last chapter, the issue here is the degree to which
such an argument may be said to revive the value and importance of the author by placing
emphasis on a text’s original intention, or, as Hirsch terms it, the text’s ‘actual intended
meaning’.50 Similarly, in a collection of essays entitled Beyond Aesthetics (2001) the
philosopher Noel Carroll states that the ‘correct interpretation of a text is the meaning of the
text that is compatible with the author’s actual intentions’.51 Carroll’s argument also
considers that readers may have a ‘conversational interest’52 in literary texts and thus seek to
further their understanding of the author’s intentions from evidence beyond ‘the black marks
on the page’.53 Whilst Wimsatt and Beardsley (like Leavis in the debate) argue that there
should be no need to seek extrinsic information from outside of the text if the intentions are
successfully demonstrated within, they seem unable to draw a line as to what constitutes the
boundaries of a text54 or adequately defend the possibility, that in some cases, intention may
be made non-apparent in the text.
48 E.D. Hirsch, 1967. Validity in Interpretation, (New Haven: Yale U.P.) p.23.
49 ibid., p.4.
50 ibid.,. p.34
51 Noel Carroll, 2001. Beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays, (Cambridge: CUP) p.197.
52 ibid., p.174.
53 Day, ‘F.R. Leavis: Criticism and Culture’, p.136.
54 There are many extended problems that arise when defining the boundaries of a literary text. If, for example,
the belief is held that evaluation should focus on the text itself as opposed to the text’s surrounding ‘context’,
then subsequent questions may include that of whether inter-textual analysis is permitted whereby a literary text
is examined in relation to other work, often by the same author, in order to further critical understanding. In
answering this question, however, a critic would need to make a decision on several complex matters, one being,
whether or not an author’s ‘other work’ should be deemed contextual or fair ground for analysis.
CHAPTER FIVE The Leavis-Bateson Debate: In Wider Theory
120
William E. Tolhurst and Jerrold Levinson develop Carroll’s theory by arguing that the
value of literary work and its meaning can be deduced from ‘our best appropriately informed
projection of [an] author’s intended meaning from our position as intended interpreters.’55
This suggests that a critic’s task is to ‘hypothesize’ an author’s intention from the point of
view of a reader ‘most prepared and able to hypothesize56 as a result of their research into
both ‘the work’s internal structure and the relevant surrounding context of creation’57. This
‘supported study’58 in which criticism and historical research are combined to produce ‘the
best possible’59 understanding of a work can be seen to reflect the type of approach advocated
by Bateson in 1953 as well as that in his The Scholar-Critic text of 1972. One of the
problems, however, with this seemingly ‘best of both worlds’ approach as similarly noted in
chapter 3, is that once a reader or critic partakes in such an exploration, they are unable to
make a critical decision to ‘forget’ or ‘unfactor’60 the influence of external or historical
information upon the effects of their evaluative judgement. This disables the possibility of
returning to a position of objective or ‘uninfluenced’ reading as practised in the Cambridge
experiments of the 1920s.
Considering the broader history of modern critical theory, we may note that Wimsatt
and Beardsley’s argument proposing textual autonomy is less thoroughgoing than the
formalism of the post-structuralist theories of Barthes, Lacan, and Derrida. That said, on the
55 Jerrold Levinson, 1995. ‘Intention and Interpretation: A Last Look’, Intention and Interpretation (ed.) Gary
Iseminger, (2nd edn). (Philadelphia: Temple U.P.) p.224.
56 ibid., 226
57 ibid.
58 William E. Tolhurst, 1979. ‘On What a Text is and What it Means’, British Journal of Aesthetics, 19, 1, 3-14,
p.10.
59 ibid.
60 It would seem unlikely that once external or extrinsic evidence has been consulted that a critical decision
could be made to forget or not factor that information into an evaluation once it has become realised. Such
examples may include, an author’s political or religious position or ideology, or their race, gender, socio-
economic class, education, or age. These factors, while in some cases appear as external or possibly even
unrelated directly to the intrinsic context of the work, may influence a response or judgment upon the work’s
value or merit.  If for example, a reader was a devout and committed Christian, and read a poem about football
to find out that the author had, at a previous time of his life, strongly renounced or criticised people with faith,
then it may be possible that the reader may look negatively upon the poem even though it has little or no
reflection on anything asides from sport.
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other hand, Hirsch’s ‘defence of the author’61 also seems moderate by comparison to the
theories of critics such as Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels.  In Against Theory
(1985) Knapp and Michaels argued that there was no such thing as ‘intentionless meaning’62
thus challenging even Hirsch’s proposal that there is ‘a moment of interpretation before
intention is present.’63 In short, Hirsch suggested that a text can mean something prior to the
author’s execution, but that the willed intention is what supplies meaning to the text. Knapp
and Michaels argue that for the creation of ‘any sentence there must have been an origin of
intention’.64 The Leavis-Bateson debate is similar in two main ways to the discourse of
dispute summarised above. Firstly Leavis felt that Bateson’s ‘social-context’ was too
indeterminate as a means for judging a work. ‘His discipline is not merely irrelevant; it isn’t,
and can’t be a discipline at all: it has no determinate enough field or aim’.65 Second, Leavis
believed that the process of understanding reversed the process of composition, for instead of
starting with author’s mental life and proceeding to textual embodiment or projection; it
started with the text and worked its way back to its originating mental life; hence, for Leavis,
the legitimate basis of a critical stress upon the text. A theory which seems to support
Leavis’s position is T.K. Seung’s view that: ‘If authorial intention were available for direct
inspection and observation by readers, it could readily be used for settling the claims of
61 Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, p.2.
62 Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, 1985. ‘Against Theory’, Against Theory: Literary Studies and the
New Pragmatism, (ed.) W.J.T. Mitchell (Chicago: Chicago U.P.) p.13.
63 Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, p.56.
64 While Knapp and Michaels have argued that there is no such thing as ‘intentionless meaning’, such a belief
raises the question of whether they accept that ‘meaning’ can be produced through linguistic and semantic
structures and word combinations.  If not, then an interpretational issue occurs in the sense that without relying
on language and word associations (over and above intention) we revert to a problem widely termed the
‘Humpty-Dumpty fallacy’. Anti-intentionalists (which Leavis’s position reflects within the debate) argue that
giving ‘ultimate authority to private intention collapses into the so-called Humpty-Dumpty theory of meaning,
after the character in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass who claimed that when he said ‘There’s glory
for you’, he meant ‘There’s a nice knock-down argument for you’. Contra Humpty-Dumpty, intentions alone
cannot determine meaning, which must rely to a large extent on publicly accepted linguistic convention. The
retrievability of meaning through knowledge of convention is at the heart of the anti-intentionalist case. Of
course, the intentionalist might accept a role for convention, but still insist that what makes an utterance of ‘That
was clever’ mean ‘That was stupid’ must rest partially on what the speaker intended. The matter is complicated
further by the fact that sarcasm—when and how it occurs—is itself highly conventionalized.’  Peter Larmarque,
2006. ‘The intentional fallacy’, Literary Theory and Criticism, (ed. Patricia Waugh) (Oxford: OUP) p.180.
65 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.173.
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competing interpretations. Unfortunately, authorial intention can be reached only through
textual interpretations’.66 In such a case Leavis’s focus on the text may be viewed (certainly
by Seung) as equal to, or at least similar, to Bateson’s contextual and biographical inquiry, in
terms of producing a reflection on what the author intended and what the text means. The
issue that a critic faces, however, if this approach is to be implemented, is discussed by
Jerrold Levinson: ‘if we can…make the author out to have created a cleverer or more striking
or more imaginative piece, without violating the image of his work as an artist that is
underpinned by the total available textual and contextual evidence, we should perhaps do
so’.67 This is a controversial but interesting area if we reflect upon the potential critical
‘consequences’. For example, if, as reader or critic, we are entitled to make the ‘best’ of an
author’s work by inferring the cleverest or most impressive meaning, if it so happens that that
meaning departs from the author’s original intention, then who is the creator of meaning—the
author or the reader?68
I have explained that Leavis felt that the facts of any given historical period were
subject to a critical decision of inclusion or exclusion, and therefore, critical in formulation
by their nature. Bateson’s later argument asserted that specific contexts (i.e. biography, non-
fictitious writing, etc) could help determine authorial intention and thus the author’s intended
meaning. This method would appear at first to counter Leavis’s argument, by maintaining
that an author may express those particular aspects of his contemporary period, situation, or
psychology affected his intentions and reasons for writing, and thus, what he meant. Indeed,
Bateson, throughout his two major 1972 publications, explicitly presented the view that
biography was more useful in exploring an author’s writing than his previous observation of
66 T.K. Seung, 1984. Structuralism and Hermeneutics, (New York: Columbia U.P.) p.115.
67 Levinson, ‘Intention and Interpretation’, p.224.
68 Is it possible that this may be said of Leavis’s reading of Marvell’s poem?— the very point that Bateson
makes, and claimed, falsely in Leavis’s view, that scholarship would not become subject to, due to a focus only
on information that can be determined factually.
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the wider socio-political context of the work’s original period. However, when considered in
detail, as Michael Moore suggests, biography itself constitutes complex and uncertain
grounds which may in effect serve to destabilize its legitimacy as a method for historical and
contextual inquiry. Moore writes:
Though we may expect them to be “[f]ree of literary conventions”, naturalistic and
‘non-fictional’ there is little to really divide a biography from a novel at the point at
which a reader encounters them (Pascal, 1960, p. 53). Both are rationalisations of
disparate experience, distilled into narrative form. Form is the optimal word, since
narrative uses of language are no freer from structural distortion than others. As
Arthur C Danto shows, narrative always distorts the events it records, partially
because it decides what an “event” is as part of its application of temporal logic to
chaotic reality (1962, pp. 154-155). This serves as a warning not to give the label of
'truth' attached to an autobiography, biography or other piece of 'life-writing' too
much credence. The most important thing to remember is that we have no access to
the original experience that underlies both the fictional and supposedly non-fictional
text.69
As such, the value Bateson places on biography as a means of realising authorial psychology
and intention seems weakened by the possibility of a similar interpretational ‘distortion’
applicable not only to the processes of composition, but also to the process of reading.
Leavis, throughout the debate, and in much of his wider writing (New Bearings being
a particular example) held the view that literature should be evaluated in terms of the
intellectual and cultural value it holds in its relation to a reader’s society. It may be argued
that unless Leavis deems ‘present-centric’ criticism to be necessary because of the
impossibility of alternative methods (i.e. retrieving true or accurate historical context), then
ultimately, his critical decision to view literature in this way, and to perform criticism based
on such a view, can be said to stem from personal values, aesthetic choice and preference.70
Indeed, in deeming that a work should be assessed according to its resonance with the
69 Michael Moore, 2011. [unpublished research project], University of Birmingham.
70 In order to explain this point more clearly in the particular case of the debate, we may consider the following
analogy: Leavis wishes to travel in the blue car (present-centric text-based criticism) as opposed to the red car
(Bateson’s contextual historicist criticism). Although the blue car is already Leavis’s preference, it so happens
that the engine (methodology) of the red car does not work. Therefore, Leavis makes the point to Bateson that
travelling in the blue car is the only way possible of moving forwards.
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‘contemporary sensibility’ Leavis appears to accede to a value-based decision about what
literature should do, or should achieve.
Indeed, in deeming that a work of literature should be assessed according to its
resonance with the ‘contemporary sensibility’ Leavis appears to accede to a value-based
decision about what literature should do, or should achieve. I wish at this stage, to make it my
argument that this is true of Bateson’s positions as well as Leavis’s, and that such value-
based discrepancies constitute the fundamental cause of contest on all the issues throughout
the debate. This claim may appear quite vast, that is, to say that every issue of contest in the
debate stems from differing ideas relating to what Leavis and Bateson respectively feel
literature ‘should do’. But this is precisely the origin of all the critical differences that emerge
within the debate. Indeed, one of the aims of this chapter has been to show that while Leavis
and Bateson engaged in a dispute that has been commonly classified as one between literary
criticism and literary history (or scholarship), underneath those terms were the subsidiary
issues of text versus context, intentionalism versus anti-intentionalism, and historical
evaluative focus versus a focus whereby literature is examined in relation to the
contemporary world. The first point to be made is that all of these issues, as I have shown
above, have been examined in greater deal throughout wider literary and critical discourse.
The reason for this is that whether they are termed ‘problems’, ‘discrepancies’, or
‘dichotomies’, they constantly emerge where there is discussion on the fundamental nature of
literary evaluation. That they have not been resolved, however, is due to the same reason that
the Leavis-Bateson debate did not find ‘true’ resolution, that being, that there does not exist a
nomothetic truth in relation to critical matters in which it can be confirmed that one position
or view-point is more correct than another.
The important characteristic of the Leavis-Bateson then, is not that it failed to identify
an ‘undisputable’ or ‘agreed’ means of conducting literary evaluation. Its failure in this
respect is in fact what relates it to all other discourses in which similar attempts have been
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made. Rather, the debate is significant in that it brings together Bateson’s explicit attempt to
make the study of literature more objective via establishing contexts of fact and original
authorial intention and Leavis’s argument that no such factual objectivity can exist, and that
those contexts that Bateson’s supposes to be factual are actually created via critical decisions.
Looking at the debate in this way, the importance of both Leavis and Bateson (as British
literary figures) becomes secondary to the vital issue that emerges, that being, the possibility
that criticism and approaches to literature are purely critical and therefore purely subjective.
If this is true, then the very basis of Bateson’s entire agenda is null and void in that the study
of literature would be antithetical to objective domains of certifiable truth and fact.
Furthermore while Leavis may have been successful in exposing Bateson’s positivist
determination as futile, his very success in doing so unearths a paradox which ultimately
scuppers his own position. To understand this, it should be first to note, that in proving that
no determinable facts could be obtained via Bateson’s proposed methods of contextual and
historical research, Leavis was left to argue that in the absence of objectivity, criticism must
avail of intelligence, careful and close reading, responsibility, and literary knowledge. These
terms, and many others he uses, are but metaphysical criterion and the success or otherwise
of proving that they have been evident in any given critical performance will itself be a
matter of opinion. Moreover, if we take the term ‘intelligence’ for example, not only is such a
‘virtue’ difficult to measure or confirm, but that it should be assumed as important at all, is
without basis. While Leavis may be applauded in correctly identifying the oversights of
Bateson’s position, he generally appears to present a succession of dogmatic values in a
manner whereby the dogma in itself is often hidden (or clouded) behind a sophisticated
expression of said values. It has been argued in several studies that a close connection exists
between Leavis’s literary criticism and his cultural criticism whereby his socio-cultural view
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that the modern world would benefit from the experience and cultural traditions of the past71
had lead to a view that ‘good’ literature was literature that intrinsically epitomised moral
values. However, the subjective problematic nevertheless remains the same in that
subjectivity is still applicable to anthropological, social, and cultural beliefs,72 just as they are
to beliefs or ideological positions of an aesthetic nature. The influence therefore of Leavis’s
wider moral code upon his criticism does not justify a basis to confirm that his critical
ideology is anymore ‘correct’ than an opposing or even antithetical set of values. 73
71 Terry Eagleton writes that Leavis, ‘dismissive of ‘literary’ values...insisted that how one evaluated literary
works was deeply bound up with deeper judgements about the nature of history and society as a whole.’ Terry
Eagleton, 1983. Literary Theory: An Introduction, (Oxford: Blackwell), p.33. For more information on Leavis’s
views on culture and cultural evolution see Guy Ortolano, 2002. ‘Two Cultures, One University: The
institutional Origins of the “Two Cultures” Controversy. Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British
Studies, 34, 4, 606-624. Richard Storer, 2009. ‘Culture’, F.R. Leavis (London: Routledge). Gary Day, 1996.
‘F.R. Leavis: Criticism and Culture’, Literary Theory and Criticism, (ed. Patricia Waugh) (Oxford: OUP).
72 To some, it is possible that modernisation, hyper-modernisation, scientific-revolution, and technological
advancement are deemed positive societal aims despite the type of consequences that may provoke (as with
Leavis) a sense of vehement disapproval.
73 On the use of the word ‘morality’ it is worth noting Terry Eagleton’s observation that: ‘Morality is no longer
to be grasped as a formulated code or explicit ethical system: it is rather a sensitive preoccupation with the
whole quality of life itself, with the oblique, nuanced particulars of human experience. Somewhat rephrased, this
can be taken as meaning that the old religious ideologies have lost their force, and that a more subtle
communication of moral values, one which works by ‘dramatic enactment’ rather than rebarbative abstraction,
is this in order. Since such values are nowhere more vividly dramatized than in literature, brought home to ‘felt
experience’ with all the unquestionable reality of a blow on the head, literature becomes more than just a
handmaiden of moral ideology: it is moral ideology for the modern age, as the work of F.R. Leavis was most
graphically to evince.’ Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory, p.27.
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CONCLUSION:
CONDITION, IMPLICATION, PROPENSITY, AND BAD-FAITH
This thesis has observed that the Leavis-Bateson debate was a debate of contest and dispute
with regard to the function and practice of literary evaluation. Though he would concede to
the belief that Leavis had been ‘right’,1 and that he had been wrong to ‘overstate the case for
literary history’,2 Bateson’s motives were born from a desire to make the evaluation of
literature more factual and objective. The positivist posture of the motive can be admired in
so far as the consequences of a purely subjective discipline call into question the
epistemological justification for the existence of a literary discipline itself. The role of this
conclusion is to provide an understanding of why the disagreements occurred between Leavis
and Bateson, and the consequence of such disagreements more widely in relation to the study
of literature as a field and discipline of knowledge.
I begin then by stating that the crux of contention between Leavis and Bateson can be
traced, at its most fundamental level, to differences in what they respectively believe to
constitute literary artistic merit. Because Leavis and Bateson were discussing principles of
criticism, it may appear questionable that I propose their differences as stemming from
discrepancies in ‘literary taste’. However my research has identified a central connection
(and inseparable relationship) between what Leavis and Bateson respectively argue to be the
correct methods of evaluating literature, and the varying concepts of what they believe
literary art itself ought to be. As such it is my view that the anatomy of their contention
centres on an impasse of literary values and that this impasse of values is neither specific nor
particular to their debate, but inherently and consistently identifiable wherever there are
attempts to define and calibrate the principles of studying literature.
1 F.W. Bateson, 1964. ‘Alternative to Scrutiny’, Essays in Criticism, XIV, 1, 10-20. p.12.
2 F.W. Bateson, 1978. ‘F.R.L. And E in C: A Retrospect’, Essays in Criticism, XXVIII, 4, 353-361.p.356.
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Indeed, if history is to understand the Leavis-Bateson debate, it should understand that
it centred on a discrepancy, a discrepancy in what Leavis and Bateson believe a work of
literature should do, or should achieve in order that it be seen as ‘good’ literature. In this
sense, throughout the debate, Leavis and Bateson can be seen as implicitly demonstrating
what Paul de man argues to be the inevitable condition of evaluative criticism, which in an
essay entitled ‘Criticism and Crisis’, (1967) he describes by stating:
Even in its most naïve form, that of evaluation, the critical act is concerned with
conformity to origin or specificity: when we say of art that it is good or bad, we are in
fact judging a certain degree of conformity to an original intent called artistic. We
imply that bad art is barely art at all; good art, on the contrary, comes close to our
preconceived and implicit notion of what art ought to be.3
De Man’s premise is that in criticism we make our judgment of a work’s merit or value
according to the work’s ‘conformity to an original intent called artistic’. As such, where one
expresses their understanding of what they believe literature to be, or when one expresses
what they perceive as the merit of say, a novel, a poem, or play, their judgment stems from a
‘preconceived and implicit’ ideological concept of what it is they deem to constitute literary
or artistic success. The condition therefore of the Leavis-Bateson debate, can be stated in
similar terms: whether Leavis and Bateson deem a work to be good or bad, or for that matter,
literature at all, depends upon the work’s conformity or proximity to their literary values, and
it is these literary values that directly shape and influence how they respectively feel criticism
should be practiced. Indeed, in both phases of the debate differing literary values can be seen
as central to the critical contention between Leavis and Bateson. One of the main examples of
this I have noted in chapter 3 when observing Leavis’s and Bateson’s respective readings of
Marvell. For Leavis Marvell’s ‘A Dialogue between the Soul and Body’, was ‘among
3 Paul de Man, 1983. Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, 2nd edn.
(London: Routledge) p.8. De Man’s essay ‘Criticism and Crisis’ was originally delivered as a lecture at the
University of Texas and appeared in Arion under the title ‘The Crisis of Contemporary Criticism’ in 1967.
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Marvell’s supreme things, profoundly original, and a proof of genius’.4 In my view the nature
of such a judgment holds little or no value in that it simply requires for a reader to not enjoy
(in the case of Marvell’s poem) an existential or metaphysical consideration of self, for the
same work to be felt particularly un-enjoyable or worth less merit than that Leavis bestows
upon it.5 Leavis’s verdict seen in his response of superlatives—‘supreme’ and ‘genius’—can
ultimately be understood as value-based, and therefore, subjective in nature. His general
argument in 1953 on the issue of Bateson’s reading of Marvell was that an ‘intelligent
reader’6 should like Marvell’s poem, or deem it to be deserved of merit. Moreover, the
particular case of Bateson’s failure to do so, in Leavis’s opinion, itself highlighted the errors
of the scholarly approach and method. The type of critical dogmatism evident in Leavis’s
writing can be seen throughout wider academic literary practice, often producing, in say an
academic environment, an effect whereby a ‘failure’ to view or respond to a poem in a
certain light may reflect unfavourably upon the critical aptitude or capacity of the reader or
student. The problem emerges in that it is difficult to see on what basis it could be argued
that a particular text or poem (just as Marvell’s) can be said or proven to hold an inherent
truth of value or merit in which a particular judgement upon it could be taught as a
nomothetic truth of knowledge. It will be clear from these statements that the issue of
subjective relativism is still evident within the Leavis-Bateson debate, despite the fact that the
central engagement throughout was concerned with matters of critical principle, in other
4 F.R. Leavis, 2008. ‘The Responsible Critic or The Function of Criticism at Anytime’, Scrutiny, XIX, 4,
(Cambridge: CUP) p.169.
5 Marvell’s poem, I believe, is truly wonderful and one of the best poems I have ever read. In that sense I am in
complete agreement with Leavis. Nevertheless, my view (though I hold it strongly) that the poem is good is not
more important (and cannot be proved more ‘valid’) than the view of someone who, for whatever reason, thinks
it is not a good poem. Even if the person in question was someone who could hardly read, and had not the
capacity to consider (or identify with) the existential torment in Marvell’s poem, this still does not make their
reading of it any less true for them, than my view that it is good, is true for me. Miguel Unamuno’s aphorism
that: ‘Your neighbour’s vision is as true for him as your own vision is true for you’ is exemplary of this line of
perspectivist thought. Miguel de Unamuno, 1972. The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Nations trans. A.
Kerrigan, (Princeton: Princeton U.P.).p.45.
6 Leavis, ‘Anytime’, p.171.
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words, with a means of assailing the very problems of subjectivity in a literary-critical
discipline.
If Leavis was correct within the debate in his argument that Bateson’s proposed
methods of literary history stemmed from subjective assumptions regarding literary values
(which made such a history ‘essentially literary criticism’,7 then the implication is that whilst
such values maybe felt with true critical determination and belief; to teach or suppose such
beliefs as critical or aesthetic truths would be to do so without grounds of theoretical
justification.  The presence therefore of subjective values in a debate of autotelic and meta-
critical focus highlights the significant epistemological implications that appear inherent to
the construct of literature and literary criticism as disciplines of knowledge. If such subjective
variance in perceptions of merit were not inherent to the act of criticism, then all responses to
the same literary work would result in the same judgement of its merit. But this does not
occur. A concern expressed by William S. Burroughs in a critical essay entitled ‘A Review of
the Reviewers’ analogises this point and precisely identifies the ‘crisis’ of criticism via a
scenario where one reader may look upon a textual characteristic as preferable or good,
whilst another reader, may perceive the same characteristic as not good. Burroughs states:
Critics constantly complain that writers are lacking in standards, yet they themselves
seem to have no standards other than personal prejudice for literary criticism. To use
an analogy: suppose the Michelin Inspectors were equally devoid of consensual
criteria for judging food. Here is one inspector... ‘food superlative, service
impeccable, kitchen spotless’, and another about the same restaurant ... ‘food
abominable, service atrocious, kitchen filthy’. Another inspector strips an Italian
restaurant of its stars because he doesn’t like Italian cooking. Another would close a
restaurant because he disapproves of the chef’s private life or the political opinions of
the proprietor or complains that the chicken on his plate is not roast beef. 8
Burroughs asserts that the act of criticism is a performance of ‘personal prejudice’. In the
analogy he illustrates the consequence of subjectivity in evaluation when he implies that if
personal prejudice were to exist as the evaluative criteria amongst Michelin inspectors, then it
7 F.R Leavis, 2008. ‘A Review’, Scrutiny, IV, 1935-1936, Cambridge: CUP) p.96.
8 William S. Burroughs, 1985. ‘A Review of the Reviewers’, The Adding Machine: Collected Essays, (London:
Calder) p.195.
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is possible that conflicting judgments of merit would occur, and that each restaurant would be
rated according to the taste of the assessor, as opposed to through a ‘consensual criteria’ for
judgement. If we invert the analogy, in order to look upon the central disputes of the debate,
we must deduce by the same admonition that the judgements made by Leavis and Bateson—
in the absence of ‘consensual criteria’ — cannot be authoritatively or objectively determined
as valid or invalid beyond the jurisdiction of a particular set of critical or artistic values. In
another essay Burroughs illustrates this absence of concrete criteria upon the functional
purpose of a literary discipline, and in doing so, emphasises precisely the issue behind the
methodological disagreements between Leavis and Bateson. Burroughs writes:
When Anthony Burgess was teaching his course in creative writing, a student asked
him: ‘Why should you be up there teaching writing and not me?’ A good question;
and I wish I could give as definite an answer as can be given in regard to other
subjects where the technology is more clearly defined. No one, unless he is himself an
experienced pilot, asks why the pilot of an airliner should be in the cockpit and not
him. The answer is that he knows how to fly the plane and you don’t. Nor would a
student of quantum mechanics, engineering, or mathematics ask such a question; the
teacher is there because he knows more about the subject than the student. To say he
knows more about the subject presupposes that there is something definite to know,
that a technology exists and can be taught to qualified students.9
The impasse of the Leavis-Bateson debate can therefore be seen, as Burroughs highlights, to
stem from the non-existence of a clearly ‘defined’ or ‘definite’ concept of what literature is,
and thus, by extension, the means to validate concepts of what literature should ‘do’, and how
it should be assessed in relation to what it is supposed it should have achieved. Particularly
significant in the excerpt is that Burroughs distinguishes writing and literature from the type
of nomothetic or law-like certitude present within the sciences of ‘quantum mechanics,
engineering, or mathematics’. Due to the absence of authority on matters of aesthetic nature,
Burgess, despite being the instructor, remains void of a basis by which to confirm his concept
of what literary art ought to be as more valid or superior to that of his student’s concept.
9 William S. Burroughs, 1985. ‘Technology of Writing’, The Adding Machine: Collected Essays, (London:
Calder) p.32.
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While it is unlikely that Burroughs is denying the possibility that Burgess, like Leavis and
Bateson, may possess wider reading experience than their pupils; the fact that they may, does
not offer resolution to the problem of critical authority. Let us assume, for instance, that a
tutor has read more literature than his student, and that due to experience, or cognitive
differences, in say, intelligence or aptitude, thus asserts a differing judgement of a work’s
merit. Ultimately what will have adjusted, through experience, or any other factor, would be
the tutor’s perception of what literary art ought to be; what it is that constitutes a good feature
within a text, or inversely, one that is less admirable. Thus, while it may appear a contentious
claim that a tutor’s judgement of literary merit cannot be more valid than a student’s, it
nevertheless remains a sound claim, due to the absence of a concrete law or consensus
regarding what it is that constitutes literary merit in the first place.
We may extend understanding of this by considering that in order, for example, to
prove a critical judgement of a work’s merit to be invalid, there would need to exist a means
to do so; a means in which once could verifiably demonstrate that the work deserves a
judgement of merit different to that reached in the ‘invalid’ judgment. The problem in
attempting to prove any such critical position, whether it be opposing, or for that matter, in
support, is that in the absence of ‘something definite to know’ one must return to the value-
based domain in which the understanding of what characteristics of a text are, say, ‘good’ or
‘bad’, depends not on deference to a determinable truth, but rather, on what constitutes good
or bad to a particular reader or critic. As such, a definite or a posteriori ‘truth of merit’ akin
to, as Burroughs suggests, the type of factual knowledge or universal certitude present in a
mathematic equation appears inherently void from the type of knowledge that can be
associated with responses or judgments upon the merit of literary art. It is for these reasons
that the conflict and nature of dispute between Leavis and Bateson in both in 1935 and 1953
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can be understood as epitomic of the evaluative critical condition of judgements that stem
from subjective values.
The second major observation of my research, following that of the debate’s
condition, is that that this absence of ‘something definite to know’ has a significant
implication upon the efforts made to construct fundamental criteria and principles for critical
evaluation. In his attempts, for example, to propose standards for evaluation, Leavis argues
that literature, in order to be successful, must be observed as at least ‘mean[ing] something’,10
and achieving a certain level of ‘sophistication’.11 He continues that, evaluation therefore,
should concern itself with whether or not these qualities have been achieved within a work.
While these criteria may appear a standard or conservative concept of what literary art must
be in order to be good or even distinguish itself from mere ‘writing’, it is however important
to emphasise that Leavis’s assumptions should not be mistaken as aesthetic fact, that is to
say, as an undisputable criterion or standard inherent to the values of all. We may ask: why
must a work of literature have to demonstrate sophistication to be successful? Why must a
work of literature have to mean something? Why should these, or indeed, any other proposals
of aesthetic directive assumed by Leavis or Bateson within the debate, necessarily be
considered any more serious or important than claims to the contrary which may propose that
literature, in order to be good, should not appear sophisticated? Even in the scenario that
Leavis’s criteria were to find universal agreement, that is, were to form or inform the
foundational critical values of all, no sooner would a glass be raised in the seeming prosperity
of critical unity than it would be thrown in the ensuing dispute of what it is that constitutes
sophistication. The exact same problems are applicable to Bateson’s values. Twenty-five
years after his last exchange with Leavis, Bateson would go as far as stating that in retrospect
10 F.R. Leavis, 2008. ‘Retrospect of a Decade’, Scrutiny, IX, 1, 1940-1941, (Cambridge: CUP) p.72.
11 ibid.
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he would probably ‘cast his vote for criticism’12 as the most accurate way of classifying the
type of method he originally sought to establish as scholarship. The reason I have been
cautious in chapters 4 and 5 when referring to Bateson’s ‘defeat’ or Leavis’s ‘victory’ is
because Bateson’s concession of defeat, while it gives Leavis victory in the context of the
debate, is less significant than the understanding that what lies behind his method (whether
termed ‘literary history’, ‘scholarship’, or even ‘criticism’) is a value-based architecture of
explicit evaluative preferences. Bateson states:
A poem, for example, is not good or bad in itself but only in terms of the contexts in
which it originated. For us to be able to use it, to live ourselves into it, the essential
requirement is simply an understanding of those original contexts, and especially the
original social context.  A social order, as such, is necessarily the affirmation of
certain values. In the social context, therefore, the values implied in the poem become
explicit, and its relative goodness or badness declares itself.13
Bateson’s argument here is that inherent values do not exist within a poem rather they emerge
when assessed in relation to the social values from the period of the work’s original
composition, and as such an examination of the relative social context is necessary in
determining whether a poem is ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Having originally argued that this offers an
objective evaluative basis in which to conduct literary assessment, Bateson had disregarded
the fact that such an evaluative criterion is itself entirely value-based. The general claim
being: that literary art must bear a relation to a given period in history, or that it must appear
to be ‘good’ in relation to the values prevalent at the time it was written. Not only is Bateson
guilty of aesthetic assumption in supposing that wider social contexts are required in order to
‘realize’ the aesthetic of the work, but a vast array of value-laden ‘non-contextual’
observations made by Bateson essentially contradict his very stance on the matter. One
example can be seen in his claim that Marvell’s poem had failed in the sense that its ‘vivid
imagery’14 had ‘resulted in the blurring of the argument’15 it had intended to present.
12 Bateson, ‘F.R.L. And E in C: A Retrospect’, p.356.
13 F.W. Bateson, 1953. ‘The Function of Criticism at the Present Time’, Essays in Criticism, III, 1, 1-27, p.19.
14 ibid., p.16.
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According to Bateson’s own position the case could be put against him that: unless he can
factually evidence that to ‘blur an argument’ is a negative trait—and moreover, considered a
negative trait in the original social context of Marvell’s poem—then there is no basis
whatsoever to assume such a feature of the poem as indicative of an aesthetic failure. What if,
say, to ‘blur an argument’ was thought by someone as a ‘good’ poetic feature or trait? My
point here—that blurring an argument could be an admirable thing—may sound unusual or
further still, simply wrong; however,  to state that it is unusual or wrong is merely a statement
of contrary values, not a statement of critical truth.  It may even be said that the more unusual
the claim sounds, the more those who disagree with it are indoctrinated by isomorphic and
traditionally re-enforced and established literary values. I shall explore this point further
below. But what is important to recognise here is that Bateson’s response to Marvell, and his
judgements upon the merits of Marvell’s poetry, stem from an entirely value-based domain.
The example I have provided is one of many that would equally demonstrate the same point,
not only that Bateson contradicts his principles of ‘contextual’ dependence, but more
importantly, that the foundation of Bateson’s literary ideology is rooted in assumptions
stemming from personal prejudice. The centrality of this issue to the debate is notable in that
the above excerpt on how Bateson felt a poem’s merit should be determined was itself the
central argument of his ‘The Function of Criticism at the Present Time’ essay from which the
1953 exchanges ensued.
Eighteen years earlier the 1935 exchanges ensued from his E.P.E.L. (1934) manifesto,
and again, despite being a doctrine that promoted ‘factual’ determination in literary analysis,
such purely value-based assumptions regarding literature were present throughout. For
instance we may consider the claim Bateson makes when setting out his thesis that ‘the better
15 ibid.
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the poet the less likely he is to be the mere mouthpiece of his period.’16 Again – one must
simply ask: what if some believe that a poet should be the mouthpiece of their period, or that
being the mouthpiece of their period is, in itself, what makes the poet a good poet? If the
search in literary criticism is for truth—the true value of a text, the true method that best leads
to the best judgement on whether the text has been successful—then there is not even a
justifiable reason to afford the editor of Scrutiny and the editor of Essays in Criticism a more
significant say over and beyond that which may be expressed by anyone else. That Leavis
and Bateson are established figures, in influential roles, whose ‘personal prejudices’ did and
continue to hold significance and influence beyond their own critical jurisdiction, however,
does have a reason. However this reason is not because their critical or literary ideologies
bear a closer proximity to critical ‘truth’, rather it is because of the privilege and power of
their respective positions in leading universities and as editors of leading literary journals.
Not only were they interpreting literature in their debate, but they were interpreting the best
means of approaching literary analysis. But it is as Nietzsche states, ‘All things [including
methods of approaching literature] are subject to interpretation, and whichever interpretation
prevails at a given time is a function of power and not truth.’17 The paradox of the debate, as I
have discussed towards the end of chapter 5, is that the more it can be said that Leavis proves
Bateson wrong in believing that literary assessment can be factual, the more the study of
literature requires the ‘cement’18 of fact and objectivity. Without it, returning to my point
above, how can Leavis himself justify or propose that his personal prejudices and opinions
regarding literature and critical methods are in anyway significant?
So far in this conclusion, the argument may be put to my thesis that its claim is merely
one of relativism, and that my motive is only to stress that criticism and approaches to
16 F.W. Bateson, 1934. English Poetry and the English Language: An Experiment in Literary History, (Oxford:
Clarendon). p.vi.
17 Friedrich Nietzsche, 2001. The Basic Writings of Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. W. Kauffman, (London:
Random) p.70.
18 F.R. Leavis, 1966. ‘Valuation in Criticism’, Orbis Litterarum, 21, 61-70, p.61.
CONCLUSION Condition, Implication, Propensity, and Bad-Faith.
137
literature are inherently subjective. It may even be said, that to view Leavis’s and Bateson’s
critical positions as holding no extra-ordinary critical significance is even, in a certain sense,
disrespectful. But these types of criticism are not important in my view. What is important is
whether what I am saying is right or wrong, and in their search for the ‘right performance of
the function of criticism’,19 it is right to assert that Leavis and Bateson do not adequately
consider that a reader may look upon an object or thing as preferable or good, while another
reader, viewing the same, may see it as not good and having none of the merit to call it
favourable. Indeed, this we call subjectivity; a subjectivity that does not, of course, disappear
in our viewing or reading of literary art.
At the same time as Leavis was developing his plans for Scrutiny G.N.M. Tyrell
published a work entitled Grades of Significance (1930), in which he illustrates the same
point. Tyrell writes:
Take a book, for example. To an animal a book is merely a coloured shape. Any
higher significance a book may hold lies above the level of its thought. And the book
is a coloured shape; the animal is not wrong. To go a step higher, an uneducated
savage may regard a book as a series of marks on paper. This is the book seen on a
higher level of significance than the animal’s, the one which corresponds to the
savage’s level of thought. Again it is not wrong, only the book can mean more. It may
mean a series of letters arranged according to certain rules. This is the book on a
higher level of significance than the savage’s. It might be that for an intelligent being
who had never even heard of the art of writing. Or finally, on a still higher level, the
book may be an expression of meaning. Each of these is a correct definition of a book
in terms of the corresponding background of thought.20
While Tyrell’s reference to an animal in the excerpt presents a departure from the realm of
human phenomenological processes, in doing so, it demonstrates that while distinctions of
standards or capabilities inevitably exist, the ultimate or highest critical truth of a work for
one, is not necessarily a truth for all. He says that although an animal does not see the
possibility of meaning in a book, its understanding of the book as ‘a coloured shape’ is not
19 F.R. Leavis, 2008. ‘The Responsible Critic or The Function of Criticism at Anytime’, Scrutiny, XIX, 4, 1952-
1953, (Cambridge: CUP) p.162.
20 G.N.M. Tyrell, 1947. Grades of Significance: The Dependence of Meaning on Current Thought,  2nd edn,
(London: Rider) p.29.
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wrong, and as such, it is valid.21 The incremental distinction between types of reading or
observation in the excerpt further substantiate belief, not in a valid or correct meaning in a
verifiable or inherent sense, but rather a meaning with a closer proximity to a truth that is
dependent on the perception22 of the observer. The implication of this being, that the
discrepancy of function between criticism as a performative act of relativist perceptual values
and the notion of a critical discipline, is that the latter pursues (in principle and in definition)
the assumption that there exists judgements of literary work that are more ‘valid’ or nearer to
the ‘truth’ of a work’s merit than others.
To understand the debate as pointing to an unassailable state or crisis23 in literary
studies would, however, fall short of a potentially wider understanding of the complexity of
the matter. Because it is not possible to end disputes of taste without simultaneously
terminating the etymologically defined aim of the critical act itself, that being, to evaluate or
judge literary work, the study of literature must therefore be understood to exist,
quintessentially, as a self-perpetuating impasse of values. It is for this reason that in Validity
in Interpretation (1967) E.D. Hirsch expresses his doubt over the discipline’s potential to
produce the kind of knowledge Bateson and Leavis sought in the debate in which a particular
21 Although it is more a limitation of his analogy, rather than the validity of his point, it is worth providing a
caveat to the effect that Tyrell is unlikely to be sure of what an animal may ‘think’ about an object.
22 Tyrell’s emphasis on perception is noted and explained by Robert Barry in his A Theory of Almost Everything,
where he writes: ‘In other words, what we ‘see’ is determined in part by the level of knowledge that we bring
with us to the situation, and since acquired knowledge varies considerably from person to person (depending on
social and cultural back-ground, experience, interests, and so on) there are inevitably many things which some
people ‘see’ while others cannot.  Robert Barry, 1996. A Theory of Almost Everything: A Scientific and
Religious Quest for Ultimate Answers, (London: Oneworld) p.75.
23 The word ‘crisis’ and term ‘crisis of methods’ have recently found wide-spread usage in modern literary
theory. Carol Atherton states: ‘The last two decades have witnessed a number of concerns about the existence of
a ‘crisis’ in English studies’, a sense that traditional assumptions about the nature and purpose of the study of
English literature are being eroded by a version of the discipline that is much more fragmentary and uncertain.
This model of a disciplinary development has a tendency to see this ‘crisis’ as a new phenomenon, brought
about by such factors as the rise of literary theory, the expansion of the literary canon, and a concomitant
questioning of both the central subject matter of English and the manner in which this body of knowledge is
studied and evaluated. Yet behind this model there is also a notion that there was a time when the discipline of
English Literature was secure: that there was, at some point, a stable and commonly held set of beliefs about
what the discipline should involve, and what it intended to achieve.’ Carol Atherton, 2005. ‘The Organisation of
Literary knowledge: The Study of English in the Late Nineteenth Century’, The Organisation of Knowledge in
Victorian Britain, (ed.) M. Daunton, (Oxford: OUP), p.219.
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reading or method can be verified as ‘valid’, or more valid over another. Referring to a tutor
in the academic institution, Hirsch asks: ‘On what ground does he claim that his “reading” is
more valid than that of any pupil?24 With a similar view to that expressed by Burroughs,
Hirsch supplies the admonition: ‘On no very firm ground.’25 This ‘no very firm ground’
highlights the impasse which he argues constitutes the ‘principal cause of the loss of bearings
sometimes felt though not often confessed by academic critics’.26 Hirsch’s observation of a
‘loss of bearings’ stems precisely from the argument here; that being, that due to the
subjective nature of literary criticism, a problem of authority exists, whereby, even within an
intellectual community, literary establishment, or academic institution, there are no means by
which to authoritatively or justifiably confirm validity of a judgment regarding a work’s
merit or value. The reference in my introduction to the Latin maxim: De gustibus non est
disputandum, translated as ‘there is no point in disputing about tastes’ therefore holds a threat
to the justification of literary studies as an academic discipline especially if the implication is
to be understood as the view that opinions about matters of taste are not objectively right or
wrong, and hence, disagreements about matters of taste cannot be objectively resolved. It is
for this reason that I referred, in the beginning of my introduction, to Bateson’s initial motive
for writing E.P.E.L. (1934) as admirable because a set of general principles that unify or
calibrate critical perceptions of merit would benefit the consistency of literary criticism as a
discipline. However, in practice, as the debate has shown, attempts to construct and agree
upon these principles cause conflict amongst critics and theorists.
The features then of the Leavis-Bateson debate that become apparent from my
research is that both engage in a contest of literary values—which I term the condition of the
debate—and as a result, both conduct their arguments, despite the fact that such a condition
of subjectivity, has a disciplinary implication whereby they are devoid of a means to
24 E.D. Hirsch, 1967. Validity in Interpretation, (New Haven: Yale U.P.) p.4.
25 ibid.
26 ibid., p.5.
CONCLUSION Condition, Implication, Propensity, and Bad-Faith.
140
certifiably demonstrate or confirm their respective views of critical practice as correct or
more correct over that proposed by the other. Another feature of the Leavis-Bateson debate
emblematic of discourse that involves an evaluative discussion of literature and literary-
critical principles, is that, whilst there may exist no ‘ground’ or ‘basis’ upon which to confirm
their critical judgments or ideologies as superior over another’s, there nevertheless exists a
propensity to uphold certain literary values, and present them as significant beyond the
domain of the self. Indeed, the absence of a means to objectively resolve conflicts of literary
value does not at any stage within the debate prevent Leavis or Bateson from holding and
expressing belief that some writers or works are of more merit and value than other works.27
To illustrate the nature of this propensity in wider contexts (to show that the issues central the
debate are still relevant in criticism today) it is worth noting that one may, for example, hold
a belief that the poetry of Geoffrey Chaucer presents a level of philosophical inquiry and
sophistication greater than can be identified in the work of J.K. Rowling. One may, as
another example, attest that the writing of George Orwell offers a profundity or moral inquiry
in excess of that, say, in a glamour model’s contribution to a make-up magazine; or that the
novels of Irvine Welsh provide a social realism more precise and verisimilitudinous than that
found in the pages of a Mills and Boon novel. However, irrespective of the degree to which
one is be able to critically or comparatively demonstrate an argument to support such claims,
the question still remains: where does there exist in literary art, or in the discipline of its
criticism, a point of concrete authority that confers that such qualities such as; ‘philosophical
inquiry’, ‘sophistication’, ‘social realism’ and so forth, necessarily constitute a value of
27 The writers that Leavis and Bateson discussed in an evaluative capacity, in order to demonstrate how each
would fare in light of their critical approaches, are numerous.  In the 1935 exchanges alone (not including those
discussed in Bateson’s E.P.E.L.) evaluative remarks were made about:  Yeats, Eliot, Houseman, the Elizabethan
poets, Marlowe, Shakespeare, Jonson, Tourneur, Middleton, Thomson, Young, Gray, Collins, the Metaphysical
poets, Pope, Johnson, the Romantic poets, the Victorian Poets, Tennyson, Pre-Raphaelites, Hopkins, Dryden,
Waller, Addison, the Elizabethan dramatists, Kyd, Surrey, Cowley, Milton, and EmilyBrontë. And in the 1953
exchanges (not including those discussed in Bateson’s ‘The Function of Criticism at the Present Time’ or those
discussed in 1935) evaluative remarks were made about:  Auden, Spender, Keynes, Coleridge, Huxley, Pound,
Joyce, Wyndham Lewis, Caudwell, King, Quarles, and Day Lewis.
CONCLUSION Condition, Implication, Propensity, and Bad-Faith.
141
literary merit more significant or important than contrary assumptions that may say, good
literature, in order to be good, should avoid such features?
Throughout both phases of the debate Leavis and Bateson offer numerous verdicts
and judgements upon the qualities and merits of particular poets. In all cases the judgements
reached stem from personal values and personal prejudices. The purely subjective nature of
these values, however, are less explicit as they may be in standard evaluative discourse, in
that within the Leavis-Bateson debate the judgements of taste are somewhat disguised or
hidden under the substitutive objective of determining ‘methods’, whereby in the absence of
determinable critical truth, the onus shifts to proposals whereby good critical practice is
practice that conforms to certain methods of approach. In other words, what makes a
particular work of criticism better or more valid than another is not its proximity to the ‘truth’
of a work’s merit, but rather its proximity and conformity to the method by which it is
deemed a critic should have went about realising and deducing their judgement. In Hans-
Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method (1960) it is stated that: ‘According to Vico, what gives
the human will direction is not the abstract universality of reason but the concrete universality
represented by the community of a group, a people, a nation, or the whole human race.’28
Gadamer, via Vico, appears to assert that while organising a discipline or craft of tastes meets
an impasse of hermeneutical dead-ends, there equally exists a propensity for a sense of
community (‘sensus communis’)29 in which ‘convention’,30‘agreement’,31 and ‘knowledge’32
both phenomenological and epistemological can be said to exist according to a discipline in
which consensus can be established. Gadamer writes:
In the same way as the English moral philosophers emphasize that moral and aesthetic
judgments do not obey reason, but have the character of sentiment (or taste), and
similarly Tetens, one of the representatives of the German Enlightenment, sees the
28 Hans-Georg Gadamer, 1975. Truth and Method, 2nd edn, (London: Sheed & Ward) p.21.
29 ibid.
30 ibid., p.67
31 ibid.
32 ibid., p.66
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sensus communis without reflection. In fact the logical basis of judgment –subsuming
a particular under a universal, recognizing something as an example of a rule – cannot
be demonstrated. Thus judgment requires a principle to guide its application.33
This includes an organisation of, if not taste itself, then the methodology by which that taste
is principled. A work of literature may therefore, be deemed good or not good, or a critical
response, valid or not valid, according to the ‘rules’34 or ‘principles’35 that represent a truth of
methodology or a ‘concrete generality/universality’.36 For Gadamer, however, as earlier for
Vico in his On the Study Methods of our Time (1709) this acknowledgment, admittedly for
both, remained troublesome in that an aesthetic ‘concrete generality/universality’ remains
ontologically elusive, given its inherent dependence upon judgmental ‘bias.’37 Gadamer’s
Truth and Method concludes that we see the world from the perspective of the self, but that
despite this there nevertheless exists a propensity to communicate beyond the
phenomenological limitation of the self.
In criticism, proposals regarding how a text should be assessed, and what it is that
such an assessment should seek to determine or identify from a reading of a literary text,
depends itself on what it is believed that a text should have accomplished. The seeming
oversight in the Leavis-Bateson debate is that both Leavis and Bateson suppose that their
methods and ideas of what literary art should be hold important grounds for consideration
even though they have no basis confirm such positions as objectively true. Writing that the
word ‘criticism’ originates from the Greek, and translates to the English language as
‘judgment’, Martin Gray, in his Dictionary of Literary Terms, defines literary criticism as the
‘interpretation, analysis, classification, and ultimately judgment of a work of literature’.38
33 ibid., p.30
34 ibid., p.40.
35 ibid., p.74
36 ibid., p.21. The term ‘concrete generality’ in Truth and Method is changed to ‘concrete universality’ in later
editions, for example, (London: Continuum) 2004.
37 Gadamer, Truth and Method,p.153
38 Martin Gray (ed.) 1992. A Dictionary of Literary Terms, 2nd ed. (London: Longman)
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Similarly, J.A. Cuddon in his Literary Terms and Literary Theory writes that ‘The art or
science of literary criticism is devoted to the comparison and analysis, to the interpretation
and evaluation of works of literature’39 and The Oxford English Dictionary; that the ‘function
or work of the critic’ is ‘the art of estimating the qualities and character of literary or artistic
work’.40 Significant here is that such definitions indicate that there is at least a modicum of
agreement in terms of what the function of literary criticism and the role of the literary critic
is understood to be. The debate, however, has shown that as Leavis and Bateson approach
literary texts with varying ideas as to what constitutes literary merit they judge the text
according to a criterion that is non-universal. In this sense, irrespective of how much
discrepancy exists between the values that inform their critical ‘estimation’ of literary merit,
in performing criticism that stems from values, neither are betraying the functional—or
etymological—objective of criticism, but rather, the value assumptions of each other, and
other’s more widely.
What masquerades as ‘fact’ in literary criticism, without actually being fact, are the
values that have become established to the point where it would seem incumbent to hold
them as knowledge as opposed to what they are—assumptions. The significance of this is that
both Leavis and Bateson, throughout the debate, can seldom be claimed as establishing a
literary ideology that is entirely independent from pre-disposition to canonical and
disciplinary influences of values and standards. To hold together the possibility that one may
possess a view of the merit of a work of literature, while simultaneously acknowledging, that
a verdict of merit is in itself less ‘definite’ than would be necessary to constitute the type of
knowledge or fact in other fields, is neither a new dualism nor a new philosophical
expectation upon the meta-critical ideology of the critic. Both the Keatsian concept of
39 Cuddon, J.A. (ed.) 1999. The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory, 4th edn. (London:
Penguin) p.196.
40 Oxford University Press, ‘Criticism,, n.’ OED Online. (2010): http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/44598.
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‘negative capability’41 and Heidegger’s promotion of ‘Gelansenheitt’42 in this sense become
central to a deeper—if still conflicted—understanding  of criticism as a dichotomy of values
and as a pursuit of aesthetic truth and knowledge.
A distinction between the inner, biased point of view, and outer, verifiable and
factually determinable knowledge was constructed by Plato in his The Republic. Plato’s
distinction between what he termed the realm of opinion (doxa),43 and the realm of
knowledge (epistēmē)44 is represented in the following table which usefully enables an
understanding of the difficulties that emerge in type of knowledge that literature and its
criticism can be said to elicit.
Figure 145: Plato’s Scheme of Knowledge (Divided Line):
Knowledge (epistēmē) Opinion (doxa)
Intelligence (noēsis)
or Dialectic
Mathematical
Reasoning (dianoia)
Belief (pistis) Illusion (eikasia)
41 M.H. Abrams explains that the poet John Keats ‘introduced this term in a letter written in December 1817 to
define a literary quality “which Shakespeare possessed so enormously —I mean Negative Capability, that is,
when man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and
reason.” Keats contrasted to this quality the  writings of Coleridge, who “would let go by a fine isolated
verisimilitude … from being incapable of remaining content with half knowledge,” and went on to express the
general principle “that with a great poet the sense of beauty overcomes every other consideration, or rather
obliterates all consideration.” The elusive term has entered critical circulation and has accumulated a large body
of commentary. When conjoined with observations in other letters by Keats, “negative capability” can be taken
(1) to characterize an impersonal, or objective, author who maintains aesthetic distance, as opposed to a
subjective author is personally involved with the characters and actions represented in a work of literature, as
opposed also to an author who uses a literary work to present and to make persuasive his or her personal beliefs,
and (2) to suggest that, when embodied in a beautiful artistic form, the literary subject matter, concepts, and
characters are not subject to the ordinary standards of evidence, truth, and morality, as we apply these standards
in the course of our practical experience. M.H. Abrams, (ed.) 1999. A Glossary of Literary Terms, (Boston:
Heinle) p.174.
42 John Caputo introduces term ‘Gelansenheitt’ as follows: The ‘ethics of dissemination is also an ethics of
Gelansenheitt—and here we are again letting Derrida draw Heidegger into the agora—which means an ethics of
letting be…as thinking of willing… releasing…and living without why?’.  John D. Caputo, 1987. Radical
Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project, (Indiana: Indiana U.P.) p. 264-265
43 The distinctions made between ‘Knowledge’ (episteme) and ‘Opinion’ (doxa) are later central within the
distinction in transcendental philosophy between Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften, denoting
respectively, the human (or social) sciences and the natural sciences. As such, the anti-positivist claim such as in
Wilhelm Windelband’s An Introduction to Philosophy (1895)  is that due to the possibility of the discovery of
‘fact, general relationships, and properties—a  “nomothetic”, law-like methodology is present in the natural
sciences’; whereas the social and cultural sciences ‘employ an ideographic or individualising procedure’ non-
conducive to a factually empirical objectivity. Wilhelm Windelband, 1921. An Introduction to Philosophy
(London: Fisher Unwin).p.24.
44 See (fn.35)
45 Plato, 2003. The Republic, trans. D. Lee, (London: Penguin) p.235.
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Forms (Intelligible Realm) (to noēton) Physical (Visible Realm) – Shadows. (to
horēton)
ONE – Immutable truth and reality TWO – Mutable truth and reality
All types of ‘knowledge’ and critical position expressed with the debate fit into Plato’s
domain of ‘opinion’, except, that is, for the ‘names, titles, dates, and “facts about”’46 literary
texts central to Bateson’s literary history. While this type of information can be accurately
understood as ‘knowledge’ in the true sense of Plato’s ‘truth and reality’, the process of
applying such facts in order to deduce judgement of the merit or value of a literary work
involves, as Leavis argues, a process of ‘critical decision’.47 While Leavis is correct in this
respect, the understanding that critical responses to literature are essentially opinion solves
little in the sense that opinion and values are inherently subject to an ontological and
ideographic impasse. One way of understanding this is to consider the ontological
problematic in Aristotle’s assertion that: ‘Happiness is the highest good’.48 In literature, we
may understand that the ‘highest good’ is that which equals a literary work’s aesthetic or
artistic success or value. Aristotle supplies a caveat to his philosophical proposal that is
applicable (and representative) of problems in artistic and critical subjectivity. He states:
‘whilst everyone agrees that the highest good is happiness, they disagree about what
happiness is’.49 Indeed, this is unequivocally the disciplinary caveat we must also, in
literature, apply to notions of ‘value’. Even, for example, if one were to believe a poem to be
best that is ‘without value’ or of no value to anyone—should they find such a poem and
believe it void of value, then its success in being of ‘no value’, would, in effect, constitute for
them—its ‘value’. The paradox therefore of the type of disciplinary standards that Leavis and
Bateson can be seen as disputing is that on the one hand there exists a propensity to
46 F.R Leavis, 2008. ‘A Review’, Scrutiny, IV, 1935-1936, Cambridge: CUP) p.96.
47 F.R. Leavis, 2008. ‘The Responsible Critic or The Function of Criticism at Anytime’, Scrutiny, XIX, 4, 1952-
1953, (Cambridge: CUP) p.164.
48 Aristotle, and Anthony Kenny, 2011. Eudemian Ethics, (Oxford: OUP) p. 13
49 ibid., p.13-14.
CONCLUSION Condition, Implication, Propensity, and Bad-Faith.
146
communicate literary values and judgments of merit within an expressive medium of literary
critical dialectic discourse, and yet, on the other hand, there seems no means of validating
such judgments given that merit is subjective and value-based as opposed to ontical;
meaning, as Heidegger expressed, that of ‘plain facts’50 such as the nomothetically deductible
laws of physics and chemistry. Almost all of the Leavis-Bateson debate operates with a
performative incognizance of these vital and fundamental considerations, though, it would
seem, this is not because Leavis and Bateson are unaware of them, but rather because
engagement with such issues would make the proposal of literary methods, principles, and
standards, an act of bad faith.
Indeed, if we are to accept that this absence of a universal truth or consensus
regarding what constitutes merit, does not in itself, terminate the propensity that exists to
communicate or express critical responses or judgments relating to literary merit, then we
must equally accept, that these judgments of merit, stemming as they do, from inherently
value-based assumptions, can only therefore, maintain, inform, and construct standards of
criterion within a literary discipline in a Sartrean mode of Bad Faith; that is to say, complicit
in an elevation of evaluative standards and values that are not necessarily the values and
standards of all. The term ‘bad faith’ (Mauvaise Foi) is the central focus of the second
chapter of Sartre’s essay on phenomenological ontology entitled Being and Nothingness
(1943) Sartre provides two examples51 that illustrate bad faith, both of which are useful when
50 Martin Heidegger, 1978. Being and Time, (London: Wiley & Blackwell) p.68.
51 Sartre’s term ‘bad-faith’ (mauvaise foi) is explained through two examples which can be used to understand
the type of faith that a literary critic or tutor engage in when performing their respective tasks of evaluation or
the teaching of literary-critical values. Sartre’s explanations are quite extensive so I shall summarise the first
example. Example (1) is that of a woman who reluctantly takes the hand of a man who she does not have
feelings for. She does so because she does not want to offend or upset him and because she does not want to
have to take action of conflict—in this case, raiding the conflict of her non-love for him, against his love for her.
In her mind then she ‘disarms’ the action of holding his hand from ‘sexual’ connotations. Example (2) is that of
a waiter in a café who, although first and foremost a man, performs the role of a waiter. Sartre states: ‘His
movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes toward the patrons with a step a
little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly; his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous
for the order of the customer. Finally there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of
some kind of automaton while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tight-rope-walker by putting it in a
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applied as an understanding of how literary criticism occurs in the absence of what Burroughs
describes as ‘something definite to know’. Leavis’s and Bateson’s proposals of disciplinary
standards are made in bad faith because the literary ideologies they respectively seek to assert
are made despite a simultaneous knowledge that such values do not represent the literary
values of all. To suppose their judgment of merit to be correct and other judgments incorrect
would be to suppose that correctness ‘exists’ in judgements of aesthetic nature.
In academic institutions tutors are, on one level, aware that the values and criterion
they instruct as standards are not absolute in a nomothetic sense. This is especially true with
regards to judgements they may encourage regarding the merit and value of work, what work
should be studied, and the ways in which it should be evaluated. Thus, what occurs in bad
faith is precisely, the instruction of values intended as an influencing construct upon the
developing literary ideology of the pupil, without simultaneously stressing the relativist
origin from which any such evaluative principles stem. The deeper problem, however,
emerges in relation to the notion of ‘discipline’, in that—if purely ‘good faith’ were to prevail
and a tutor was to focus consistently and only upon the meta-critical justification of the
evaluative ideology used to reach judgment; that is, the assumptions from which a judgment
stems (and not begin an exercise of values until such justification is reached) then the
perpetually unstable, perpetually broken equilibrium which he perpetually reestablishes by a light movement of
the arm and hand. All his behaviour seems to us a game. He applies himself to chaining his movements as if
they were mechanisms, the one regulating the other; his gestures and even his voice seem to be mechanisms; he
gives himself the quickness and pitiless rapidity of things. He is playing, he is amusing himself. But what is he
playing?  We need not watch long before we can explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a café.’ Jean-Paul
Sartre, 1991. Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, (London: Routledge) p.55,59.
In the case of both the woman and the man, they actively engage in a performance aware that the performance in
itself is not ‘true’. However this act of bad-faith has its benefits. In the case of the woman, her bad-faith prevents
her from the disturbing the serenity of the interactive discourse with her admirer, even though it conflicts with
the truth as she knows it. In the case of the man performing as the waiter the performance is deemed essential
the necessary application of behaviour to his role as waiter. A critic or tutor perform their roles aware that such
roles require promote literary values, literary values that are not ‘true’ or ‘factual’ in an ontic sense, but rather of
‘taste’ and ‘opinion’. Such roles (evaluative criticism/teaching of literary values) however, cannot be undertaken
without value-based assumptions taking place. Therefore, if one is aware of these issues, and continues to
perform critical evaluation or teach critical values as ‘correct’ or more valid than others, then they are doing so
in bad-faith.
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evaluative act—although it would occur in bad faith without such justification, could never in
fact begin.
In this sense a discipline of literary criticism is similar to a government in power.
Where a government may be able to make laws of ethical or moral nature due to its position
of political authority, a literary discipline influences aesthetic or literary moral standards
(values) through an established, economic, (if not necessarily justifiable or agreeable)
position of artistic governance, empowerment, and council. The bones of theoretical
contention in this thesis then become evident in the possible responses to such as a question
as: is all writing literature? If it were to be claimed, ‘no’, then equally such a claim must
entail that some writing is literature while other writing, for whatever given reason, is not.
But then what is it that constitutes literature? What are those qualities or characteristics that
make it so? In discussing the ‘function of criticism’ the Leavis-Bateson debate is impassed by
the very same question. Indeed, to contend the ‘function of criticism’ or ask ‘what is
literature?’ are inversions of the same inquiry in that the proposal of critical principles are
made, in the belief that they are most suited to the identification of a work’s success—the
assessment by which a work should be judged. There are, however, various reasons why the
study of literature as a discipline continues anyway with, what may appear at first, a
seemingly independent thrust from the ‘abstract’ issue of ‘value-impasse’ highlighted by this
analysis of Leavis-Bateson debate. Indeed, it would seem that Hirsch’s observation that
issues of validity are ‘seldom spoken of’ are most likely due the consequences such inquiry
may have for the discipline.
In Politics and Value in English Studies (1993) Josephine Guy and Ian Small suggest
that ‘if pursued rigorously’52 such enquiry may ‘actually place [the discipline] in a crisis more
genuine and more profound...one which would logically result in the dissolution of English
52 Josephine Guy, and Ian Small, 1993. Politics and Value in English Studies: A Discipline in Crisis?,
(Cambridge: CUP) p.7.
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departments and the disappearance of literary criticism as an academic activity’.53 While Guy
and Small suggest this to be a ‘controversial’54 admonition they nevertheless go on to state
that whether controversial or not – it is a real problem, which, even if unassailable does not
cease, in itself, to be a problem. For Paul de Man the type of criticism involved in evaluative
judgments is distinguished from the type here whereby the justification and principles of
criticism itself are evaluated and brought into question. De Man calls this type of criticism
‘Authentic criticism’55 and states that: ‘Whether authentic criticism is a liability or an asset to
literary studies as a whole remains an open question. One thing, however, is certain; namely
that literary studies cannot possibly refuse to take cognizance of its existence. It would be as
if historians refused to acknowledge the existence of wars because they threaten to interfere
with the serenity that is indispensible to an orderly pursuit of their discipline.’56
In a lucid sketch of the practical manifestation of unresolved theoretical disputes,
John Lennard introduces his The Poetry Handbook (1996) with the following remarks:
Some teachers make no distinction between practical criticism and critical theory, or
regard practical criticism as a critical theory, to be taught alongside psychoanalytical,
feminist, Marxist, and structuralist  theories; others seem to do very little except invite
discussion on ‘how it feels’ to read poem x. And as practical criticism (though not
always called that) remains a compulsory paper in most English Literature A-levels
and Scottish Highers, and most undergraduate English courses, this is an unwelcome
state of affairs...For students there are many consequences. Their teachers at school
and (if they go on to read English) at university may contradict one another, and too
rarely seem to put the problem of differing viewpoints and frameworks for analysis in
perspective; important aspects of the subject are often omitted in the confusion; and as
a result many students who are otherwise more than competent have little or no idea
of what they are being asked to do. The problem is how this may be remedied without
losing the richness and diversity of thought which, at its best, practical criticism can
foster, or, to put it another way, what are the basics? And how may they be taught?57
This extended excerpt is most interesting in that Lennard appears to have identified the crux
of the problem, wherein which, the discipline (represented here in ‘academic’ teaching)
53 ibid.
54 ibid., p.63.
55 De Man, Blindness and Insight, p.8.
56 ibid.
57 John Lennard, 1996. The Poetry Handbook: A Guide for Reading Poetry for Pleasure and Practical
Criticism, (Oxford: OUP) p.xiii.
CONCLUSION Condition, Implication, Propensity, and Bad-Faith.
150
seems unable to cater for the ‘diversity’ of view-points in order that it can make a craft of the
subtleties of a certain or particular method. But the inevitability of the impasse that I propose
in this work, is to be found in Lennard’s following statement in which he states—falling
directly into Hirsch’s ‘groundless’ void—that ‘the basics are an understanding of, and ability
to judge, the elements of a poet’s craft.’58 We may ask, why should the ‘poet’s craft’ be the
measure by which the poem should be judged or assessed This is not a criticism of Lennard’s
idea of what criticism should be per se, just as I make no attempt to criticise the particular
biases of Leavis’s or Bateson’s critical ideologies, my point rather, is that all such views and
ideologies in relation to literature (and what it should be), and criticism (and what it should
be) are void of a grounds by which they can be confirmed as the correct method. My
argument is that literature is not an exact science, what is good to one critic may be bad to
another. That Leavis and Bateson argue over the merits of writers. Literary traits and styles,
and furthermore, propose the way literature ‘should be read’ as ‘standards’, is I think,
dogmatic and exemplary of bad-faith.
To conclude I have collected my research into a theoretical model of four related
assertions, which can be seen as a means of both illustrating and accounting for the existence
of conflict present within in the twentieth century debate between F.R. Leavis and F.W.
Bateson.
1. Condition: Leavis and Bateson decide what literature is good or bad depending on its
conformity to their preconceived and implicit notions of what literary art should be.
This is the inherent and unassailable condition of all evaluative criticism.
2. Implication: As a result, neither Leavis nor Bateson can assert their views of what
literary criticism or approaches to literature should be, as more valid than any other
statement, even those of a directly contrary nature. This is the implication of the
58 ibid.
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condition, whereby subjective values and tastes are not conducive to the ontical or
nomothetic certitude of epistemological fields of knowledge and discipline.
3. Propensity: Despite the implication of not being able to confirm the validity of one
particular approach over another, the propensity remains to believe that some
literature is better than other literature, and thus that some methods of literary
approach are better than others.  To be aware that this belief is subjective does not in
itself terminate one’s belief in the validity of certain evaluative or methodological
claims.
4. Bad-Faith: Because a propensity exists to promote certain literary views and values,
the promotion of certain values does occur. They occur, however, in the knowledge
that however strongly the values are held they are not factual in the sense that they
can be proven or determined as correct. As such they occur in bad faith.
What cannot be claimed about this model is that the four stages represent neat or clear-cut
distinctions from each other. In fact, it is important to emphasise the contrary, that being, that
each stage emerges as a consequence of another, and therefore, the boundaries implied in a
‘four-part’ model are in fact less and less distinct the closer one observes. In this sense, the
most accurate understanding of the model will be that which observes it as a self-perpetuating
cycle of literary-critical impasse.
Figure 2. C.I.P.B.F. Model.
CONCLUSION Condition, Implication, Propensity, and Bad-Faith.
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Literary criticism, and more broadly the study of literature, consistently emerges as
antithetical to the means of being able to confirm absolute truth or confirmation of a work’s
artistic or aesthetic value. Though the quite catastrophically laconic Latin maxim: De
Gustibus non est Disputandum, provides the admonition that there is no point of disputing
matters of taste, few of us will be deniers to the inherency of qualitative (that is to say,
expressible) values within an artistic work—hence the existence of criticism.  But none of us,
including Leavis or Bateson, can stand independently from the subjective perspective of the
self upon the process of determining a judgment of virtue, value, and merit.
Condition
Implication
Propensity
Bad Faith
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